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Abstract
Arctic marine mammals and the communities that depend on them for subsistence are 
facing unprecedented rates o f environmental change. Comparative studies o f policy 
implementation are necessary in order to identify key mechanisms o f successful environmental 
governance under challenging conditions. This study compares two federal agencies responsible 
for the conservation o f  Arctic marine mammals. Drawing on multiple methods, I develop in­
depth case studies o f the policy implementation process for managing bowhead whale and polar 
bear subsistence hunting. I examine how and why agency approaches to conservation differ and 
assess policy effectiveness.
The analysis focuses on three aspects o f institutional performance as drivers o f policy 
outcomes: historical events, organizational culture, and structural relationships with stakeholders. 
The study begins by tracing the development o f marine mammal management in Alaska through 
time. I find that definitions o f subsistence developed under previous eras continue to shape 
debates over wildlife management in Alaska, confounding ecologically relevant policy reform. I 
next examine the roles o f agency culture, policy history, and relationships with stakeholders in 
influencing how agencies implement contemporary harvest assessment programs. Findings 
suggest that the internal orientation o f  the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service makes it more likely to 
retain control over management programs than the more externally oriented National Marine 
Fisheries Service. Furthermore, these policy approaches affect the development o f social norms at 
the local level. Through a social network analysis, I demonstrate that the extent to which policy 
programs are integrated into the existing social networks o f a village affects policy success. 
Hunter participation in and support for policies is stronger when there are local centers o f 
coordination and meaningful policy deliberation.
Finally, I assess existing policies regarding both species to examine whether or not 
contemporary policy approaches address key drivers o f system change and provide effective 
feedback channels. Findings demonstrate that both agencies have focused on regulating harvests;
I argue that in order to foster resilience o f the system into the future, policy actors must re­
configure management approaches and policies towards the protection o f functional seascapes. I 
propose two strategies in order to govern for recovery (polar bears) and resistance (bowhead 
whales).
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Global warming and the rapid loss o f summer sea ice have impacted Arctic communities 
and ecosystems at an unprecedented rate, requiring adaptive and novel institutional responses 
(Arctic Council 2005). Marine mammal management in the United States based on the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act and its implementing regulations recognize the connection between 
marine mammals and Alaska Native livelihoods and, as such, lend themselves to an important 
and novel analysis o f policy responses for coupled human and ecological systems (i.e., social- 
ecological systems). At the present time, marine mammal conservation in Alaska is governed by 
overlapping rules: local rules developed by Alaska Native cultures and communities, regional 
rules developed by co-management boards, federal rules stemming from Congress and federal 
agencies, and international treaties. Achieving a level o f compatibility amongst rules at all levels 
is important to successful outcomes (Berkes 2002; Anderies et al. 2004). However, two federal 
agencies, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, negotiate 
and administer co-management institutions differently for marine mammals under their separate 
jurisdiction, potentially confounding the ability o f all policy actors to move towards an ecosystem 
management paradigm.
This study focuses on public policy processes as well as outcomes through tracking three 
critical aspects o f institutional performance: the influence o f historical events on current policy 
concepts, organizational culture as a driver o f policy approaches, and the extent to which 
structural relationships with stakeholders determine policy dynamics. Marine mammal 
management partnerships between hunters and two federal agencies, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, are compared through case studies across 
scales o f social organization: the local village, regional co-management boards, and federal 
agency policies. I evaluate policy success through an examination o f the match, or “fit” (Young 
2002a) o f institutions to social-ecological system dynamics and diagnose potential mismatches of 
policy strategies and policy problems.
This study is innovative in that the Marine Mammal Protection Act has not before been 
evaluated in the public policy literature for its performance based on identifiable outcomes for its 
ecological and cultural goals. I use the goals developed in co-management contracts as well as 
goals modeled on endangered species’ recovery plans to identify policy tools that best fit policy
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problems. The key argument o f this dissertation is that the differences between the agencies in 
managing these two situations, and the larger regimes o f which they are a part, are emergent 
properties o f agency-community relations rooted in historical, structural, and cultural approaches 
to governing resources. They are emergent in that all three factors interact in a configural, versus 
additive, way (Ostrom 1999) to create agency approaches. Furthermore, these differences in 
approach can be traced from policy on the page to practices on the ground with consequences for 
governing for sustainability in a time o f rapid change. The extent to which an agency shares 
power, the institutional structures they operate through, and historical legacies o f prior policy 
regimes shape patterns o f governance and could make the difference between success and failure 
in mobilizing collective action for conserving resources.
Vignettes o f  cross-scale governance
On May 30, 2007, whaling captains from rural villages across Alaska traveled to the
assembly o f the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This year the meeting was held in 
downtown Anchorage, Alaska, and the main event from an American perspective was a 
discussion over the reauthorization o f aboriginal whaling quotas for ten Alaskan villages. 
Although the Commission, the whalers, and the U.S. government had held the same deliberations 
over the past thirty years o f working together, the outcome was not assured. Rumors had been 
swirling in whaling communities for months about a possible Japanese procedural move to block 
the renewal o f quotas. In the curious world o f international environmental politics and U.S.- 
Japanese relations, a Japanese delegate had even previously notified Alaska Senator Ted Stevens 
about their intentions. Unlike the international crisis that threatened to shut down aboriginal 
whaling in the 1970s due to conservation concerns, in 2007 the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas 
population of bowhead whales was agreed to be strong in numbers. Japan, however, needed some 
bargaining leverage against the Americans if  they were to move forward with their proposals for 
small-scale whaling off the coast o f Japan. In a March 8, 2007 interview with the Anchorage 
Daily News, National Marine Fisheries Service director and U.S. Commissioner to the IWC 
remarked, " What we've said is absolutely no deals here. We're not going to make a deal with you. 
We're not going to be blackmailed. We're not going to be held hostage.” (Associated Press 2007).
Knowing the political stakes, whaling captains and their wives dressed in their best 
Inupiaq anoraks and throughout the Commission meeting told the delegates what their vote meant 
for Alaska Native whalers. Surprisingly, the vote was relatively quick and the proposal passed
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with consensus, with Japan dropping its objection prior to the meeting. When the vote was 
known, the Commission room “erupted in applause,” (DeMarban 2007) whalers cheered, whalers 
and federal officials shook hands, and communities around Alaska expressed a sigh o f relief. 
Whalers and their federal partners have come a long way since the 1970s in understanding each 
other, working together towards similar aims, and increasing their knowledge of bowhead whales. 
Although many challenges to bowhead whale conservation remain, on May 30, 2007 whaling 
families were beaming.
Contrast the collective sigh o f  relief, from both federal agency staff and whalers at the 
IWC with a hearing held in Barrow by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. Community members 
were also at this meeting, but not as part o f a governing body. They were there as an audience. 
The Service employees sat at the front o f the room, with a table between them and the 
community. Microphones were placed on the table and people were encouraged to testify as to 
whether or not they possessed any additional information that could help the Service to determine 
whether polar bears should be listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act. The Service 
had held private meetings earlier in the day with the North Slope Borough, and its Department o f 
Wildlife Management. The Borough and the Service were not on the same page, even though no 
one could predict whether the Secretary o f the Department o f  the Interior would eventually list 
the bears. Some members o f the audience were involved with the Nanuuq Commission, the 
tribally authorized Alaska Native Organization, which was reluctantly supporting the listing. The 
mood o f the audience was one o f frustration at both the process and the potential outcome.
Both o f these vignettes represent what institutional scholar Elinor Ostrom (1990) calls 
“action situations” -  the combined places and processes in which decisions are made. When I first 
encountered different federal agencies managing similar categories o f species (e.g., marine 
mammals) in the same communities and within the same or similar legal frameworks, I was 
struck by the similarities between the two situations. Each situation revolves around the 
subsistence practices o f Alaska Native communities and the relationships they build with federal 
agencies tasked by international and national law with regulating the sustainable use o f  these 
resources. A deeper look, however, reveals significant ecological complexities and operational 
differences in each situation. The goal o f this dissertation is to examine the internal workings of 
each situation, document and compare the differences o f each, build a plausible explanation for
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these differences, and determine whether the differences matter for the sustainability o f both the 
resources and the communities living with them.
Co-management in Alaska
Over the past twenty years, co-management as a system o f governance has received a lot
o f attention from both academics and practitioners examining ways to reduce conflict between 
state-ordered rules around resource use and the way people in indigenous rural areas genuinely 
live their lives'. Use o f the term governance recognizes that various political actors, including 
those within and external to government bodies, are involving in decision-making, implementing, 
and sometimes, ignoring rules. In addition, for any particular resource in question, the state2 may 
not effectively be “in charge.” Despite the widespread recognition that agencies must work with 
subsistence communities to conserve resources, issues o f power, funding, and who sets the 
agenda continue to be important threads o f conflict in community-state relationships across 
Alaska. Many groups, even government agencies, have called for more or stronger co­
management arrangements. However, Alaskan co-management arrangements have significant 
vulnerabilities as compared to their Arctic Canadian counterparts. The Canadian Arctic co­
management boards (e.g., Nunavut Wildlife Management Board) were bom out o f  lands claims 
processes that defined aboriginal-state relations through prolonged political negotiation. As the 
Nunavut board was developed, most if  not all o f the players3 understood their legal obligations 
and opportunities.
In Alaska, the overlapping jurisdiction over wildlife management by the state, federal and 
tribal authorities is an ongoing political conflict, often mitigated through memoranda of 
understanding, rather than hard law. Alaska Natives living along the coast are exempt from the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act’s moratorium on the take of marine mammals as long as they are 
taking these animals for subsistence use, the animal is part o f a healthy population, and the use is 
not wasteful. Federal strategies for monitoring these conditions are a source of ongoing political 
contestation and negotiation with co-management boards, villages, hunters, and handicraft 
artisans.
1 Usher and Bankes (1986) use the terms de jure and de facto to illustrate these differences; Osherenko uses the term dualism (1988), and Pomeroy and Berkes discuss the two solitudes (1997).2 The term “state” is used in the sense of an ultimate sovereign, e.g., aboriginal-state relations. The term “State” is used in relation to proper nouns, e.g., State of Alaska.3 This was arguably not the case for many communities living far from Iqualuit, the new capitol.
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Not all marine mammals are regulated under these exemptions, however. The taking o f 
bowhead whales is regulated under international, federal, Alaska Native and local rules. Quotas 
are deliberated at the international level, designed and delivered through federal-Alaska Native 
processes and enforced at the local level. The differences in the bowhead whale and polar bear 
regimes -  the use o f hard quotas versus voluntary measures, histories o f state-community 
relations, and different levels of power sharing offer a unique opportunity to study public policy 
from a comparative standpoint. The relatively narrow area o f  law also offers an opportunity to 
observe the policy process from rule development to implementation, as well as policy 
adaptation. The fact that only Alaska Natives can take marine mammals for subsistence, there are 
only two agencies responsible for their management (the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service), and the regulated community is fairly small allows for a 
somewhat controlled policy experiment that can inform larger or more complex policy problems.
The key challenge o f marine mammal policy in Alaska is effective cross-scale 
governance, which is a fundamental element o f aboriginal-state relations, as well as the local 
implementation o f any federal or state policy. A significant amount o f contemporary public 
policy implementation takes place through networks o f  people; increasingly, the role o f federal 
agencies is to steer the network rather than directly implement the policy (Hufen and Ringeling 
1990; O ’Toole 1997). For wildlife management, however, agencies often maintain a more active 
role because o f their responsibilities towards public resources as well as their scientific expertise. 
In the United States, as in other northern states, tribal organizations have increasingly taken on 
the delivery o f public policy programs, e.g., early education, social services and resource 
management. The success o f policies like these requires effective cross-scale governance (Cash et 
al. 2006).
Many institutional theorists have examined the idea o f policy “fit” (Young 2002a) in 
terms o f rules matching biophysical properties o f the system in review. As a point o f departure, 
this dissertation focuses on the social fit o f rules to the place and people subjected to 
management. Importantly, the study focuses on the management o f common-pool resources, or 
those resources that are collectively “owned” yet subject to overuse if  access to them is not 
managed. The study makes four contributions to the study o f common-pool resource 
management:
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1. an in-depth longitudinal analysis o f marine mammal management in Alaska across four 
eras o f human-environmental relationships;
2. a contemporary comparative analysis o f cross-scale public administration o f two common 
pool resources;
3. two case studies evaluating resource management through social networks o f people and 
an analysis o f the relationship o f network structure to policy outcomes; and
4. a causal explanation o f how different agency cultures, histories and relationships with 
stakeholders shape policy approaches.
Outline o f  the chapters
The analysis unfolds over six chapters. Chapter two is a literature review of institutional
analysis, common property theory, and co-management as a strategy to enhance the social fit 
between local indigenous common pool resource management and bureaucratic processes of 
resource management.
Chapter three conceptualizes modem marine mammal co-management as an emergent4 
property o f federal -  Alaska Native relationships. Using institutional theory, I build narratives of 
marine mammal management eras by illuminating differences in how actors manage to solve the 
same problem in multiple eras. Time periods are treated as case studies; I describe dominant 
forces affecting human-marine mammal relations in each era. I subsequently illustrate how 
Alaska Native Nations, the Russian and American Empires, the State o f Alaska and aboriginal- 
state collaborative bodies have solved resource sustainability problems differently. In looking 
between time periods, when one regime becomes another, the research demonstrates that the 
combination o f sovereignty, dominant mode o f production (W olf 1984; Caulfield 1997), and 
value orientation shaped the adopted dominant mode o f governance over human uses o f marine 
mammals, resulting in relative measures o f sustainability. I then trace these outcomes and 
institutional trajectories through time to understand change and transformation o f governance.
Chapter four examines agency culture as a driver o f policy outcomes. I develop a 
framework to facilitate analysis through amalgamating 1) elements o f Easton’s (1965) theory o f 
the policy process and its relationship to performance; 2) Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (1990) which aids in organizing the identification o f policy actors,
4 The term “emergent” is meant to convey that co-management as a process is a function of repeated interactions across time; this is in comparison to seeing co-management as an endpoint.
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situations and outcomes; and 3) Young’s (2002a) concept of fit between policy strategies and the 
social and ecological aspects o f policy problems. I argue that organizational culture affects policy 
outcomes through the choice o f policy instruments and an agency’s willingness to share authority 
for decision-making within its discretion. Using the method o f policy narrative analysis, I begin 
with a discussion o f the interplay o f agency history, structure and culture as forces affecting 
policy decision-making. I next build cultural profiles for the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service in their roles as co-management partners. I then discuss the 
results o f a survey o f agency employees focused on organizational culture and relationships to 
stakeholders. The implications o f each cultural type for co-management are explored through an 
institutional analysis o f harvest assessment methodologies for bowhead whales and polar bears.
Chapter five examines how well institutions for marine mammal management fit the local 
social context o f resource users through a policy network analysis. I compare the self-organizing 
capacity o f hunters across marine mammal management regimes and relate differences in social 
network structures and authorities to differences in outcomes. I examine networks created 
between hunters and agencies to test propositions o f effectiveness stemming from literatures on 
policy networks, network governance and co-management in networks. I argue that the extent to 
which federal institutions use policy networks that mirror local self-organized networks increase 
their effectiveness and is a measure o f how well policies policy fit within communities as social 
systems.
Chapter six presents a comparative analysis o f the two marine mammal policy regimes 
using a complex systems approach with an applied focus on critically evaluating contributions of 
current policy to resilience. I build upon the Chapin et al. (2006a) social-ecological system 
framework which graphically illustrates how different types o f institutions act as feedback loops 
between social and ecological drivers at multiple spatial and temporal scales. I review pertinent 
literature and develop a heuristic for identifying policies that act as effective feedback channels. I 
next describe key drivers affecting the availability and usage o f  each animal as an ecosystem 
service. Using efficacy and feasibility as components o f overall policy effectiveness, I analyze the 
scale and effect o f institutions responsive to the main threats to bowhead whale and polar bear 
populations.
Chapter seven concludes the dissertation by reiterating the key themes o f the previous 
chapters and linking them to a concept o f resilience management. Managing for resilience places
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an emphasis on the ability o f actors within a system to adapt to ecological and social surprises. 
Because actors at all scales o f governance have different institutional, financial and social 
strengths to draw on, a resilience management approach is one that enhances the interconnections 
between actors in order to act in concert. In conclusion, I consider the challenges o f governing 
human activities in the Arctic marine environment and propose governance strategies for 
enhancing collective action.
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9Chapter 2: Theoretical grounding for the study: common-pool resources, institutions, and organizational culture
Introduction
This chapter reviews literatures relevant to a comparative analysis o f the National Marine 
Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service in their co-management strategies for 
marine mammals. A framework to facilitate analysis is developed by integrating concepts from 
complementary bodies o f scholarship: institutional analysis, common property theory, 
organizational culture theory, co-management practice and resilience thinking. This chapter 
surveys the aforementioned literature in order answer this dissertation’s key research questions: 
why do two federal agencies implementing the same wildlife management laws in Alaskan 
villages create different types o f relationships with locals, and do these differences matter for 
conservation outcomes? Furthermore, what role do institutions play in the resilience o f social- 
ecological systems in Northern Alaska?
P art one o f  th is chapter surveys key developm ents and  sem inal w orks in the study 
o f  institu tions and com m on pool resources, beginn ing  w ith  G arrett H ard in ’s “The 
T ragedy o f  the C om m ons” (H ardin  1968) and ending  w ith  a d iscussion o f  the 
Institu tional A nalysis and D evelopm ent fram ew ork  as a tool to  conceptualize the 
com ponents o f  the system  o f  interest. P art tw o explores literature relevan t to studies o f  
organizational culture, stem m ing from  sociology, o rganizational studies and 
anthropology. The in tegration  o f  concepts from  all fields helps to conceptualize the 
developm ent o f  agency approaches and their subsequent effect on resource m anagem ent 
outcom es. P art three exam ines w orks on social-ecological resilience, especially  as they 
relate to resource m anagem ent institu tions.
Defining the study area: institutions, organizations and the management o f common pool resources
As marine mammal management in Alaska has been, to greater or lesser extent, self­
regulated (without privatization or direct government control) by Alaska Native communities for 
generations, marine mammals can be considered resources held “in common.” Sustaining the 
marine commons is a challenge that is appreciated across the state, across cultures, and through
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collaboration with government agencies. The collaborations are institutions -  a convention 
explained below through this section tracking the history of political and sociological thought 
about how people work together to sustain resources.
Tragedy of the commons and the development of common-pool resource literatures
How do user groups sustainably harvest resources held in common? In her book
Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom notes that this issue is old as Western philosophy itself. 
She cites Aristotle’s Politics, Book II, ch.3 “ .. .what is common to the greatest number has the 
least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly o f  his own, hardly at all o f  the common 
interest,’'’ (1990: 2). In modem academic circles, one often cited work is H. Scott Gordon’s 1954 
paper, “The Economic Theory o f a Common-Property Resource: the Fishery.” Gordon (1954) 
modeled a fishery to argue that resources were exhaustible because they are owned in common, 
“yield no economic rent” and are exploited under conditions of “individualist competition” (p. 
124). Gordon was answering user groups and managers who were at the time arguing against 
regulating fisheries, in the belief that the resource could withstand unlimited fishing pressure. 
Gordon’s suggested framework became the basis for bioeconomic analyses in fisheries and was 
influential in shaping early academic opinion o f the commons. During the ensuing decade, 
discussions o f the commons became widespread in the United States along with growing 
awareness of environmental issues.
Academic interest in “common property resources” was heightened after the publication 
o f  Garrett Hardin’s 1968 provocative essay “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Essentially, Hardin 
(1968) posited that resource users on public lands lacked institutional mechanisms to keep each 
other from overexploiting the public resources. He argued for a system o f “mutual coercion, 
mutually agreed upon” (pg. 1247) by all parties to enforce a measure o f sustainability. He argued 
for “social arrangements,” systems o f rules, to manage exploitation o f the commons.
Many scholars refer to common property resources, but I will use the term common pool 
resources to distinguish between a system o f ownership which is analogous to the concept o f 
property, and a system o f stewardship or connection that indigenous communities have with a 
resource that may not be recognized as a property right by legal institutions or perhaps by the 
communities themselves. For example, in People ofTogiak v. United States5, the court found that 
the United States has a fiduciary responsibility to protect the harvest practices o f Alaskan
5 470 F. Supp. at 423,427, n.9 (D.D.C. 1979).
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Eskimos who hunt walrus but did not make a finding on the nature o f the “right” o f Alaskan 
Eskimos to take walrus. Susan Buck (1998) defines common pool resources as those subtractable 
resources managed under a property regime in which a legally defined user pool cannot be 
efficiently excluded from the resource domain. Subtractability refers to the nature of a resource; 
resources “subtracted” from a population through hunting or other mortality events are not 
available to other users. Common pool resources are neither private nor public goods. Common 
pool resource arrangements do not allow access open to all but to a finite and specified group of 
users who hold their rights in common (Runge 1981; Bromley and Cemea 1989; Bromley 1992).
While Hardin spent much o f his article arguing against overpopulation o f the planet, the 
topic o f “the commons” in general sparked an ongoing debate about “commons” and institutions 
designed for or emergent from the commons. In fact, the Comprehensive Bibliography o f the 
Commons housed at Indiana University contained 57,885 references on the commons by 2009 
(Indiana University 2009). A review o f this literature is obviously out o f the scope o f this paper. 
However, Dietz et al. (2002) helpfully synthesize the key findings on the commons since Hardin. 
The authors argue that Hardin made two assumptions that have not been supported by research to 
date: 1) that only government-controlled or private property arrangements can protect from 
overexploitation, and 2) that user groups have no mechanisms by which to regulate their own 
behavior. Widespread resource degradation has occurred under Hardin’s two favored solutions, 
and many small-scale resource users have developed institutional arrangements favoring 
sustainability.
In another response to Hardin and ongoing conceptions o f the “tragedy o f the commons” 
McCay and Acheson (1987) argue that “open access” resources are rarely open to all, and have 
been sustainably managed by small collectives (i.e., communities) without full government 
control or privatization. How this management happens in the absence o f government coercion or 
privatization (as Hardin proposed) is the focus of much o f the common property work o f the past 
twenty years (Ostrom et al. 2002). The systematic interactions o f resource users and governance 
providers over time create routinized expectations (rules) o f how transactions will be 
accomplished. These “rules o f the game” are known as institutions. Institutions are sets o f rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to recognized practices, assign roles to 
the participants o f these practices, and govern the interactions o f participants in these roles 
(Young 1994). Institutional arrangements (formal and informal rules o f  the game) affect user
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behavior and incentives to coordinate, cooperate and contribute in the formulation, 
implementation and enforcement o f management regimes (Young 1994). Organizations should be 
understood as groups o f individuals bound by some common purpose but are not institutions per 
se (North 1990). However, organizations operate within the framework - the rules and constraints 
- set by institutions. Examples include government departments or local whaling captains’ 
associations that administer sets o f formal and informal “rules o f the game.”
The development of institutional theory
Over the past two decades, the study o f institutions has gained popularity among the
social sciences. The study o f how institutions shape behavior is labeled “new institutionalism.” 
Sociologists Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (1991) argue this development is a reaction 
against behavioralists -  scholars who interpret collective political and economic behavior as the 
aggregate consequence o f individual (rational) choice. Ostrom (1990) notes that new 
institutionalism, in contrast to “old” institutionalism, is pragmatic, empirical, and marked by 
emphasis on “rules in use.” Old institutionalism, she writes, left its analysis at the formal 
provisions o f contracts, constitutions, treaties, or other constitutive documents (Ostrom 1990).
The political actors in these situations were considered to be rational actors maximizing utility. 
New institutionalists look for the actual role that institutions play in peoples’ actions. Putnam 
(1993) reminds us that most new institutionalists agree on two major points: 1) institutions shape 
politics by structuring political behavior, and 2) institutions are shaped by history as previous 
choices influence rules created by subsequent generations. In trying to explain how individual 
actions create collective responses, Schelling (1978) defined institutions as the link between 
micromotives and macrobehavior.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) note that previous works neglected social context as well as 
the persistence o f social institutions. This neglect created a large gap in understanding as social 
theorists argue, “ .. .social, political and economic institutions have become larger, considerably 
more complex and resourceful, andprim a facie more important to collective life” (March and 
Olsen 1984: 734 as cited in DiMaggio and Powell 1991). DiMaggio and Powell also link “new” 
institutionalism to an older tradition o f political economy that focused on mechanisms through 
which social and economic action occurred. The authors note the current effort to meld the 
research foci o f these traditions with contemporary developments in theory and method is an
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attempt to . .provide fresh answers to old questions about how social choices are shaped,
mediated, and channeled by institutional arrangements’'’ (1991:2).
Dimaggio and Powell (1991) break down institutional analysis into several disciplines: 
economics, political science, and sociology. Within political science, the authors further delineate 
the streams of positive theory (focused on domestic political institutions) and regime theory 
(focused on international relations). DiMaggio and Powell interpret positive theory to be mostly 
concerned with how political structures or institutions (mostly related to domestic political bodies 
such as Congress) shape political outcomes. In contrast, regime theory probes the conditions 
under which international cooperation occurs, and examines how regimes promote cooperation or 
fail to. Under both o f these streams, DiMaggio and Powell discuss the limitations o f the rational 
choice theory and build a case for including sociological formations o f problems into institutional 
analysis. In their view, sociology and “organization theory” are uniquely situated to evaluate 
institutions as emergent rules ordering social action. Sociology especially focuses on shared 
cognitions (i.e., the mental process o f knowing) and how they work to shape social interactions so 
that the way one interacts is interpreted as the correct way to act.
DiMaggio and Powell stress that after a while, interactions become routinized and the 
way they are accomplished is often taken for granted, whether or not it accomplishes any 
particular goal or not. For those not sharing the same values as promoted by the institution, they 
may nevertheless acquiesce. The authors note:
...individuals do not choose freely  among institutions, customs, social norms, or 
legal procedures. One cannot decide to get a divorce in a new manner, or play  
chess by different rules, or opt out o f  paying taxes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:
9-10).
In the same way, Alaska Native co-managers may chair meetings consistent with Roberts Rules 
o f Order6 regardless o f the subject at hand or the influence o f other forms o f  indigenous decision­
making. Organizations are institutionalized to the extent that they persist regardless o f whether or 
not they fulfill their original intent. For instance,
DiMaggio and Powell write:
Studies o f  organizational and political change routinely point to findings that are 
hard to square with either rational-actor or functionalist
6 Roberts Rules of Order is a style manual for parliamentary debate.
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accounts ...Administrators and politicians champion programs that are 
established but not implemented; managers gather information assiduously, but 
fa il  to analyze it; experts are hired not fo r  advice but to signal legitimacy (1991:
3).
According to the authors, past theories overly reliant on “rational” actors have proven insufficient 
to explain many facets o f organizational life. Denzau and North (1994) note that institutional 
models reliant on rationality lack explanatory power especially when problems and solutions are 
characterized by uncertainty, as they are in most complex systems. In addition, terribly inefficient 
institutions persist despite efficient alternatives. Sociological explanations o f institutionalism 
have tended to focus on the development and persistence o f institutions and have not approached 
aspects of performance, per se, that interest environmental policy scholars. New institutionalists 
in political science, however, have in the last decade turned towards the task o f evaluating the 
performance o f institutions (Underdal and Young 2004).
Young (2002a) notes that institutions are both blamed for environmental problems like 
pollution (e.g., weak rules against pollution create incentives to pollute) and called upon to solve 
environmental problems. Thus, institutions can be both independent and dependent variables. An 
emphasis on institutions directs attention to a particular suite o f independent variables or driving 
forces in contrast to the study o f a specific kind o f environmental change, such as the depletion of 
fish stocks. A focus on institutional design may consider institutional variables such as: the 
degree to which enforcement is devolved to local users, the scope o f management, who are 
managers and how do they relate with the resource users? A focus on causality addresses to what 
extent is the state o f the system (e.g., whale populations, sex ratio o f animals, or availability of 
skin for skin sewers) attributable to the institution? A focus on performance evaluates why some 
institutional responses prove more equitable, efficient and/or sustainable.
Young tells us that institutions play more or less significant causal roles with regard to 
most environmental changes involving human action. However, institutions:
...seldom account fo r  all o f  the variance in these situations. In the typical case, 
they are one among a number o f  driving forces whose operation, both 
individually and in combination, generates relevant environmental changes 
(Young 2002a: 4).
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The institutional scholar is tasked with separating the signals associated with institutional drivers 
from those associated with other drivers and understanding how different drivers interact to 
account for observed outcomes.
Modern studies o f the commons and research frameworks
So how does one study institutions, especially those institutions created or evolved to coordinate 
collective behavior around common-pool resources (CPRs)? For the last twenty years, scholars at 
the Workshop on Political Theory at the University o f Indiana have been compiling cases o f CPR 
institutions to determine what factors or variables are most likely to result in sustainable harvests 
o f renewable resources. After the 1985 National Research Council panel on the study o f the 
commons, a research agenda emerged focused on unanswered questions. Research in the pursuant 
decades has changed the focus of commons work from a search for a correct overall theory of 
sustainable commons management to a search for understanding the conditions under which 
particular institutional forms serve user groups well in sustaining resources over long time 
periods.
A key development in this search was Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) “design principles” for 
effective CPR management. Ostrom and other colleagues found the following eight principles 
common to hundreds o f effective resource management institutions o f common-pool resources:
• The resource has clearly defined boundaries
• Costs to participants are proportionate to benefits
• Collective choice arrangements exist to make and modify the rules
• The institution provides for monitoring
• Graduated sanctions exist for breaking the rules
• Participants have access to conflict resolution
• Rights to organize and tenure rights are not contested
• Management organizations are nested within larger governance structures when the 
resource is interdependent with other systems.
While these eight principles are common to most long-standing CPRs, spirited debate exists about 
their effectiveness as institutional prescription. For instance, Agrawal (2002) finds that 
scholarship subsequent to the development o f the design principles has suffered from two types of
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problems -  many scholars have focused on the institutions themselves and not understood the role 
that context plays and affects the extent to which some institutions are more likely to be effective 
than others. The second problem Agrawal addresses is the lack of attention to testing which 
factors out o f all identified factors are most important. Young (2002b) reminds us that institutions 
are also the result o f bargaining, as actors work hard to advance their own causes during regime 
formation. McCay (2002) and Agrawal (2002) argue that institutions should be understood in 
context o f the broader social, political, and ecological systems in which they are embedded. In her 
study o f international resource regimes, Buck (1998) makes the point that history also shapes 
institutional responses. She traces the development and performance o f several international 
commons legal regimes and finds that the regimes are somewhat path-dependent, in that 
precipitating events structure the problem definition and ongoing conflicts (Buck 1998). Also 
uncommon are studies that connect the different variables in causal chains or propose plausible 
causal mechanisms. These last concerns about causality echo those o f scholars who developed the 
research program for the Institutional Dimensions o f Environmental Global Change (Young et al. 
1999) and will be discussed later in this chapter when I turn towards understanding institutional 
performance.
The task for this chapter is to build a framework to understand the institutions involved in 
marine mammal management in Alaska, a path to follow in order to map questions onto the 
institutional theory landscape. Elinor Ostrom is considered to be a leading authority on small- 
scale CPRs, and her group is credited with developing one o f the most ofiten-used frameworks 
employed in studying institutions, the Institutional Analysis and Development (LAD) framework 
(Ostrom et al. 1994). The elements described below form the framework o f  IAD analysis and will 
inform this work on marine mammal management. Once the components o f  the case studies are 
understood, I will turn to institutional aspects that McCay and Agrawal identify: context o f  the 
situation and conceptualizing causal mechanisms. Because o f the multi-scale character o f marine 
mammal management, two lenses are needed. The IAD lens is useful in order to examine 
institutional performance as it relates to the local, self-organized common-pool resource network. 
Young’s institutional diagnostics (2002a) will help me to understand the institution’s fit with 
context and international regimes.
Because they are (to lesser or greater extent) a decision and power-sharing agreement 
between governments and resource users with proprietary rights (Pinkerton 1989; Pinkerton
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2003), co-management agreements address three separate yet interrelated kinds o f institutional 
regimes. The first is the local CPR with self-organizing principles, the second is the modem state 
with its legal mandates, and the third kind o f regime is international. Maneuvering between the 
three levels and their different mental models, claims to legitimacy, and effectiveness, is a 
daunting challenge for the governing and the governed alike. In fact, evolving forms o f multi­
scale governance are becoming the norm, as more governments realize their enforcement 
limitations and the value of long-term local knowledge o f the system to sustainable management. 
Many communities have also contested conventional top-down management. Some have 
embraced joint knowledge creation through linking local and scientific knowledge systems, 
others have assembled their own teams of scientists to look out for local interests in defining 
research agendas, monitoring local resources and engaging in scientific debates. As complex 
resource management problems are rarely solved at any one scale alone, successful co­
management can provide the bridge that links critical actors together for collective action.
Key concepts in Institutional Analysis and Development
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework grows out o f new
institutionalism and the study o f institutions in political science. As a framework, IAD helps to 
organize diagnostic, analytical and prescriptive capabilities focusing on a resource management 
problem o f interest (Ostrom 2005). The development and use o f theories enable the analyst to 
specify which components o f a framework are relevant for certain kinds o f  questions and to make 
broad working assumptions about these elements (Ostrom 2005). As illustrated in figure 2.1, the 
action arena is shaped by attributes o f the world, attributes o f community, and the rules-in-use. 
Said another way, action arenas (for instance, marine mammal management) are dependent 
variables affected by the nature o f the community involved in the resource management action 
arena. The variable “attributes o f community” will form the key independent variable later in this 
paper as I discuss the scholarship o f organizational culture.
Ostrom (1999) writes that sociologists and anthropologists often use the attributes o f 
community variable to analyze the effects o f cultural values on structuring rules, incentives and 
sanctions. McCay (2002) cautions the institutional analyst to be critical about the concept of
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Figure 2.1 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (based on O strom  et 
al. 1994: 37).
“community.” McCay builds on definitions of community provided by Singleton and Taylor 
(1992) when she writes:
Community is measured by the presence, absence, or strength o f  shared beliefs 
and preferences; some stability in membership; some expectation offuture  
interactions; and direct and multiple kinds o f  relationships among members.
Mutual vulnerability refers to the extent to which members o f  the group can be 
affected by the contributions or withholdings o f  others; that is; the extent to 
which they are subject to peer pressure because they value the good opinion, 
friendship, or cooperation o f  others. Both attributes are essential conditions fo r  
the mutual monitoring and sanctioning that are widely acknowledged to be 
critical endogenous factors fo r  managing local common resources (McCay 2002:
385).
Community in this definition is not only a place where commons dilemmas are managed, but can 
also be found in created groups. Pretty (2003) reminds us that where social bonds and norms are 
high in formalized groups, people have the confidence to invest in collective activity toward 
sustainability. Even in situations where actors are coming from very different worldviews and
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ways o f  knowing, social bonds and norms can form the basis o f effective conservation practices. 
This is important, as Agrawal and Gibson (1999: 632) note, because . .even well-funded 
coercive conservation generally fails.”
Singleton and Taylor (1992) argue that community can bridge inequality and 
heterogeneity to the extent that members o f the community are mutually vulnerable (see also 
Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Singleton and Taylor (1992) theorize that the different types o f 
solutions that will result will depend on the degree of community: at one extreme are fully 
devolved, endogenous solutions that depend on high degrees o f community; at the other, 
solutions heavily dependent on state enforcement because of low degrees o f community, and 
governance hybrids such as co-management. Importantly for students o f co-management, the 
strength o f bonds and heterogeneity o f preferences may also depend on the distribution o f power 
and wealth within the group (McCay 2002). For instance, the transaction costs to collaboration in 
heterogeneous groups can be significant for members o f minority or otherwise marginalized 
actors such as indigenous hunters (Kofinas 1998).
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) make the point that heterogeneity may have a 
positive or negative affect on commons management depending on what the dependent variable 
is. The “Olsen effect,” named for the work o f Mancur Olsen posits that collective action can arise 
in an unequal situation. For instance, i f  a very wealthy landowner with many acres o f forests 
agrees to cooperate in a regional fire management scheme, he could single-handedly influence the 
success o f any institutional arrangement in controlling the spread o f  forest fires regardless o f 
whether or not his poorer neighbors do. Similarly in Alaska, villages who harvest the most whales 
will have a broader impact on the success o f the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission co­
management regime than those villages that rarely harvest whales.
However, in a comparative review o f large-n studies o f common pool resource 
institutions, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) found that heterogeneity most often has a 
negative affect on cooperation in commons. They analyzed six large-n studies for heterogeneity 
in the following factors: income, wealth, timing o f appropriation (e.g., upstream or downstream 
for irrigation), alternatives to resource, ethnic or social, and rule choice. For my study, inequality 
in power relations and wealth among co-management partners is assumed, since marine mammal 
co-management institutions are dependent upon federal partners for funding, research permits, 
and recognition as a legitimate policy venue. Unlike co-management agreements that arise from
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land claims or court settlements, marine mammal co-management institutions in Alaska are 
largely voluntary agreements based on memoranda o f understanding. However, federal actors 
could not likely sustain a common-pool resource (CPR) institution alone with only the threat o f 
force because they do not have enough resources (or sometimes knowledge o f behavioral ecology 
o f the species) to effectively monitor all users. The extent to which a government agency shares 
the power and burden o f sanctioning is an interesting aspect o f its organizational (agency) culture. 
The next section further explores concepts o f organizational culture.
Organizational culture and its effect on institutions
The development of the literature
The study o f organizational cultures is interdisciplinary. From anthropology to sociology
to management studies, authors have sought to discover elements o f culture in organizations, and 
examine how these qualities affect decision-making. Organizational sociologist Charles Perrow 
(1986) explains that the process o f organizing requires the coordination of employee behavior.
The coordination takes on the guise o f control strategies to greater or lesser extent depending on 
the distance between employee beliefs and the demand o f bosses as well as the importance o f the 
task to the organization. Perrow distinguishes three types o f control: (1) direct and obtrusive, such 
as orders, rules and surveillance; (2) structural and less obtrusive, such as division o f labor and 
organizational form; and (3) indirect and physically unobtrusive, such as the acculturation of 
employees to norms and actions considered appropriate (p. 129).
Max Weber was one o f the earliest scholars o f organizational culture in that he described 
a bureaucracy in terms of not only its structure, but also the norms o f “officialdom” that 
bureaucrats must strive for in order to maintain order. Weber argued that the most important norm 
was that officials be o f higher social status than the public so that they maintain a level o f 
authority associated with wealth, higher learning, and expertise. In addition, Weber discussed 
how bureaucracies reflect aspects o f the larger culture they are embedded in. Weber (1978) 
posited that officials should be devoted to impersonal and functional purposes. However, he 
wrote:
These purposes, o f  course, frequently gain an ideological halo from  cultural 
values, such as state, church, community, party or enterprise, which appear as 
surrogates fo r  a this-worldly or other-worldly personal master and which are 
embodied by a given group (p. 959).
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W eber described the ideal type o f bureaucracy as one based on formalized, compartmentalized 
offices with sharply defined labor rules, fixed jurisdictions, a clear chain o f command and rules o f 
professional conduct to ensure the consistent, objective application o f rules to the governed 
(Weber 1978).
W eber’s construction o f bureaucracy is highly rational. In fact, Weber wrote that 
bureaucracy is the “ .. .discharge o f business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for 
persons’” (p. 975). Weber envisioned bureaucratic government as a smooth operating machine, 
enabling democracy to flourish as social and economic differences were leveled to create equality 
“before the law” (p. 976). Weber assumed that the goals to which bureaucrats were to attend to 
were also rational; however, he did seem concerned that once a bureaucracy was established, it 
would be nearly impossible to dismantle it.
Anthropologists (Nader 1972) and organizational sociologists (Perrow 1986) question the 
rationality o f actual bureaucracies in practice and inspire others studying bureaucracy to conduct 
studies o f bureaucracies using ethnographic methods, to capture what agencies actually do and 
compare actions to what they say they do in policy documents or public statements. Martin 
(1992) argues that organizations are rarely homogenous in culture and argues for a three-face 
approach, recognizing that organizations can consist o f integrated parts, can be differentiated into 
various sub-cultures, and can be fragmented by ambiguity in goals and values. While much o f the 
organizational studies literature has focused on corporate cultures, Smircich (1983) gives an 
excellent overview o f organizational culture and administrative studies. She argues that analysts 
who see culture as systems o f shared symbols and meanings take their cue from anthropologists 
such as Irving Hallowell (1955) and Clifford Geertz (1973) who treated societies as systems of 
shared symbols and meanings. When applied to organizational analysis, an organization is 
conceived as a “pattern o f symbolic discourse” which must be deciphered by those seeking to join 
or understand the organization. Organizational psychologist Edgar Schein (1985) remains 
influential in studies o f organizational culture that focus on basic underlying assumptions and 
how patterns of those assumptions affect behavior o f the organization as a whole. Schein argues 
that culture is what a group learns over a period o f time as that group solves its problems o f 
survival in an external environment and its problems o f internal integration. According to Schein, 
attitudes, espoused values and behavior all stem from a group’s shared perceptions, language, and 
thought processes (Schein 1990).
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Mahler (1997) examines how organizational culture affects group learning and 
adaptation. She utilizes a theory o f organizational learning to examine several case studies in 
which institutions have been shaped by their culture. Mahler hypothesizes that the more 
ambiguous a problem is, the more important organizational culture is in shaping reaction to 
problems. Mahler supports her hypothesis with examples o f how culture (beliefs, norms, 
practices) forms organizations resistant to change as well as adaptive organizations. In the 
management o f marine mammals, population assessments come with a high degree o f uncertainty 
because o f  the difficulties associated with counting animals underwater or otherwise obscured 
from view. An agency’s philosophy towards uncertainty in population assessments affects the 
adoption o f rules regarding subsistence harvesting. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
addresses uncertainty in polar bear population assessments through the recommendation o f a 
precautionary approach to harvest levels. In contrast, in Canada, the Nunavut Wildlife 
Management Board has attempted to address uncertainty through risk assessment modeling in its 
quota allocation process for polar bear hunting (Taylor et al. 2006).
Peterson and Spencer (1991) and Rousseau (1990) discuss two schools o f  thought on 
organizational culture: as something an organization is, or something an organization has. In 
adopting the first school, Smircich (1983) describes culture as a root metaphor. In this view, 
organizations are particular forms o f human expression, but do not have concrete status, like a 
machine or organism. Researchers following this school would be interested in learning how 
social processes shape social meanings. Unlike corporate organizations, however, bureaucracies 
are required  to do certain things or achieve certain ends and do not often have the ability to 
change or shape their own understandings o f problems. At the same time, they do have room to 
shape their response to problems, within the prevailing legal framework. Sharing the perspective 
that culture is something an organization has is applicable to studies o f bureaucracies because 
unlike corporations or non-profits, they are expected to maintain a consistent system o f rules over 
time.
Organizational culture in resource management studies
Many studies o f organizational culture in the resource management literature use a
government agency’s reaction to external or internal processes in order to examine cultural 
understandings within the agency without empirically measuring cultural traits. Deal and 
Kennedy (1982) define culture as the social and normative glue that holds an organization
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together. Kennedy has followed Schein in analyzing how organizational culture affects 
socialization o f new recruits in the USFS (Kennedy 1986). Kennedy and Quigley (1998) further 
examined how USFS culture affects the agency’s ability to adapt to an adopted ecosystem 
management paradigm. McBeath (2004) presents the reaction o f the National Marine Fisheries 
Service to a series o f scientific, legal, and judicial pressures and uses these reactions to explain 
the agency’s cultural change towards Stellar Sea Lion management.
However, an agency is not destined to respond in a predictable manner across time. 
Bankes (2005) argues that legal hierarchies can be “flipped” so that an agency must integrate 
partners or issues that it previously considered within its discretion to address a particular way. 
For example, the Boldt decision in Washington State was a significant change to fisheries policy 
in that the court required Washington to include tribes with treaty rights in the decision-making 
process for fisheries allocation in addition to sharing in fifty percent o f the harvest. In Alaska, the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act7 (MMPA) was amended in 1994 to allow the agencies to partner 
with and fund Alaska Native organizations through cooperative agreements (Section 119). 
Though not as sweeping in its scope as the Boldt decision, institutions for essentially each Alaska 
marine mammal and its associated user groups were developed through Section 119 funding 
agreements and created new policy venues across the State through which the federal agencies 
and Alaska Native representatives now discuss marine mammal management.
Svyantek and DeShon (1993) liken organizational culture to the concept o f an attractor in 
chaos theory, in which the attractor represents a stable overall behavior pattern for the 
organization. Disturbances will occur to move the culture towards different states, but the 
organization will return to its attracted state over time. These authors conceptualize culture as 
having both a self-sustaining component and an adaptive component. Interventions are most 
effective in changing the adaptive component, and likely ineffective in changing the cultural 
component because the cognitive frames an organization has affects how the organization defines 
its role and purpose in its domain (Svyantek and DeShon 1993). This aspect has important 
implications for designing policy interventions. Stem et al. (2002) also propose paying attention 
to policy interventions that are targeted to particular variables like mediators -  those variables 
that are more adaptive to external influences. Policy interventions targeting organizational
7 Pub. L. No. 92-522, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361 et seq.
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recruitment and systems o f acculturation have shown moderate success in changing 
organizational culture (Kennedy and Quigley 1998).
Anthropology and organizational culture
Although the concept o f culture was borrowed from anthropology, anthropological
studies o f bureaucracy focus on the organization as a site o f the production o f meaning and 
strategies for control over subjects’ actions (Heyman 1995). Agencies’ mobilizations o f resources 
and policy fulfillment are biased to achieve (or fail to achieve) certain ends (Schattschneider 
1960) so anthropological studies o f bureaucracies focus on the gap between what agencies 
purport to do, and what they actually do. Organizational worldview fosters the subtle coherence 
o f decisions over a wide variety o f cases (Heyman 1995). Mahler (1997) argues that the more 
ambiguous a problem is, the more an organization’s culture will shape its response.
Anthropological constructions o f organizational culture remind us that “culture” can have 
dysfunctional and negative impacts on resource management. Alvesson (2002) argues that much 
scholarship in organizational studies is geared towards examining culture in terms of its 
instrumental or pragmatic value to corporate success. The idea that a firm can have a “good 
culture” relates to the “strong culture” hypothesis, characterized by norms beneficial to the 
company, customers, and society in general.
Alvesson (2002) argues:
It seems strange that the (major part o f  the) literature should generally disregard 
such values as bureaucratic- ‘meritocratic ’ hierarchy, unequal distribution o f  
privileges and rewards, a mixture o f  individualism and conformity, male 
domination, emphasis on money, economic growth, consumerism, advanced 
technology, exploitation o f  nature, and the equation o f  economic criteria with 
rationality (p. 42).
Alvesson further writes:
A bias towards the “positive ”functions o f  culture and its close relation to issues 
such as harmony, consensus, clarity and meaningfulness is also implicit in many 
[organizational] studies ...Symbols and cultural aspects are often seen as 
functional (or dysfunctional) fo r  the organization in terms o f  goal attainment, 
meeting the emotional-expressive needs o f  members, reducing tension in 
communication, and so on...Culture is understood as (usually or potentially)
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useful -  and those aspects o f  culture that are not easily or directly seen as useful 
remain out o f  sight, e.g. on gender and ethics (p. 44).
Alvesson recommends researchers avoid sweeping generalizations about culture as a whole and 
instead look at specific “cultural manifestations” and study their consequences, which may or 
may not lead to measurable successful outcomes. Within a resource management context, a 
cultural manifestation could be the type o f collaborative agreements an agency engages in, or its 
arguments in front o f an administrative law judge.
Cultural manifestations are akin to the idea o f emergent behaviors, actions arising from 
complex interactions between people in particular contexts. However, cultural manifestations are 
also physical things left behind -  agency logos, press releases, and letters, etc. Schein (1985) 
referred to these things as artifacts o f organizational culture, not the culture itself. Alvesson and 
other organizational theorists use these artifacts to infer values o f an organization. In marine 
mammal resource management, agency rules around meat utilization8 and “traditional” methods 
o f harvesting are agency cultural manifestations that sometimes conflict with indigenous 
perspectives on those same concepts.
Weeden (2002), writing from political science, argues that an anthropological 
conceptualization o f culture as “semiotic practices” adds value to political analyses and can be 
applied as a causal variable. Culture as semiotic practices refers to what language and symbols do 
(as opposed to Schein’s view o f language and symbols as artifacts o f deeper cultural beliefs), how 
they are inscribed in concrete actions and finally, how they operate to produce observable 
political effects. Weeden argues for the use o f semiotic practices as a lens because it offers a view 
o f political phenomena by focusing attention on how and why actors invest them with meaning.
In this way, Weeden draws on both anthropological understandings o f culture as shared 
meanings, and sociologists such as Ann Swidler (1986) who understands culture as a repertoire or 
“tool kit” that influences “strategies o f action” (p. 273).
I f  a bureaucracy is not purely a rational tool to objectively deliver policy, then, it must 
have an informal social, political dynamic by which policies are internally framed, debated, 
prioritized and advocated for before the policymakers engage with their constituents, bosses, and 
area o f responsibility. It is this social, political dynamic and the dominant mental models that
8 For instance, what kind and percentage of meat must be used in order to meet agency guidelines for avoiding “wasteful” take. For an in-depth treatment of this topic, see Robards and Joly (2007-2008).
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shape the range o f policy choices that I am conceptualizing as an agency “culture.” For instance, 
staff familiarity and perceptions o f  the usefulness o f traditional ecological knowledge will likely 
affect their support for including it in management decision-making.
My approach to organizational culture is consistent with the resource management 
studies cited above as well as Weeden and Alvesson’s approaches in that cultural manifestations 
are analyzed as causal variables with particular emphasis on how manifestations affect decision­
making. Cultural manifestations are both dependent and independent variables, as they are shaped 
by interacting forces o f history, structure and culture but also then affect subsequent decision­
making.
Organizational culture and institutional performance
In the organizational studies literature, facets o f culture have been qualitatively correlated
with performance characteristics such as efficiency, teamwork, the development o f shared 
definitions, internal or external focus, participatory nature, and persistence. Few studies have 
quantitatively linked aspects o f  organizational culture to indicators o f  performance. However, 
Petty et al. (1995) found that in one electrical utility company with multiple sub-organizations, 
corporate culture emphasizing teamwork was positively correlated with goal achievement. Given 
that the early organizational culture studies looked mostly at the instrumental rationality9 o f 
organizations, it is not surprising that many analyses o f government performance have dealt with 
power, resource availability and political influence since they are the tools a bureaucracy uses to 
implement its goals (Clarke and McCool 1996). The performance o f government agencies have 
also been measured against the hallmarks o f “good government” : efficiency, equity, and 
effectiveness. Recent studies have also looked at direct outcomes, such as the relationship of 
institutions to biophysical outcomes (e.g., number o f whales, air quality, and global air 
temperature).
I f  we consider organizational culture to be “the way things are done around here” (Deal 
and Kennedy 1982), we can increase the number o f studies addressing links between 
organizational culture and institutional performance. Provan and Milward (1995), in a landmark 
study o f health policy networks, correlated patient outcomes such as mental health services and
9 Instrumental rationality is generally perceived to be a specific form of rationality focusing on cost- effective means to achieve a certain end, whether or not that end is meaningful. In the case of federal bureaucracies, a focus on implementation of a blatantly flawed policy could be considered a case of instrumental rationality.
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patient quality o f life ratings with the way services were delivered through hierarchical or diffuse 
networks. Organizational culture has also been cited as a barrier to resource management 
strategies such as co-management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Natcher et al. 2005), collaboration 
(Laninga 2003), ecosystem management (Kennedy and Quigley 1998), and adaptive management 
(Jacobson et al. 2006). Causal explanations o f cultural impact have received less attention but 
have been addressed by institutional scholars using “social-practice models” o f collective action 
(Young 2002a: 29). In these models (contrasted with more utilitarian collective action models), 
institutions give rise to social practices that structure behavior. Analysts using social-practice 
models assume that organizations make decisions based on what they consider to be appropriate 
behavior, versus calculations o f utility (Young 2002a).
Analyses o f institutional performance
Many o f  the common-pool resources and action arenas investigated under the IAD
framework have been fairly simple, bounded, and small-scale. Performance in these cases is often 
fairly straightforward and focused on sustaining a particular resource -  timber, clams, etc. For 
marine systems, characterized by their open and literally fluid boundaries, one must ask what 
other analytical tools have been used to analyze institutional performance for larger, migratory or 
more complex resource or environmental problems? Young et al. (1999) argue for a research 
program examining causal mechanisms o f institutional performance. The authors outline several 
strategies including a focus on institutional drivers and their interaction with other drivers o f 
ecosystem change. The institutional driver I am interested in is an agency’s approach to policy­
making. In order to analyze institutional effectiveness, Young et al. develop a diagnostic 
approach to institutional analysis that calls for an effort to identify critical features o f specific 
problems followed by an effort to specify institutional arrangements best suited to deal with them. 
Institutional diagnostics, Young (2002a) argues, should address three sets o f factors critical to 
performance: fit, interplay, and scale.
“Fit” is a metric focused on how well institutional characteristics match the socio- 
ecological system characteristics they seek to address (Young et al. 1999). Rapid ecological 
change in the North makes fit a particularly important factor for addressing the conservation of 
ice-dependent species as the Northern seas become warmer. Command-and-control approaches 
will inevitably have less influence over fast system dynamics (e.g., chaotic fish populations) that 
are variable and/or uncertain than slower system dynamics that are fairly stable over time (e.g.,
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habitat structure). “Interplay” represents how institutions interact with other institutions, even 
unrelated ones, acting upon a problem or resource base. The effect o f any new institution could be 
synergistic or complicating attempts to address environmental issues. Young (2002a) notes that 
interplay between national policies relating to consumptive use o f federal lands and waters (e.g., 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act) and local common pool resource institutions (e.g., Alaska 
Eskimo Whaling Commission Management Plan) regarding subsistence uses are amongst the 
most contentious issues in the North (p. 88).
Finally, the “problem o f scale” focuses on the ability o f institutions to function 
effectively at different levels o f social and ecological organization (Young et al. 1999). Policy 
interventions based on analyses o f local-level processes may not work when applied to national 
problems, and vice versa because o f differing contexts, the heterogeneity o f interests involved, 
and difficulties in enforcement. For instance, a devolved enforcement system like the one 
employed by the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission might not work at the national level for 
commercial fisheries because o f the lack o f social pressures to conform amongst crews and the 
individual profit-oriented nature o f most commercial fisheries.
Feeny et al. (1990) offer multiple cases in which top-down changes have negatively 
affected resource sustainability, largely because new management laws often create open-access 
situations when they disrupt common property institutions. In contrast, Janssen et al. (2007) argue 
that preserving institutional diversity at local levels “ .. .maintains a rich set o f solutions o f social 
systems adapting to ecological context” (pg. 308). Berkes (1999) defines these institutions as a 
component o f local knowledge systems, especially in indigenous communities with a long history 
o f interacting with their environments. For some migratory fish species, national or international 
regulations limiting who and how one can harvest can benefit local fishers through reducing 
competition outside o f their social systems from foreign fleets. However, national or international 
laws relating to fisheries have tended to favor large, commercial users over subsistence or 
artisanal ones (Young 2002a). Berkes (2006) argues that systems are rarely situated at one scale, 
most likely affected by external processes or events at other scales so that all o f these connections 
must be considered in diagnosing institutional performance.
The performance I am interested in relates to an institution’s contributions toward 
resilience o f social-ecological systems (SES). Institutions shape how people and governments 
interact with the ecosystem. In order to sustain any particular ecosystem service, at the very least,
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institutions must prevent negative impacts from degrading the resource. In the most progressive 
SESs, institutions provide opportunities for learning and processing feedback to better understand 
system dynamics and enable responses to signals o f change in the ecosystem or social system. As 
far as the institutional diagnostics o f fit, interplay, and scale are predictive o f institutional 
dysfunction, they can be helpful in understanding why some institutions are better than others are 
in fostering links between social and ecological components o f an SES. The resilience o f  an SES 
lies upon the strength o f these links, as well as the SES’ ability to weather internal and external 
disturbances.
Social-ecological resilience in an institutional context
Resilience has been defined in two predominant ways in the ecological literature,
reflecting two different aspects o f stability: efficiency in maintaining a steady state and 
persistence in the face o f disturbance. Holling (1973) argues that the perspectives hold different 
consequences for ecological systems. Holling and others define the first aspect engineering 
resilience, and the second ecosystem resilience (Holling 1996; Holling and Meffe 1996). 
Engineering resilience is measured by resistance to disturbance and the speed o f return to the 
equilibrium. In contrast, ecosystem resilience is measured by the magnitude o f disturbance that 
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes 
that control behavior (Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Holling and Gunderson (2002) argue that sustainable relationships between people and 
nature require an emphasis on ecosystem resilience. The authors argue that concepts of 
engineering resilience have structured contemporary resource management practice. A shift to 
ecosystem resilience would change management and policy emphases from a micro command- 
and-control approach to one that sets overall conditions to allow adaptive strategies (Holling and 
Meffe 1996; Holling and Gunderson 2002).
Holling and Gunderson argue:
Exclusive emphasis on engineering resilience reinforces the dangerous myth that 
the variability o f  natural systems can be effectively controlled, that the 
consequences are predictable and that sustained maximum production is an 
attainable and sustainable goal (p. 28).
Gunderson, Holling and Light (1995) link this reliance to the “pathology” or common problem of 
resource management. Resource management is pathological to the extent that it employs
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strategies developed under the mental framework o f steady-state dynamics and is not attuned to 
or allowing o f natural variability o f  the problem at hand, relying on maintaining efficient control 
o f ecosystem properties (Holling and Meffe 1996). Walker et al. (2004) note that systems under 
stress that have lost resilience may transform into altered or undesirable states. An obvious 
example of such a transformation would be any SES in which a keystone species declines to the 
point at which the system no longer maintains ecological services important for people or their 
ecosystem. Polar bears and bowhead whales have been managed under policies designed with 
equilibrium as a policy goal. A central aim o f this dissertation is to investigate how well existing 
policies are working in an era o f fundamental change in ecosystem characteristics.
Resilience as a manaeement goal
Ecological surprises inevitably cause policy crises. In contrast, a management strategy
based on the resilience framework is based on a conscious choice to put extra weight on 
“outliers” on the assumption that ecosystems are more prone to such behavior than are engineered 
systems with limited attraction basins, such as commodity prices (Walker et al. 2002). W alker et 
al. argue:
The goal o f  resilience management is to prevent an SES from  moving into 
undesirable configurations. It depends on the system being able to cope with 
external shocks in the face  o f  irreducible uncertainty (2002:3).
Actors within an SES should aim to adopt policies that enhance a system’s ability to reorganize 
and move within an acceptable state (Folke et al. 2002; Walker et al. 2002) (e.g., policies that 
maintain essential habitat features such as open migration corridors or important fish nurseries). 
Folke et al. (2002) argue that management with a resilience lens focuses on slowly changing 
variables such as soils, biological legacies and landscape processes that maintain “ecological 
memory.” The authors note that resilience may be built through active management strategies that 
monitor, clarify, and redirect underlying, fundamental variables and thereby foster adaptive 
capacity.
The development o f indicators for empirical resilience studies has lagged behind the 
theoretical work o f conceptualizing social-ecological system dynamics (Carpenter et al. 2001). 
Recent work has focused on evaluating the ability o f management structures to maintain the 
production and delivery o f ecosystem services (Walker and Meyers 2004). Walker et al. (2006)
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report on heuristics gleaned from case studies over the years. O f these propositions, the following 
bear upon resilience management:
• The “rule o f hand.” Critical changes in social-ecological systems are determined by a 
small set o f variables
• Adaptability is primarily determined by (1) the absolute and relative amounts of all forms 
o f capital: social, human, natural, manufactured and financial and (2) systems of 
governance
• Mental models drive change in social-ecological systems and adaptability is enhanced 
through partially overlapping mental models o f system structure and function
• Learning is a key component o f adaptability and is enhanced by careful experimentation 
in the form of active adaptive management
• Efforts to deliberately enhance adaptability can unintentionally lead to loss o f resilience.
Anderies et al. (2004) writing from a social science perspective, suggest that instead o f 
asking how we can better manage resources, we should ask ourselves what makes social- 
ecological systems (SESs) robust? Carpenter et al. (2001) note that ecosystem resilience can be 
difficult to apply to systems in which some components are consciously designed (such as 
management structures), which prescribe certain actions and deny others. Anderies et al. (2004) 
note that most resource management regimes consist o f both engineered or designed elements 
(e.g., laws, agencies) and natural systems, so they propose a measure o f “robustness” to indicate 
resource management strategies which maintain favored ecological services, such as fisheries, 
timber, or water quality.
Anderies et al. emphasize robustness because it emphasizes the cost-benefit trade-offs 
associated with systems designed to cope with uncertainty. One example o f an approach to 
enhance the robustness o f an SES would be to focus on governance that enhances the resilience o f 
an ecosystem configuration that provides valued ecosystem services.
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Governance is concerned with setting directions and coordinating policy rather than 
directly tackling management prescriptions. Milward and Provan (2000b) define the term 
governance as:
...concerned with creating the conditions fo r  ordered rule and collective action, 
often including agents in the private and nonprofit sectors, as well as within the 
public sector (p. 239).
Stoker (1998) argues that the essence o f governance, as opposed to forms o f government such as 
the legislative, executive and judiciary branches lies in its focus on governing mechanisms (e.g., 
grants, contracts, and memoranda o f understanding) that do not rest solely on the authority and 
sanctions o f government. Properties o f governance exist in self-organizing systems as well as 
highly bureaucratic ones. Anderies et al. (2004) imagine SESs and engineered systems at opposite 
ends o f a continuum o f systems with both designed and self-organizing subcomponents and levels 
o f uncertainty. In the former, the majority o f components are self-organizing, very few are 
designed and uncertainty is high. In the latter, the majority o f sub-systems are designed, very few 
o f those self-organize, and uncertainty is low (figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 Continuum of systems Figure based on Anderies et al. (2004).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Anderies et al. (2004) focus on SESs that incorporate the resource, its governance system 
and associated governmental infrastructure as a coupled system. Particularly critical is the link 
between resource users and the public infrastructure (e.g., physical and social capital) providers. 
For instance, resource users who are actively involved in making rules are more likely to consider 
them legitimate as compared to those excluded from the process. This link can be strained by the 
introduction o f an externally designed rule-set such as a federal law imposed on a local common- 
pool resource regime. Dietz et al. (2003) stress the importance o f adaptive governance for SESs. 
Such governance incorporates actors across multiple levels of social organization, builds 
opportunity for institutional learning, and capitalizes on the self-organizing capacity o f social 
networks. In times o f crisis, a resilient SES that is governed adaptively may be able to transform 
itself into a more or equally desirable state (Folke et al. 2005).
Many resilience thinkers, such as Folke (2006), focus on those governance systems 
operating outside or tangential to formal government institutions, for instance emergent (i.e., o f 
an ad-hoc nature or adhocratic) networks with little or no formal powers. To the extent to which 
co-management between Alaska Natives and federal agencies is built around deliberately 
constructed institutional responses and strategies (e.g., the Marine Mammal Protection Act or the 
Endangered Species Act), the governance infrastructure is more fixed than that o f a problem- 
focused network as in the Kristianstad wetlands in Sweden10 (Olsson et al. 2004a).
Folke et al. (1998a) focus on the match between ecological processes and management 
strategies. The tightly linked co-evolutionary nature o f successful, small SESs make a strong case 
for including local knowledge (i.e., traditional ecological knowledge) into decision-making and 
the design o f new institutions. Folke et al. (1998b) credit local knowledge as a key ingredient in 
the long-term management o f resources. The next section touches on the unique potential o f  co­
management to accommodate local knowledge in larger-scale management systems.
While appreciating the difference in root metaphors for robustness (engineering) and 
resilience (ecology), I use the resilience concept because co-management o f marine mammals in 
Alaska has both fixed and emergent governance characteristics and operates under high levels of 
uncertainty. Fixed characteristics include co-management boards with bylaws, constituents,
10 However, the complexity of managing for competing uses of the outer continental shelf using a multitude of controlling institutions has required problem-focused network activity and is becoming less and less like a conventional management process.
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agency partners and linkages such as financial contracts. At the same time, policy networks 
connect co-managers to local governments, tribal councils, and advocacy groups playing some 
role in governance. A tension between formal institutions involved in co-management and 
informal strategies for resource management will undoubtedly increase as co-managers find 
themselves governing under new conditions with few formal institutional responses available at 
the ready.
Co-management as a strategy for resilience
Marine systems have been recognized as complex systems (Wilson et al. 1994; Walters
1997; Jen toft 2000); thus, management is subject to significant levels o f uncertainty. Recent 
institutional theorists have recommended collaborative, adaptive approaches to resource 
management in order to build flexible management systems responsive to the task o f ecosystem 
management under limited information, multiple drivers o f  system change, and limited budgets 
(Wilson et al. 1994; Ostrom 1998; Berkes 2002; Young 2002b).
Warming trends in the Arctic have the potential to significantly change animal 
distribution and essential habitat features that may not be detectable using traditional resource 
management techniques such as yearly population counts. Therefore, adaptive, cross-scale 
resource management strategies are becoming more prevalent in order to link different forms of 
knowledge to understand and address change. Co-management, the sharing o f power for resource 
decision-making between the state and resource users (Pinkerton 1989; Berkes et al. 1991; 
Singleton 1998), has emerged as one promising technique to build resource management 
institutions that are equitable, efficient, and concerned with sustainability. Co-management 
strategies are also unique in their potential to link long-term local knowledge with scientific 
research based high-tech statistical models from government agencies. Both forms o f knowledge 
together may provide a more accurate (close to the true state) and precise (repeatable under 
testing) understanding o f the system than either alone.
Designing institutions that foster systemic resilience is a major project o f the Resilience 
Alliance, a group o f theorists investigating the ability o f social and ecological systems to retain 
key functions in the face o f change. Capacity for learning, adaptation, and self-organization are 
key concepts o f resilience (Resilience Alliance 2005). Folke et al. (2003) assert that effective co­
management fosters regional resilience and builds capacity for positive adaptation to ecosystem 
change. Berkes’ (1989) analysis o f co-management institutional success is particularly relevant to
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resilience theory. The author describes a well-functioning co-management regime as one that is 
efficient, stable, resilient to surprise and shock, and equitable.
Olsson et al. (2004b) further argue that because of their multi-scaled approach, co­
management institutions are uniquely situated to cope with surprise at local scales while 
maintaining key components o f social-ecological systems as a whole. A key difference between 
co-management and other forms of resource management is its ability to bring information from 
multiple scales to bear on decision-making (Berkes 2002). Another unique quality is the potential 
o f co-management actors to match rules-in-use to rules-in-force through enhanced local 
management authority (Anderies et al. 2004). Olsson et al. (2004b) report that sustained, cross­
scale interactions inherent in co-management strengthen a network o f actors for collective action. 
However, co-management is not necessarily adaptive by design.
Co-management institutions can be unresponsive and maladaptive just as easily as 
conventional management institutions. Recent resilience thinkers have stressed the importance of 
adaptation in management. Folke et al. (2002) define adaptive co-management as a process “ .. .by 
which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, 
ongoing, self-organized process of learning by doing” (p. 20).
Co-management is not, however, a panacea (Caulfield 1997). Armitage (2006) reminds 
us that a model o f adaptive governance or participatory co-management embodies a number of 
prescribed values: participation and collaboration, accountability, learning, trust, etc. However, 
Armitage writes:
...in most social-ecological systems, pre-existing or entrenched political and  
economic interests both driving and reacting to change suggest that calls fo r  
adaptive, multi-level governance may be overly optimistic. Issues o f  power and  
control, the social construction o f  problems, knowledge valuation and the 
positioning o f  different groups suggest that our understanding o f  what makes 
multi-level governance a possibility in specific places and at specific times may 
need to be carefully deconstructed (Armitage 2006:18) .
Similar concerns have been raised by Kofinas (2005) and Nadasdy (2002). “Complete” co­
management, as defined by Pinkerton (2003) refers to institutions that recognize proprietary 
rights o f resource users and maintain equity in all facets o f resource management, including 
research, allocation and distribution decisions. One task of this dissertation is to examine how co-
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management succeeds in conserving resources and cultural uses o f those resources within 
relatively weak legal authorities as compared to their Arctic Canadian counterparts.
Conclusion
This study builds upon the literatures described above, examining co-management as a 
conservation strategy at three scales: the local, the agency-hunter interface, and federal policy 
venues. Ultimately, I seek to understand social processes o f policy formation, how institutions 
develop through time, and how well policy choices fit into the social environments they are 
designed to affect. The scholarship introduced in this literature review helps to frame the 
mechanics involved in creating good rules for environmental stewardship. Alternatively, the 
study could have been informed by theories o f the bureaucratic process or an anthropological 
study o f one o f the federal agencies. However, neither approach would have satisfactorily 
explained the interactions across scales, from federal to indigenous communities, through 
networks o f people and rooted in particular sets o f relationships. The cross-scale nature o f marine 
mammal management in Alaska, and differential levels o f access to information, meetings, and 
key individuals required an interdisciplinary approach in order to capture and analyze relevant 
events. For instance, if  I had conducted a place-based anthropological study o f the Alaska Eskimo 
Whaling Commission, I would have had to travel to field sites in Barrow; Houston, Texas (the 
Executive Director’s place o f work in 2007); and Santiago, Chile (the site o f a meeting o f the 
International Whaling Commission). A comparative study of the two agencies focused on a place- 
based study o f Barrow, Alaska would have been biased towards an analysis o f the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service as the National Marine Fisheries Service conducted the majority o f its work 
through its networks instead o f  through site visits. A comparative analysis of co-management 
deliberation, practice and policy consequences across scales is thus aided by a triangulation of 
findings across methods and sources o f evidence. Each chosen method and sources o f evidence 
are presented in individual chapters.
A contemporary account o f institutional performance is by definition bounded in a 
particular time and through particular sets o f interactions. However, the performance of 
contemporary wildlife management policy is affected by prior relationships between communities 
and 1) resources, 2) other power structures at multiple spatial scales (e.g., colonial, federal, 
treaty, international), and 3) policy actors and specific institutions that act to shape behavior.
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Chapter 3. Marine mammals management in Alaska: a historical account of institutional origins and trajectories
Tutisic ’s house, like all the other log cabins there, reminded me strongly o f  some peculiar 
Russian ones I  had seen much farther south. This was interesting. Hadn ’t they copied them from  
the Russians? I  inquired, eagerly. Nobody knew. All they were sure o f  was that when people lived 
in the timber they always built houses like this. -  Charles D. Brower, Fifty Years Below Zero 
(1997: 39)
Introduction
In the Institutional Analysis and Development framework presented in chapter two, 
Ostrom (1990) conceptualizes policy venues as dependent variables, arising from interactions 
between combinations o f rules, attributes o f the world, and communities o f individuals. She also 
notes that these elements are combined in a configural, rather than additive manner in that 
outcomes are not determined by the presence or absence o f factors but rather by the nature o f 
their interactions (1990). For instance, similar policy venues at different points o f time may differ 
significantly. Alternatively, important legacies o f past policy venues may persist and confound 
modem policy reform. For these reasons, it is important to trace the history o f human use o f 
marine mammals, including nascent regulatory systems in order to understand their influence on 
the institutional structures and opportunities available to contemporary resource managers.
Co-management and cross-scale resource governance have been presented as institutional 
innovations, ways for governments and resource users to move from conflict to collaboration in 
addition to drawing on many levels o f capacities and types o f knowledge o f a system. Scholars 
taking a historical view may argue that in indigenous communities with hundreds or thousands or 
years o f land and sea occupancy and resource use, that co-management is only the latest o f many 
attempts to re-order social relationships between a dominant sovereign state and the people living 
in that state. In Alaska, history and the peopling o f the territory is bound together with the 
exploitation o f marine mammals, arguable sustainable in some cases, but not in others. The 
United States purchased Russian interests in Alaska during the height o f the fur and whaling 
trade; marine mammal management played a unique role in the negotiation and development o f 
American sovereignty in the region (Nakajima 2007).
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Most wildlife management regimes in Alaska follow the familiar pattern o f colonial 
expansion o f authority as in the rest o f the country, albeit with a unique focus on subsistence. 
Marine mammals have been treated differently since the federal government preempted state law 
and established the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to protect marine mammals as a 
class o f wildlife. Alaska Natives were exempted from the MMPA general moratorium on take 
(§ 101(b)), as long as the species taken are not depleted and uses are not wasteful. In 1994, 
Congress amended the MMPA to, among other things, direct the Secretaries o f Interior and 
Commerce, who share responsibility for marine mammal management, to enter into co­
management agreements with Alaska Native Organizations (§119). Hailed as a break with the 
past history o f top-down management, co-management has created some gains but has not proven 
to be a panacea'1 for agencies and communities working together.
A growing number o f authors have explored marine mammal co-management institutions 
in Alaska (Freeman 1989; Huntington 1989; Langdon 1989; Huntington 1992; Adams et al. 1993; 
Hensel and Morrow 1998; Chambers 1999; Brower et al. 2002; Femandez-Gimenez et al. 2006; 
Meek et al. 2008; M etcalf and Robards 2008; Robards 2008). Many o f these accounts focus on 
contemporary dilemmas while placing the conflicts or cooperative success in context. However, 
none has taken a comprehensive look at institution-building for marine mammal management as 
an historical process o f political development. Key questions explored in this analysis include: 
how might concepts from the 19th century regarding subsistence shape current policy choices, and 
what can hundreds o f years o f experimentation with marine mammal population tell us about 
sustainability and environmental change?
Following historical sociologist Jeffrey Haydu (1998) and policy researchers Howlett and 
Rayner (2006), this chapter establishes an historical narrative o f marine mammal policy change. 
Through a comparison o f four eras, I explore how evolving institutions and three particular forces 
have shaped marine mammal governance. These forces are sovereignty, dominant mode o f 
production and value orientation. Despite very different social, political and economic contexts, 
actors in each era tried to solve persistent problems. The central problem I examine in this chapter 
is the classic dilemma for the management o f subtractable living marine resources: how do actors 
organize the exploitation of a resource without exhausting it? Common property theorists have
111 thank Richard Caulfield for this language.
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illustrated that no one form o f governance (government control, privatization, or commons) is 
superior for all resources (Dietz et al. 2003). I begin this chapter with a literature review of 
methods for historical policy analysis. Using time periods as case studies, I next describe some o f 
the dominant forces affecting human-marine mammal relations, and illustrate how the Russian 
and American Empires, the new State o f Alaska, and Alaska Native Nations have solved the 
problem differently. In looking between time periods, when one regime becomes another, my 
research demonstrates that the combination o f sovereignty, dominant mode o f production (after 
W olf 1982; Caulfield 1997), and value orientation shaped the adopted dominant mode of 
governance over human uses o f  marine mammals, resulting in relative measures o f sustainability. 
I then trace these outcomes and institutional trajectories through subsequent time periods to 
understand change and transformation o f governance.
Historical institutionalism as a method for policy analysis
Building on the work o f Aminzade (1992), Griffin (1992) and Stinchcombe (1968),
Howlett and Rayner (2006) explain that for a time, policy scholars operated under the implicit 
assumption that policy-making followed an ahistorical “general linear reality” (Abbott, 1988) in 
which the cause and success o f policies could be measured empirically and, “...a  general set o f  
social forces drove policy-making, with individual deviations from  deterministic outcomes 
existing as ‘noise ’ or random error” (Howlett and Rayner 2006:1).
Theories of causation
Thelen (2003) explains that new institutionalists in multiple fields have approached the
concept of institutional origins and change as the product o f three main forces: functional - 
utilitarian design, power - distributional rewards, and cultural - social scripts. The functionalist - 
utilitarian view is that institutions are the conscious design of groups looking to achieve a 
collective action goal. According to this calculation, institutions are built for particular purposes 
and changes in the underlying goal should lead to a change in institutional form. A critique o f this 
approach is laid out by Knight (1999) who finds that many historians point to institutional 
outcomes as the reason for the institutional design without examining rival causes.
A second causal hypothesis, the power - distributional argument, is built around ideas of 
political conflict and bargaining; institutions reflect asymmetries o f power as those with more 
power design institutions favorable to themselves and potentially unfavorable to others. Thus,
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institutional change reflects a change in power relations or a change in preferences o f those in 
power. Thelen (2003) again points out how knowledge o f institutional origins can muddy the 
analytical power o f the argument in that institutions ultimately favorable to those not in power 
may arise from very different constituencies. For instance, Thelen notes that the U.S. Supreme 
Court now often protects the rights o f women and minority groups even though it was developed 
in a very different context in which neither had civil rights.
New institutionalists working in sociology have developed a third hypothesis, describing 
institutions as embodying collectively defined cultural visions o f  how the world works. Scott and 
Meyer (1994) discuss how shared understandings create scripts which come to define the,
“ ... ’right ’ i f  not the only way to do things” (p. 234). In this vein, cultural scripts define what is 
moral, legitimate, efficient, or right; a change in the larger script will usher in a change in the 
institutions o f the time as well. Powell (1991) notes, however, that it often takes a change in 
power dynamics in order to open a space in which the script can be rewritten.
Policy narratives
Critics o f the constant cause model in most social sciences increasingly argue that effects 
are determined by contingencies such as structural factors (e.g., historical timing) and the order in 
which relevant events happen, as well as actions by individuals (Howlett and Rayner 2006; 
Pierson 2000a; Abbott 1990). A turn towards narrative analysis in the social sciences has 
challenged the sufficiency of deductive, variable-based research. For instance, historical 
institutionalists trace institutional change as a legacy o f concrete historical processes. In this 
view, institutions are not only binding forces but emerge from and interact with broader social 
and political contexts in which they are embedded (Thelen 1999).
Alternatives to mechanistic models include narrative and two narrative hybrid models: 
path dependency and process sequencing. Narrative analysis has been defined by historical 
sociologists as the organization o f contemporaneous actions and happenings in a chronological, 
sequential order “ .. .that gives meaning to and explains each o f  its elements and is, at the same 
time, constituted by them” (Griffin 1992: 1097). Tilly explains that historical analyses assume that 
the ..time and place in which a structure or process appears make a difference to its character, 
that the sequence in which similar events occur has a substantial impact on their outcomes”
(Tilly 1985: 79). Gotham and Staples (1996) argue that the use o f narrative as an analytical tool
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does three things: it forces the analyst to examine causation through the use o f factual and 
counterfactual questions about historical events and sequences; second, narratives can clarify 
antecedents to causal chains; and third, narrativists increasingly use temporal connections to 
allow the analysis o f sequences of events that take agency, large-scale change, and long-term 
processes seriously to show how periodicity12 affects the trajectory o f events (Aminzade 1992; 
Gotham and Staples 1996).
Critiques to narrative analysis
However, narratives alone cannot explain policy outcomes. The use o f narrative analysis
has been critiqued as being too idiosyncratic to be useful in comparative analysis (Abbott 1990, 
Haydu 1998) and often ignores how sequences o f various events and processes can explain 
outcomes, stasis or change in policy areas (Howlett and Rayner 2006). Narrativists, however, 
defend the method as being more empirically accurate (through inductive reasoning) than 
stochastic variable-driven analysis. The theory o f path dependency solves some problems with 
narrative analysis in that it provides an explicit mechanism to explain how sequential events 
create outcomes. The theory o f path dependency comes from the economic literature as an 
explanation for why inferior technologies persist in the marketplace despite shortcomings (Arthur 
1988). In the path dependent model, a sub-optimal technology randomly (in the sense that it is not 
inevitable) becomes an industry standard based on its persistence through “locking-in” market 
shares and reinforcing mechanisms rather than utility (Arthur 1988). Haydu (1998) critiques this 
conception o f path dependency because o f its focus on deterministic processes, noting that 
Douglas North (1990) describes the decisions made at each turning point as largely exogenous 
rather than embedded in larger historical processes.
In political and other social sciences, Howlett and Rayner (2006) note, path dependency 
applies to the description o f significant historical processes which observers have found to be,
“highly contingent in origin and inertial in nature” (2006: 5). The authors further explain that the 
key difference between this model and others is that initial conditions occur by chance but have a 
significant effect over the irreversible course o f events to follow. In a contingent sequence, each 
turning point makes the occurrence o f the next more likely until the pattern o f interactions 
between people are “locked-in” to a specific pattern, creating a type o f steady state. General
12 Periodicity is used by historical sociologists such as Ronald Aminzade to mean the quality o f occurring at regular intervals as well as characteristics of that unit, such as duration, pace, trajectory and cycle (1992).
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theories can then be used to explain the results o f any particular policy outcomes at this particular 
time, as opposed to being able to apply one theory for all periods. For all o f its usefulness in other 
fields, path dependency may be less useful in the policy sciences, because social feedback 
mechanisms are rarely so deterministic (Howlett and Rayner 2006).
Path dependency
Thelen argues that path-dependent approaches, especially ones that provide explanatory 
mechanisms for switch points, lock-ins, and institutional persistence have advantages over 
constant cause explanations (e.g., functional - utilitarian design, power - distributional rewards, 
and cultural - social scripts) even as they often draw on these theories o f change. Path dependent 
theorists tend towards historist accounts (Stinchcombe 1968), in which institutions arise through a 
contingent event or agency and may be sustained by very different forces than those who 
developed the institution (Mahoney 2000, Stinchcombe 1968). Political scientists, Thelen writes, 
see path dependency in politics as involving some elements of chance in a beginning sequence, as 
a path is taken and once established, becomes a dominant institution as other alterative policies 
become less likely because relevant actors adjust their strategies in alignment with the dominant 
pattern (Thelen 2003 drawing on Levi 1997 and Pierson 2000b). Similar to the use o f path 
dependence in economics, in this view, institutions persist because they provide increasing 
returns (North 1990). However, institutions do sometimes change, collapse, or transform into 
other institutions, necessitating a careful examination o f mechanisms that may provoke change or 
transformation.
Process sequencing
The third competing method o f historical policy analysis is known as process sequencing. 
It is similar to the theory o f policy punctuated equilibrium developed by Baumgartner and Jones 
(2002) to explain periods o f policy making in the U.S. Congress. This method stresses how 
outcomes are rooted in previous events and thinking. Initial conditions may be random (such as a 
major catastrophe or other unexpected event), but more often are often resulting from previous 
policy cycles. Instead o f “locking in” a path, process sequencing highlights the continual 
processes o f steering processes along these paths:
Choices in one period not only limit future options, they may also precipitate
later crises, structure available options, and shape the choices made at those
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junctures shaping the switch points confronted by later generations, drawing the 
fau lt lines around which later crises will erupt and creating options fo r  new 
solutions (Haydu 1998: 353).
Haydu recommends building analytical power in narrative analysis by focusing on events, 
arranging them in temporal order, and examining how sequences are also causal chains (1998: 
349). Haydu delineates periods by contrasting solutions for recurring problems instead o f relying 
on particular causal variables or divergent outcomes. Reiterated problem solving also places 
social actors at “center stage” in the explanation o f outcomes with earlier events and decisions 
leading to later dilemmas (Haydu 1998: 357). Howlett and Rayner (2006) argue that the process 
sequencing model is the most appropriate model for policy studies as it more accurately 
represents policy processes that are rarely random or irreversible, but result from embedded and 
cumulative social processes that change through time.
Beyond documenting institutional origins and change, Thelen argues for the use o f 
several analytical tools to understand the mechanisms beneath institutional change and 
transformation. Building on the work o f Schickler (2001), Thelen illustrates how institutions may 
change through a layering o f new institutional features built on previous successful institutions. 
Schickler argues that new coalitions o f  actors may build upon existing institutions because they 
lack sufficient political support or may not want to dismantle the existing system. Campbell 
(1997) describes democratic political development in Eastern Europe after 1989 as institutional 
“bricolage” in which some new policies were developed by building upon the communist era 
policies already in place. Institutional conversion or transformation can happen when,
“ . . . institutions designed with one set o f  goals in mind are redirected towards other ends” (Thelen 
2003: 228). Finally, Thelen argues for the analytical power of historical institutionalism in that 
institutional forms and functions can be more fully understood only when they are viewed in 
context of, “...a  larger temporal framework that includes the sequences o f  events and processes 
that shaped their development” (2003: 231 based on Pierson and Skocpol 2004).
The analysis in this chapter follows Haydu’s (1998) method for using time periods as 
case studies, and Howlett and Rayner (2006)’s focus on process sequencing. These methods 
structure cases and highlight transitions between eras as places where people as well as social, 
cultural and environmental events chart history’s course.
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Preview of the argument
Co-management o f marine mammals in Alaska is best understood as a mode of
governance stemming from a long trajectory o f institutional change. Table 3.1 illustrates key 
elements o f the analysis across eras, previewing a focus on institutional form, purpose and scale. 
In this chapter, I develop a narrative o f institutional change from existing secondary texts written 
by agencies, academics and tribes. I complement these sources with primary texts to understand 
how actors o f the time conceptualized their management strategies. In the analysis section, I 
analyze how three “constant causes” -  strength o f sovereignty, mode o f production, and value 
orientations affected not only the change from one regime to the next, but also the mode o f 
governance and relative sustainability o f each regime.
For this analysis, I define sovereignty as a social force following Krasner (1988) in terms 
o f defining and defending borders as well as the organization o f public authority within the state. 
W olf (1982) argues that one o f the most destructive aspects of colonialism is its propensity to 
change colonized societies by changing the way society produces and distributes goods (i.e., 
mode o f production, following Karl Marx), leading to a breakdown in relationships that sustain 
ways o f life. W olf elaborated on relationships built through trade amongst kin, tributary (i.e., 
taxation), and capitalist modes (1982). The third causal force shaping marine mammal 
governance in Alaska arises from distinct values governing the appropriate relationships between 
humans and animals. Each society defines what a logical and appropriate action is for particular 
situations and reinforces this logic through social reinforcement and sanctioning (March and 
Olsen 1984). As illustrated in this chapter, this logic is often reflected in institutions and may be 
contested through struggle, force, and the political process.
Outline o f chapter
In the first section I trace the settling o f Alaska by groups o f migrants from Siberia, who 
eventually differentiate in Native Nations, develop complex societies using a plethora of 
resources, and build indigenous institutions guiding behavior. The continuity o f indigenous 
institutions into modem times is discussed as a force shaping present-day management dilemmas 
and hybrid state-institutions such as co-management. In the second section, the rise o f Russian 
and American colonial powers shifts the landscape o f marine mammal governance from a 
complex social-ecological system to one that undergoes rapid and disruptive change, including an
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Table 3.1 Defining features of four eras of marine mammal management in Alaska 
Era Institutional form Purpose Scale
AlaskaNativeNations
Territorial boundaries Establishing and defending Regionalaccess to resources
Traditional rules for harvesting Defining proper human- environmental relations Tribal
Colonial Trade and taxation rules Establish extractive monopoly, National -area sovereignty International
Company rules for conservation and commercial quality
Sustain harvest, sustain economy Regional andspecies-specific
Earlystatehood
Define subsistence versus commercial
Game rules
Maintain monopoly, food security
Regulate big game trophy hunting for conservation, sovereignty
Regional and species-specific
Regional and species-specific
PostMMPA
Defining and limiting Maintain monopoly, statesubsistence
Moratorium on hunting
sovereignty
Conservation, values shift
State-wide,International
National,International
Rules for reducing incidental take Conservation, values shift Tribal, State-wide, International
Defining acceptable practices for subsistence
Defining subsistence through cultural and financial thresholds to limit trade for conservation and sovereignty
Tribal, Regional,State-wide,International
Co-managementagreements Defining and building relationships, new management rules
Cross-scale, Tribal, Regional, State­wide, International
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authoritarian capitalistic model with a goal o f maximum productivity. This results in massive 
dislocations o f communities and near collapse o f  many valued resources. The colonial powers 
begin to learn from the system and towards the end o f their tenures have developed recognizable 
institutions o f resource management. The Alaska territory and then new State o f Alaska develops 
a short-lived regime for marine mammal management, collapsing under forces o f competing 
sovereignty from tribes and against a wider backdrop o f a clash in dominant values for the 
acceptable exploitation o f marine mammals. Finally, the beginnings o f the modem governance 
regime come into focus in the contemporary era as federal agencies build management programs 
using existing staff from the state and build relationships with communities.
The settling o f Alaska, the rise o f Alaska Native nations and marine mammal hunting: 9000 BP to 1848
Alaska has been home to indigenous peoples for at least 9000 years (West et al. 2007). 
As populations grew and migration continued across the Bering Strait, distinct and diverse 
Nations developed in Alaska, organized around particular places and ways o f life. Archeological, 
oral historical evidence and the travel journals o f maritime traders identify several drivers o f 
human-marine mammal relationships. As discussed below, settlement was based on resource 
availability; indigenous institutions developed in relationship to resource use and other Native 
Nations. These inter-national relations and indigenous institutions remain important to the story 
o f marine mammal management in several ways — the first o f which is the understanding o f a 
shared destiny between people and animals. This understanding does not necessarily translate 
directly into a romantic notion o f the “lay ecologist” (Caulfield 1997) but provides the basis for 
an enduring role for nations in the stewardship o f animal species. Resources that people used to 
“make a living” in this era often established cultural identifiers and connections used in 
subsequent eras by colonial powers, Native Nations and their contemporary counterparts to 
delineate access to resources, recognize rights to harvest, and craft institutions regarding 
acceptable harvest practices13. Although many parts o f coastal Alaska developed rich traditions
13 For instance, aboriginal whaling is, in 2009, strictly regulated by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The cultural continuity of whaling practices must be carefully documented and approved by the Commission in order for a community to engage in sanctioned whaling. The Village o f Pt. Lay, Alaska was formally admitted as a whaling community at the IWC in 2007. Although whalers in Pt. Lay had whaled with crews from other villages and the town is littered with historic whaling bones as well as other evidence o f the importance o f whaling, 2008 was the first year they were legally allowed to launch boats from the shores of Pt. Lay. The anthropologist involved in documenting their relationship, Dr. Stephen
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regarding the use o f marine mammals, the following narrative section focuses on the Aleutians 
and the Arctic as notable examples o f how early Alaskans built social-ecological systems.
Human and environmental relationships in the Aleutians
Climate and corresponding resource change in Alaska has affected migration, standards
o f living, and material cultures through time (Savinetsky et al. 2004; W est et al. 2007; Murray 
2008). The rich environment o f the Eastern Aleutians, such as the islands o f Unalaska and 
Umnak, has provided for communities and Unangan14 culture subsisting on whales, seals, sea 
lions, sea otters, fish, sea birds and invertebrates for approximately 9000 years (West et. al.
2007). With abundant resources, larger Unangan settlements became possible and the need for 
conservation-minded institutions (rules and norms to control type and volume o f use) would have 
been low15. People in the Aleutians would have had to adapt to changes in patterns o f  animal 
abundance, however. Savinetsky et al. (2004) hypothesizes that the size o f mammal and bird 
populations in the Aleutians during the past 4000 years is negatively correlated with changes in 
summer temperature and positively correlated with changes in summer precipitation. Murray 
(2008) offers a complex view of both environmental change and human predation as drivers o f 
presence/absence and changes in abundance o f  marine mammal remains found in Arctic 
settlements. For instance, on St. Lawrence Island, walrus bone consistently occurs in the record 
across time periods for the last 1000 years, which suggests a steady state o f human uses relatively 
unlimited by ecological conditions. In the Aleutians, the presence o f walrus appears to be driven 
by climatic changes and is used more periodically during colder eras. As a contrast to these 
Alaskan conditions, Murray suggests that in the Northeastern Nunavut (Canadian) settlement o f 
Foxe Basin, change in the abundance o f walrus bone was likely influenced by both climate and 
human action (2008).
Braund, was given a standing ovation at the 2008 AEWC Captains’ Convention for his and his colleagues’ work. In another example, Aleut leaders involved in co-management regimes sometimes describe the Aleut people as, “People o f the Seal,” emphasizing current as well as historic ties to and stewardship of Steller sea lions. This connection endures despite a decline in subsistence harvests over time.14 Unangan is a term for the people who speak the Unangan language and who have historically lived in the Aleutian Islands, the Pribilof Islands and the Alaska Peninsula west of Stepovak Bay (ANLC 2009). Russian explorers and traders called these people Aleuts, a term which I will use interchangeably with Unangan in accordance to common usage.15 Berkes et al. (2000) argues that adopting conservation institutions in times of abundance may even be considered mal-adaptive as it would waste time and energy. However, institutional scholars such as DiMaggio and Powell (1991) often point to cases in which institutions function more to signal legitimacy or status rather than act as functional guides to behavior.
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The relative sustainability o f this era is conjectured to be high because o f a low level o f 
harvesting for trade versus sustenance. That does not mean that all resources were harvested in an 
ecologically robust manner. For instance, the Steller sea cow (.Hydrodamalis gigas) in the 
Aleutians is an example o f  human use as a cause o f marine mammal extinction. Although many 
marine mammal populations are resilient to small-scale harvesting, biological traits combined 
with low or moderate amounts o f hunting likely depressed the population o f Steller sea cows in 
the North Pacific. Reportedly a slow-moving and easily caught species, sea cows lived in the 
Aleutians at least until 1000 years ago when they disappear from the archeological record16. The 
last refugia for sea cows were the Commander Islands, where Vitus Bering’s crew came across 
the last remnant population; within 26 years, the Steller sea cow was extinct (West et al. 2007, 
Savinetsky et al. 2004). For the most part, most currently identified marine mammal populations 
in Alaska are thought to have been abundant prior to commercial exploitation in the 1700s 
(Pfister and DeMaster 2006).
As stated earlier, Unangan diets included a wide variety o f animals in the region. They 
did not, however, intensively use all species they knew about. For instance, the Unangan people 
knew about the rich fur seal grounds o f the Pribilof Islands (the Unangan word for these islands 
was Amiq), but did not harvest large amounts o f fur seals until Russian commercial operations 
were established in the colonial era through the enslavement o f the Unangan people (Torrey 
1978). Many Unangan hunters were prolific traders and would trade sea otter fur skins to early 
explorers. Unangans would occasionally harvest whales, but would also scavenge dead whales 
that floated to their shores. The human population o f the Aleutian Islands before the colonial era 
is estimated to have numbered approximately 10,000 (Black 2004) and represented a thriving 
people.
Human and environmental relationships in the Arctic
Settlement in Alaska north o f the Bering Strait occurred more recently than in the
Aleutians. Ackerman (1998) notes that the presence o f harpoons, walrus, seal, and polar bear 
bones found by archeologists on Wrangel Island and a sealing harpoon found with bones at Cape 
Krusenstem are evidence for a, “widespread sea mammal hunting complex in the Chukchi Sea
16 However, Lucien Turner, a weather observer on Attu island in the 1880s, reported that he often heard people talking about the presence of sea cows, and that they were so easy to capture in the intertidal zone and butcher nearby, they were considered a women’s hunt (Turner 1886 as cited in West et al. 2007).
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region at least by 3200 -2800 BP” (p. 255). The people o f the later Choris17 complex (3000 -  
2500 BP) relied more heavily on terrestrial resources such as caribou. Beginning around 2500 BP, 
the people o f the Norton culture, particularly south o f the Seward Peninsula, subsisted on fish, 
caribou, walrus and seals. Whaling arose among peoples o f the Okvik/Old Bering Sea cultures of 
the Bering Strait region, who also harvested walrus, seals, birds, and sometimes caribou. Whaling 
became more o f a significant portion o f diets in the Punuk-Bimirk-Thule cultural phases 
(Ackerman 1998). During this period, settlement sites along whale migration routes became more 
valuable, evidenced by archeological finds relating to conflict (Harritt 1995). This culture gave 
way to modem Eskimo cultures along the Chukchi, Bering and Beaufort Seas as well as Thule 
migrants who settled further east in present-day Canada and Greenland. One o f the largest 
settlements in Northern Alaska is at Point Hope, where Tikigagmiut people lived in a large 
village by 1500 BP, even before beginning their whaling tradition (Ackerman 1998).
Arctic Inupiat lived self-sufficient, nomadic lifestyles late into the 19th century organized 
on strong social bonds and in movement with bowhead whale migrations and other subsistence 
resources (Chance 1990). Chance describes the social organization of communities:
...for hundreds o f  years, the Inupiat o f  Arctic Alaska lived in distinct 
territorially-based populations. Highly competent, they had an intimate 
knowledge o f  their environment. Their economic and social life was organized 
around interlocking bilateral kin ties, extending to other localities through co­
marriage...Largely self-sufficient and politically autonomous, these kinship 
groups maintained active trading relations with other Inupiat, Siberian and  
Alaskan Yup'ik, and Athabascan Indians (Chance 1990: 29).
Access to resources and international peace was hard-won. Within intergenerational living 
memory, Alaska Natives have recalled18 (Burch 1998) various early methods o f exercising 
sovereignty over territory and resources including intense battles, truces, establishing trading 
partners, and cultural exchanges. By the time Russian, Spanish, English and American traders and 
colonists explored and “claimed” Alaskan lands and waters for their crowns or corporate
17 The Choris complex is an archeological site on the Choris Peninsula, Alaska.18 In his 2005 book, Alliance and Conflict, Burch sets the inception date of his study at 1800 because, “...it is the earliest for which both the documentary evidence produced by Westerners and the oral accounts o f Ihupiaq historians can be reasonably applied” (p. 10).
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interests, Alaska Native Nations inhabited, had moved through or were extensively using most 
areas o f the state as most o f the key resources were migratory in nature, or distributed across vast 
areas (Burch 1998).
Institutions in the Alaska Native nations era
Institutions in this era such as territorial boundaries and some ceremonies stemmed from
functional needs such as ensuring regular access to food and reinforcing social norms.
Appropriate human-animal relationships were taught through traditions, such as extensive pre­
whaling rituals (Lantis 1938; Brower 1942), observing proper conduct during whaling season 
(Brower 1942), thanksgiving ceremonies such as the bladder ceremony in Yupik areas (Lantis 
1947; Fienup-Riordan 1983), and foodsharing as well as thanksgiving through Nalukataq festivals 
in Inupiaq areas. Some, though not all o f these institutions, survived the coming colonial era, the 
beginning process o f which spanned a hundred years (1741 -  1848)19.
Institutional legacies of the era
These early institutions and the association o f communities with particular species remain
common threads in modern-day governance. For animals such as the bowhead whale, whose 
relationship with people continue to structure community life and cultural identity, stewardship is 
built upon wisdom about social-ecological dynamics often based on thousands o f years o f  living, 
observing and depending on those animals. Even for species such as sea otters or fur seals whose 
exploitation has been tied to trade as long as people can remember, generations o f living with 
these animals has produced local knowledge important in management decisions, successful 
exploitation, and relationships between people and those species. These relationships between 
people and animals as well as the technologies people used to harvest them are often considered 
baseline conditions for management decision-making; decisions in the present time usually 
reference these periods in law (e.g., the Marine Mammal Protection Act) or other rules20. For
19 Focused on the fur trade, the colonial era began at different times across Alaska’s coastal areas. Russians first begin to colonize Alaska in 1741 in Unangan territory and in 1799 in Tlingit territory; colonialism did not reach north of the Bering Strait until the first Yankee whaler arrived in 1848 to devastating effect on whales, walrus and people (Bockstoce 1986). Parts of Alaska were also visited by and claimed by Spanish and British explorers.20 For instance, the Marine Mammal Protection Act restricts harvests to Alaska Natives who are either practicing subsistence (undefined for this section) or creating “authentic native articles o f handicrafts and clothing” (emphasis mine, § 101(b)(2)). The Fur Seal Act requires Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos to take fur seals for subsistence provided they are restricted to, “ .. .canoes not transported by or used in connection
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instance, as discussed in the fourth era, definitions, narratives and dominant cultural ideas around 
“customary and traditional” “wasteful practices,” and “traditional handicrafts” draw from colonial 
visions o f what life was like “before contact” and remain powerful threads and ongoing conflicts 
in marine mammal management institutions (Robards and Joly 2007-2008).
O f course, by the time many communities had actual encounters with colonial entities, 
they were already changing as a result o f foreign trade goods, technologies, ideologies and 
disease (Black 2004). Before extensive contact with many remote villages, epidemics o f new 
diseases that the population was largely unfamiliar with and lacked immunity from, began to 
circulate through Alaskan communities, linked by extensive trade routes (Fortuine 1989). Such 
traumatic changes likely began to undermine long-established cultural traditions well adapted to 
ecological conditions that arguably supported sustainable practices prior to colonization 
(Caulfield pers. comm.).
Colonial era: 1732 - 1958
The colonial era in Alaska stretches from early Russian exploration and trade ventures to
the end o f American federal administration o f the Alaska territory. The era is characterized by 
Russian and, later, American policies geared at asserting sovereignty and defending monopolies 
o f trade for fur seals, sea otters, and whales. Importantly, though, the Russians and later 
Americans begin to adopt conservation measures to support a sustained yield o f animals. My 
narrative o f  this era particularly focuses on fur seal and bowhead whale management, as they are 
both key resources and their management history has had significant long-term social and 
ecological effects.
Russian Alaska
Russian historian Petr Aleksandrovich Tikhmenev notes that even before beginning 
exploration o f Alaskan shores, Russian fur traders were aware o f long-standing trading 
relationships between communities in present-day Chukotka and Alaska (1978). A fairly 
extensive market for fur products drove Russian expansion into Alaska beginning in the early 18th
with other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles, or sails, and manned by not more than five persons each, in the wav hitherto practiced and without the use o f firearms” (emphasis added, 16 U.S.C. §1153). Examples of the use o f historic ecological and social conditions for walrus are examined in Robards and Joly (2007-2008).
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century (Tikhmenev 1978). Although fur traders and explorers sailed numerous voyages to 
Alaska after 1732, colonization and Aleut resistance to it grew as Russian traders attempted to 
establish settlements. Captain Vitus Bering’s second Northern Seas expedition in 1741 is 
generally credited with the first European cartography and documentation o f Alaskan lands. 
Aleuts on Umnak Island reported a visit by the trader Glotov in 1759 and began a period o f trade 
before Russians started to build settlements (Tikhmenev 1978). Early Russian colonial attempts 
were seldom peaceful, and not entirely successful. After a petition by the governor o f Siberia to 
establish a military presence in Alaska and following numerous battles with Aleuts, on March 2, 
1766, Empress Catherine II pronounced a decree on trade with native communities, directing the 
promyshlenniks (fur traders) to, “ . ..treat their new brothers, the inhabitants o f  these islands, 
kindly and without the slightest persecution or deceit.. .” (Russian Empire, as cited in Tikhmenev 
1978:451). This directive underscores what was then a growing “problem” between fur traders 
looking to establish trading territories and Alaska Native peoples defending their lands21.
The battle for Russian sovereignty
Russians soon exerted their authority over Alaska Natives, lands, and resources. Markets
for their furs included those in China, where sea otter pelts were highly prized. However, 
relations deteriorated at the same time that colonization began in earnest. After a series o f failed 
attempts to colonize the Aleutian Islands, traders eventually enslaved Aleut hunters to exploit 
them to hunt fur seals and sea otters. Exploitation o f both people and animals was intensive and 
extensive. So much so, that by the early 1780s, the fur trade was in decline. Petr Aleksandrovich 
Tikhmenev, an official historian for the fur trade monopoly, the Russian-American Company 
(RAC), chronicles how the decline in furbearing populations, the hostility o f Alaskan peoples 
towards the Russians, and the violent conduct o f  the Russians influenced prominent trader 
Grigorii Ivanovich Shelikov to design a corporation capable o f creating institutions, regulating 
trade, and surveying lands for Russian sovereigntist claims.
To further his own as well as Russian interests, Shelikov created a trading company with 
investors and launched three ships by 1783. Initial attempts to forge trade relations failed. After a 
period o f battles, Shelikov enslaved Koniag people on Kodiak Island for the purposes o f sea otter
21 Further south in Tlingit territory, the Russians, the Tlingit clans, and Tsimshian clans (sometimes with help from American ships) periodically clashed over sea otters and sovereignty from 1805 to 1867 (Dean 1994).
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hunting and took twenty o f their children as hostages to, . .ensure their loyalty,''’ writes 
Tikhmenev (1978:15). Tikhmenev describes several other occasions o f hostage taking, trading 
hostages to other tribes, and enlisting Fox Islanders and Koniags to fight neighboring peoples in 
alliance with Shelikov.
Fur seal exploitation
Commercial fur seal exploitation on the Pribilof Islands began after 1786 as Russian fur 
trader Gavriil Prilbylov “discovered” the islands and later forcibly settled Unangan Aleut families 
on the island. The first year o f organized exploitation (1786 or 1787), traders recorded 40,000 fur 
seal skins, 2,000 sea otter skins, and 14,400 pounds o f walrus ivory. The Russian American 
Company was officially chartered by Emperor Paul I on July 8 1799 as a monopoly for resource 
extraction on the Northwest coast o f America from latitude 55’N. Paul issued an imperial ukase 
(decree) to this effect on 27 December 1799 that apparently interested both the early United 
States government and Canadian trade interests because o f the potential for expansion into their 
claimed territories (US Congress, Senate 1895 and Flouse 1889, as cited in Scheffer et al. 1984).
Exploitation increased unabated, between 1804 and 1807 alone, furs worth 2.5 million 
rubles were taken from Alaska, including 15,000 sea otter pelts and almost 280,000 fur seals. 
Another 500,000 fur seal pelts were in storage in Russia and 800,000 skins were found in the 
Pribilof Island storehouses, o f which 700,00 were ruined and discarded (McIntyre 1870 as cited 
in Scheffer et al. 1984). The excessive harvest o f fur seals on the Pribilof Islands had diminished 
local marine mammal populations to the point at which company officers feared extirpation and 
ordered a temporary ban in 1804 on fur sealing. Tikhmenev reports local population declines in 
the Commander Islands, Copper Island and Unalaska as well. In 1806 to 1807, nearly all o f the 
Unangan people were removed to Unalaska.
Early proclamations and rules were designed to secure a trade monopoly with Alaska 
Native hunters and increasingly were designed to assert Russian sovereignty to Alaskan resources 
and people. Over time, the Russian American Company and its government benefactors gradually 
adapted more policies aimed at sustaining the fur seal harvest. Area closures and limitations on 
the age class and sex o f seals to be harvested were eventually instituted by the traders, beginning 
in 1808 (Tikhmenev 1978; Scheffer et al. 1984) with some success. For some time, the strength 
o f these rules depended on which traders were doing the buying, as foreign captains were less
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likely than Russians to observe company rules, especially when the governor at the time favored 
higher harvests (Tikhmenev 1978). By 1822, the following reforms were put in place: the 
“zapooska” (i.e., sparing young males), a quota, the development of a breeding reserve, and a 
moratorium on killing o f silver pups other than those used for food and oil (Scheffer et al. 1984).
American trade challenges
By the early 1800s, American traders began to sail north to Alaska, and by 1804,
American captains proposed permanent trade relations with Russia (Tikhmenev 1978). The 
Russian American Fur Company directors requested the Emperor o f Russia to allow them to 
defend their trade monopoly by prohibiting foreign trade in the colony. In response, the emperor 
instructed Count Pahlen, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, to request that American 
citizens be prohibited from trade with the natives. Count Pahlen informed the Imperial Chancellor 
that in spite o f repeated attempts to do so, the American government had neither the power nor 
the desire to regulate its citizens in their attempts at trade with Russian colonies because o f 
domestic (American) politics (Tikhmenev 1978). American whaling companies and fur traders 
were at the time important patrons o f the young government in the United States (Nakajima 
2007). The Russian regime in Alaska began to weaken under challenges to its sovereignty, 
general difficulties in keeping settlements provisioned and British colonial expansion.
Russia responded to the growth o f American and English trading companies entering 
Alaskan waters with another attempt to constrict trade in the new territory. Czar Alexander I 
issued an edict (the Imperial Ukaz of 1821) -  which excluded foreign vessels from trade in 
Russian America and Eastern Siberia (Tikhmenev 1978). Both the United States and England 
pressed to have the edict reversed, as their fur trading companies demanded access to the 
resources o f the Northwest. Subsequent treaties (the Russo-American Treaty o f 1824 and the 
Anglo-Russian Treaty o f 1825) established trading boundaries that have lasted to the present day 
and established principles o f freedom o f navigation and fishing in the North Pacific Ocean.
The treaty also established Russian territory as north of 54’ 40” and allowed a period o f 
open trade for no more than ten years. After the ten-year period, the United States reportedly 
informed its citizens that free trade in colonial waters o f Alaska had been discontinued. 
Additionally, Article 2 o f the convention prohibited American ships from stopping at places 
where there were Russian settlements, without permission o f the managers o f those settlements.
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Tikhemenev notes that, . .neither the announcement nor the prohibition brought any results,” 
(1978: 315) as the whaling industry was building in intensity. Illustrating the tide against Russian 
sovereignty was turning, up to 200 American and foreign whaling ships were expected to arrive 
in Northern waters by 1840. Due to wanton overharvests o f  many species and the sheer 
magnitude o f the trade, fur exports fell through the 1800s. Whaling grew in trade until most 
species were significantly depleted by the mid 19th century (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Exports of trade goods from Alaska Source: Tikhmenev (1978: 153); Bockstoce andBotkin (1983). Species 1 7 9 7 -1 8 2 1 1821 -1842 1842 -1862
Sea otters 72,894 25,416 25,899
Fur seals 1,232,374 458,502 372,894
Sea lions 27 0 ?
Walrus tusks 58,176 lbs. 234,036 lbs. ?
Whale baleen 42,228 lbs. 124,380 lbs. 7000-9000 bowheadwhales'
Social legacies o f  Russian colonialism
Adding to the extreme shocks to Alaska Native communities from commercial
competition for marine mammals, trading ships are thought to have brought the deadly smallpox
epidemic o f 1835-1840. Fortuine describes the resulting devastation:
From Prince o f  Wales Island to Norton Sound the disease devastated the 
population, leaving in its wake as many as one-third dead and many o f  the 
remainder scarred, blind, or otherwise disabled. Beyond the physical harm, 
however, smallpox left demoralizing losses o f  a different kind: the destruction o f  
fam ily groups, communities, religious faith, and in some areas even a way o f  life.
The Alaska Natives were never the same after this catastrophe (1989: 230).
22 Russia could not and did not control the whaling trade in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait region, but the number is illustrative of the magnitude o f the marine mammal harvest of the time.
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Koniag families in sixty-five settlements on Kodiak Island that had survived Russian war, 
murder, slavery and the epidemic were consolidated by the Russians into seven new ones 
(Fortuine 1989). The Russian-American Company re-organized the Koniag way o f life yet again 
by training survivors in farming and re-building communities on the Russian settlement model, 
disconnecting Koniag families from their relationship to the sea. Alaska Natives living in Russian 
America were vaccinated against smallpox, however, which many were grateful for. Fortuine 
(1989) argues that the successful vaccination and evidence of Russian immunity to smallpox 
further undermined traditional religious authorities such as shaman, leading to a widespread 
adoption o f the Russian Orthodox faith. The Russian Orthodox Church remains an important 
element o f  Aleutian life today.
Modes o f production in the Russian era
Exploitation o f fur seals and sea otters through slavery was the dominant mode of
production in the Russian colonial era. Throughout this brutal history, however, Unangans
maintained many o f their earlier institutions, including preferences for certain age-classes o f seals
for subsistence, and utilizing whale blubber and other materials for building boats (Tikhmenev
1978; Scheffer et al. 1984). Capitalist and subsistence modes operated simultaneously, even as
the Russians attempted to control subsistence harvests somewhat. The high economic value
placed on fur seal pelts made wealth production the dominant value for marine mammals.
The American territory
With pressure from American and British traders as well as their governments, Russia
accepted an offer from the United States to buy the territory. Russia’s sovereignty over Alaskan 
trade ended the way it had begun; its last act in Alaska was to complete the August harvest o f  fur 
seals, before effecting the Alaska purchase23 in 1867 (Scheffer et al. 1984). American officials 
slowly built a presence in the region, establishing a program o f taxation for the fur trade, and 
increasing military activities. In 1869 Captain James Seward remarked upon the value and the 
grand reach o f the fur industry in Alaska during a speech given to the “citizens o f Sitka” :
The fu rs thus fo u n d  here have been the ch ie f element, fo r  more than a hundred 
years, o f  the profitable commerce o f  the Hudson's Bay Company, whose mere 
possessory privileges seem, even at this late day, too costly to f in d  a ready
23 Treaty of March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
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purchaser. This fur-trade, together with the sea fur-trade within the Territory, 
were the sole basis alike o f  Russian commerce and empire on this continent. This 
commerce was so large and important as to induce the Governments o f  Russia 
and China to build and maintain a town fo r  carrying on its exchanges in Tartary 
on the border o f  the two empires (Seward 1869: 9).
Aleuts as well as other Native Nations were enraged upon learning that Russia’s interests in 
Alaska had been sold to the United States without their consent or consultation (Torrey 1978). 
The Treaty included a provision for governing “uncivilized tribes” (Art. Ill Treaty 1967) as the 
United States Congress was accustomed to pass laws for aboriginal peoples. However, Unangans 
were considered civilized Russian subjects, and ostensibly could choose Russian or American 
citizenship through the Treaty. In practice, the United States did not recognize the civil rights of 
Unangans until 1966 (Torrey 1978). Extensive institutions and infrastructure for the fur trade 
passed into American, rather than Alaska Native, hands.
In terms o f marine mammal management, the American purchase was initially more a 
change in the cast o f characters rather than a new chapter in human-environmental relations. 
Exploitation o f fur-bearing animals through monopolies remained a key characteristic of colonial 
life in Alaska. There were a few changes that met with some relief from the Aleuts, however. 
Peter Kostromitin, an Unangan elder from Unalaska, later noted subtle, yet significant differences 
in life under the Americans:
I  am glad that I  lived to see the Americans in the country ...The Aleuts are better 
o ff now than they were under the Russians. The first Russians who came here 
killed our men and took away our women and all our possessions; and afterward, 
when the Russian-American Company came, they made all the Aleuts like slaves, 
and sent them to hunt fa r  away, where many were drowned and many killed by 
savage natives, and others stopped in strange places and never came back. The 
old Company gave us fish  fo r  nothing, but we could have got plenty o f  it fo r  
ourselves i f  we had been allowed to stay at home and provide fo r  our families.
Often they would not sell us flour or tea even i f  we had skins to pay fo r  it. Now  
we must pay fo r  everything, but we can buy what we like. God will not give me 
many days to live, but I  am satisfied (Veniaminov cited in Torrey 1978:33).
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Institutional legacies
Although conditions improved somewhat, it would be over another hundred years before 
Pribilof islanders gained control over their island from the American federal government (Torrey 
1978). Similar to the Russian regime, fur sealing in the Pribilofs under American rule got o ff to 
an unruly start with uncontrolled corporate exploitation. During 1868, and before the U.S. 
Congress acted to close the harvest, at least four private San Francisco companies established 
sealing operations on the Pribilofs and took several hundred thousand seals within a year (Roppel 
1984). Early American officials recommended to Congress to adopt the Russian conservation 
rules including area closures and limiting the harvest to males. The Russian rules were developed 
through Unangan traditional practices o f protecting females and further experimentation by the 
Company (Scheffer et al. 1984).
Captain W.A. Howard, captain o f the first American revenue steamer in Alaska, the 
Lincoln, reported on his 1867 trip while testifying to Congress in support o f  a law limiting fur 
sealing:
I  would very respectfully call the attention o f  the department to the magnificent 
trade opened up by this transfer, and consequently lost to Russia and Great 
Britain, but which, i f  unprotected by this legislation, will in a few  years be 
entirely lost to us. The Russian American Fur Company protects in a most 
careful manner the 'fur-bearing animals, ” killing only the males o f  a certain 
age, never exceeding the number necessary fo r  the supply o f  the market (Howard 
as cited in Black 2004: 274).
That same year, the Customs Act established federal jurisdiction over the Alaskan fur trade 
(except for fur seals, which were the purview o f Congress) within the Treasury Department. A 
moratorium was placed on fur seal harvesting until government control could be established 
through military occupation (Scheffer et al. 1984). Following the moratorium, Congress 
continued the Russian organizational form and awarded a monopoly fur sealing contract to the 
Alaska Commercial Company for a 20-year term. The lease included provisions such as a quota 
o f 75,000 annual harvest on St. Paul and a 25,000 quota limit on St. George (Roppel 1984) as 
well as an age limit (males over 1 year old) and seasonal closures. Responsibility for fur seals 
passed from the Secretary o f  the Interior to the Secretary of the Treasury, which established the 
“fur-seal service” in 1893. This service remained under the Treasury until 1903, when it became
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an independent agency under the Secretary o f Commerce and Labor (Scheffer et al. 1984). By 
1891, pelagic sealing (sealing in open water) combined with liberal harvests on the rookeries had 
significantly reduced the herd and harvests were weak. The United States and Great Britain 
agreed to a modus vivendi (i.e., temporary arrangement) to close the Bering Sea to pelagic sealing 
and reduce the harvest to subsistence-only (Scheffer et al. 1984). This original agreement grew 
into the Paris Tribunal o f 1893 and new regulations were drafted. These new rules instituted a 60- 
mile sanctuary around the Pribilofs, a seasonal closure and a ban on firearms in the Bering Sea. 
These rules did not have their intended effect, as Japanese pelagic sealing increased in intensity.
Nationalization o f fur seal enterprise
The Alaska Commercial Company lease expired in 1910 and with reports o f a declining
herd, illegal harvests o f females and pups as well as other mismanagement, Congress nationalized
fur seal management. The conservation group, the Camp Fire Club, publicized its concern over
reports o f dwindling herds and demanded that members o f the Fur Seal Board with ties to the
Alaska Commercial Company be fired (Anonymous 1910). Eventually St. Paul and St. George
were declared by a joint resolution o f Congress a special reservation for Government purposes
and unauthorized persons could no longer land on the islands (Scheffer et al. 1984). Meanwhile,
another epidemic o f influenza combined with measles, smallpox and potentially other diseases
swept along the Aleutian chain and along the Northern Alaska coast as far as Point Hope,
delaying the fur seal harvest on St. Paul as the entire island reportedly suffered from influenza
(Fortuine 1989). Congress began oversight hearings on the fur seal operations in 1911 and several
officials associated with the fur seal service were investigated for corruption.
The internationalization o f fur seal management
On July 7, 1911 the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan signed the
“Convention for the preservation and protection o f the fur seals and sea otter which frequent the
waters o f the North Pacific Ocean,” which declared a moratorium on pelagic sealing and the
importation o f skins caught through such means. This agreement was successful in ending the
practice and beginning a turn around phase for the Pribilof Island fur seal population (Scheffer et
al. 1984). However, the convention also created an enduring institution, the creation o f special
rules to prevent indigenous hunters from adopting modem equipment in order to hunt more
efficiently. Technology that existed during the time o f colonization was now considered
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“traditional” for legal purposes and subsistence was considered the use o f traditional hunting 
technology for food. In propagating rules, the signatories to the convention decreed:
It is further agreed that the provisions o f  this Convention shall not apply to 
Indians, Ainos, Aleuts, or other aborigines dwelling on the coast o f  the waters 
mentioned in Article I, who carry on pelagic sealing in canoes not transported by 
or used in connection with other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles, 
or sails, and manned by not more than five  persons each, in the way hitherto 
practiced and without the use o f  firearms; provided that such aborigines are not 
in the employment o f  other persons or under contract to deliver the skins to any 
person  (Convention Article IV 1911).
This restriction o f gear type and separation o f the subsistence and cash economy is a persistent 
conceptualization o f  native harvests as being at the same time, within the same class o f activity to 
require regulation but different enough to provide for an exemption from most rules. Coming at 
the time, these restrictions were geared towards reducing catch and thus prohibiting commercial 
competition from Aleuts. Considering that the fur seal harvest was the basis o f the Unangan 
economy for over 100 years by then, it is likely that hunters would have joined commercial 
enterprises if  they could have. Unangans were considered wards o f  the government, though, so it 
was unlikely that the government would have considered granting a contract to the communities 
themselves. The treaty language created enduring, sticky concepts that show up in other contexts 
as what sociologists DiMaggio and Powell (1991) call “institutional isomorphism,” the 
replication o f institutions for similar purposes without regard to unique circumstance. I will 
discuss these two ideas later in the chapter, in regards to other species and regulatory 
environments.
In 1912, Congress declared a five-year moratorium on fur seal harvests excepting seals 
taken for subsistence, whose skins were also allowed to be sold. Articles o f the time illuminate a 
debate stoked by passionate conservationists over fur seal management methods. A Fur Seal 
Service adviser argued in the New York Times that a moratorium could be detrimental to the herd 
because “superfluous males” would depress populations by fighting and killing other seals (Lucas 
1913). Writing in Science, former Secretary to the American Fur Seal Commission and Bureau of 
Fisheries agent George A. Clark argued that the government should not introduce another
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moratorium on fur sealing, as a moratorium would essentially translate into an extensive native 
harvest, “ When left without restraint, it is well known that the natives are unable to resist the 
temptation to kill pup seals fo r  fo o d ’ (Clark 1913). Clark’s comment is interesting for a few 
reasons, not the least o f which is an assertion that native harvests would be unsustainable if  not 
controlled by the federal government. It is clear that the federal government was at the time 
unable to control its own Treasury agents, several o f whom were investigated for corruption in 
overharvesting seals to sell without authorization.
The United States managed the fur seal harvest together with Russia, Japan, and Great 
Britain (for Canada) for most o f the 20th century for sealskin products, until populations became 
depressed and conservation organizations mounted significant pressure to halt the trade. This 
enterprise in various institutional forms persisted for nearly 100 years but fell apart after the U.S. 
discontinued its factory for processing fur seals on the island in the mid-1980s24. The exploitative 
social conditions on the Pribilof Islands persisted from 1786 until 1962 when Aleut hunters began 
to receive pay for their work after a successful lawsuit against the government. The islands also 
remained closed to others until the permit system was ended in 1964 (Roppel 1984). As an 
example o f how intertwined marine mammals management is with Alaskan history, Aleut people 
were granted free movement, a basic civil right, not through the Civil Rights Act o f 1964, but 
through the Fur Seal Act o f 196625.
The growth o f the whaling fleet: the decline o f the whales
Fur seals were one o f  the first, but not the only valuable marine resource in Alaska.
Commercial whaling made a dramatic entrance in the 1840s when right whale summering
grounds in the G ulf o f Alaska and off the Kamchatka Peninsula were found by Yankee whalers
looking for baleen, bones and oil for industrial applications. Exploitation rapidly intensified,
evidenced by the growth o f American whaling ships in Alaskan waters growing by order of
magnitude (a few in 1840 to 300-400 by 1851) over a decade (Gilmore 1978; Scarff 1991).
Commercial bowhead whaling elicited a similar pattern, from one ship in 1848 to fifty in 1849
and two hundred-twenty in 1852 (Bockstoce and Botkin 1983). A third o f the total pelagic catch
was taken by 1852, and half by 1865 as the population crashed from an estimated 18,000 before
24 In 1983, St. Paul islanders, although economically devastated, rallied their neighbors and declared St. Paul Independence Day (Feidt 2008).25 Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151 et seq.
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the commercial era to 3,000 by the end o f  the century (Woodby and Botkin 1993). Whalers in the 
Eastern North Pacific next turned to humpback whales, killing an estimated 4-5000 whales in 
Alaska and British Columbia between 1905 and 1910 (Rice 1978). Alaska Native communities 
living off pelagic marine mammals felt the intense brunt o f this exploitation as they saw their 
livelihoods destroyed. For instance, ninety percent o f people on St. Lawrence Island died in a 
famine between 1878 and 1880, when there were not enough walrus to feed the community after 
pelagic whalers had taken up to 140,000 walruses with the whaling fleets over the period o f 1867 
to 1883 (Bockstoce 1982). The Russian traders were even disgusted by the lawlessness and 
ruthlessness o f the exploitation, as Tikhemenev explains their difficulty in keeping American 
whalers at bay:
Continuous complaints from  the year 1843 up to 1850 prove that the temerity o f  
the whalers became extreme. Landing on the island o f  the Aleutian and Kurile 
groups, they cut wood where they pleased and rendered oil on the 
beach ...moreover, in their rowdiness they have often demolished native huts and  
small company posts, answering with threats or derision when reminded o f  the 
existing regulations and o f  the prohibition against whaling near the shore 
(Tikhmenev 1978: 317).
Ecological and social legacies o f whaling
Because whaling was conducted from off-shore vessels in the most intensive period of
exploitation, there were no effective rules preventing open-access overharvesting, in accordance
to earlier Anglo-Russian treaties establishing freedom o f navigation. The exploitation of large
whales has had several legacy effects on Alaska social-ecological systems. Because they
reproduce slowly, large marine mammals have been slow to recover. A whale census in 1980 in
the northern G ulf o f Alaska concluded that all species o f great whales were severely depleted. In
an area that historically supported thousands o f whales, the census found only 159 fin whales,
363 humpback whales, and 36 sperm whales (Rice and Wolman 1982). Ecological legacy effects
include the change in bowhead whale summering grounds away from Kamchatka and other
refuge areas (Springer et al. 2006) and a potential restructuring o f the marine ecosystem due to
the loss of food for predators and nutrients from dead animals (Kareiva et al. 2006). Authors such
as Myers and Worm (2003) have hypothesized a shift towards pelagic fisheries and bottom-up
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ecological dynamics26 as the great whales were no longer feeding on plankton to the same extent, 
removing food limitations for other species (Essington 2006; Kareiva et al. 2006).
Social legacies o f this era include expanded patterns o f trade for Inupiat and other 
whalers working from shore-based whaling stations (Brower 1942; Bockstoce 1986) before the 
collapse o f  whale stocks. More ominous legacies include the starvation o f St. Lawrence Islanders 
and social structures in St. Lawrence communities due to the overharvest o f walrus by whalers 
(Mudar and Speaker 2003), a population collapse o f Aleut peoples in the Aleutians (Black 2004) 
and widespread foreign diseases to which Alaska Natives had no immunity and few remedies 
(Fortuine 1989). Communities battered by war, disease and famine were in many cases forced to 
relocate or otherwise re-organized through missionary expansion and the development of 
territorial health and education systems. Despite all o f this unimaginable change, many 
communities continued recognizable indigenous patterns of subsistence production, sharing and 
trade. That is not to say that the social-ecological system dynamics prior to colonization remained 
unchanged, but that even through ecological and social collapse, the memory o f the system in 
many parts o f Alaska was strong enough in individuals, families, in communities, their languages 
and practices that the subsistence lifeworld continued despite these shocks to the system.
Management of marine mammals in the Territory of Alaska
In 1902, C ongress passed  the A laska G am e Law , assign ing  pro tection  o f  A laskan
m am m als to the U .S. B ureau o f  B iological Survey (later m erged w ith  the U .S. B ureau o f  
Fisheries to becom e the U .S. F ish and W ildlife  Service). A n exem ption allow ed A laska 
N atives to hun t gam e anim als and birds for fu r and clothing, but restricted  them  from  
shipping or selling any part o ther than the hides. T he law  w as am ended in 1903 to clarify  
that parts and skins o f  anim als k illed  for m eat cannot later be sold for com m erce. C aptain 
C .R .E. R adclyffe, an E nglish  big gam e sportsm an w riting  a t the tim e, condem ned w hat 
he considered to be w idespread k illing  o f  brow n bears and o ther b ig  gam e for the skin 
trade by  A laska N atives acting  under the exem ption  (R adclyffe 1904: 29). This tension 
betw een regulated  “ sportsm en” and  seem ingly  unregulated  subsistence take w ould
26 In studies of marine trophic systems, both food limitation (bottom-up drivers) and levels o f predation (top-down drivers) limit population growth of secondary consumers like whales and seals; one or the other drivers may be dominant in any ecosystem for a variety of reasons (see Essington 2006).
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rem ain  a fau lt line in A laskan  w ild life  po litics th rough  to the p resen t tim e. To its credit, 
C ongress recognized on the one hand, the im portance o f  food security  in A laska for 
A laska N atives and others liv ing out in the country , and on the o ther hand, its low  
likelihood o f  enforcing stronger restrictions. The gam e law  passed  by  C ongress in  1908 
reaffirm ed the exem ption.
Federal control o f resources
As the Alaskan territory grew in (non-Native) population, Congress authorized more
homerule functions. In 1912, the second Organic Act created a new civil government for Alaska,
but left federal control o f  resources intact. Fishing and mining interests (i.e., the Alaska Lobby)
succeeded in putting in a clause that expressly forbade the legislature, ..to alter, amend, modify
and repeal measures relating to fish  and game''' (Naske and Slotnick 1987: 95). In de facto
fashion, most fish and game rules profited commercial interests entrenched in Alaska, especially
the Seattle-based fisheries industry. Budding statehood advocates had reason to believe that
federal agencies were biased towards these large industrial partners. Naske and Slotnick (1987)
note that when the Bureau o f Fisheries (pre-cursor to the National Marine Fisheries Service)
established a Pacific branch in Seattle, it conveniently located its offices in a building where
twenty o f the major salmon companies were located. At the time, both the Bureau and its parent
Department o f Commerce resisted any suggestions that Alaskans be given any role in the
management o f salmon.
In 1925, Congress passed another game law for Alaska. It created the Alaska Game 
Commission to establish hunting seasons, register guides, and set limits on the number o f animals 
that can be killed. Natives who had not “adopted a civilized mode o f living” did not need a 
hunting license. They were allowed to take game during closed seasons when “in absolute need of 
food and other food is not available.”
Subsistence whaling defined
Around the globe, but very much o f local concern, the first Convention for the Regulation
of W haling27, signed in Geneva in 1931 and entered into force in 1935, exempted “aborigines”
from the restrictions o f the treaty, provided that they used non-industrial technology to capture
27 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1931,49 Stat. 3079; T.S. 880.
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whales and did not sell whale parts to third persons. The text borrows content and reflects the 
intent from the 1911 fur seal treaty. Article three o f the convention states:
The present Convention does not apply to aborigines dwelling on the coasts o f  
the territories o f  the High Contracting Parties provided that:
(1) They only use canoes, pirogues or other exclusively native craft propelled by 
oars or sails;
(2) They do not carry firearms;
(3) They are not in the employment o f  persons other than aborigines;
(4) They are not under contract to deliver the products o f  their whaling to any 
third person.
Here the international community is defining subsistence whaling as that which fixes aboriginal 
technology to pre-industrial time periods and separates the cash economy from the subsistence 
economy. Both o f these ideas continue to provide an undercurrent to Alaskan resource politics. 
The revised International Convention for the Regulation o f  Whaling28 in 1946 only mentions 
aboriginal fisheries in exempting them from a moratorium on harvesting grey or right whales.
The exemption was later deleted, subjecting local whaling patterns to global regulation.
Ecological and social legacies o f the American colonial era
Ecological legacies o f this era include population declines o f  fur seals, sea otters, whales
and walrus. Both the Russian and later the American government began to design rules relating to
conservation o f the species, although most early rules existed to promote the exclusivity and
profitability o f the fur sealing enterprise. Novel Russian and Unangan policies such as area
closures and protection o f females were adopted by the new American government, which
gradually developed a successful fur seal fishery. Settlements begun by Russian colonists
endured, including St. George and St. Paul. The paternalistic government overseers and corporate
foundations for the towns also endured until “abandonment” o f the Pribilof Aleuts by the U.S.
government in the 1970s (Jones 1980) once the demand for furs in Europe had declined and a
28 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule o f Whaling Regulations 1946, 62 Stat. 1716; T.I.A.S. 1849.
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burgeoning environmental movement in Europe and the contiguous United States gained 
momentum.
Social legacies o f this era include sweeping social change through epidemics, slavery, the 
expansion and transfer o f empire, and significant change in many communities in human- 
environmental relations through subsistence species declines from commercial overharvest. Such 
traumatic changes must have undermined generations-old cultural traditions that arguably 
supported sustainable ecological practices prior to colonization. In the Inupiaq community of 
Wales, for instance, after the Spanish flu o f 1918 decimated one-third o f the prosperous town, 
visiting priests assembled surviving men and women and forcibly married them to new spouses in 
order to create families for the surviving children who had lost parents (Griest undated). Many of 
the town’s most prominent whalers died in the epidemic, which would have also affected the 
social organization o f the town due to the influence whalers have in the social life o f a whaling 
village, and as the providers o f the largest source o f food for the village. The town which once 
numbered near 600 (Griest undated) is now home to 136 people (ACDCIS 2009).
Alaska Natives also experienced subtle changes that nevertheless had important impacts 
on the way people lived their lives. Women in many communities were actively involved in the 
trade o f fish and game prior to and with Russian colonies (Frink 2007). Frink (2007) argues that 
mercantile influences on the way subsistence foods were stored, processed and distributed the 
Yukon-Kuskokwim delta drove changes in the way men and women participated in trade, with 
women gaining status from trade in game under the Russians but losing it with the American 
colonial focus on the fiir trade29.
The colonial era stretches through an increasingly internationalized resource management 
regime. From early trade taxes to the declaration o f Russian sovereignty over Alaska to the 
Alaska purchase, interactions between colonial powers drove three major changes in coastal 
Alaskan communities: tragic loss o f thousands o f Alaska Natives including whole communities 
through murder, war, disease and deprivation; depletion of fur seals, otters, whales and walrus; 
and an imposed system o f human-environmental relations built on commercial trade. In order to
29 Frink (2007) argues that a change in the site o f food storage, from beneath the house in the early colonial era to outside the house in the late colonial era illustrates the wane in women’s influence over the production of subsistence foods. Animal processing for fur sales in Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta region required less expertise from women, whereas animal processing for trade in meat was the province of women.
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rationally harvest fur seals, the Russian American Company (RAC) eventually adopted several 
policies: it was granted a monopoly over the American fur trade, successfully bounding the 
system from other would-be traders for a time; on the advice o f Unangan hunters, the RAC 
adopted conservation measures such as the protection o f females; and the RAC structured its 
purchases to reward certain age-classes o f fur seal pelts. Several o f these beginning conservation 
measures were adopted by the incoming Americans, who largely ran the commercial enterprise 
the same way.
Many of the social impacts o f the system are still in evidence in the Pribilof Islands as St. 
Paul and St. George were essentially company towns, built around the fur seal rookeries. The 
story o f pelagic whaling is largely one o f uncontrolled harvest until depletion in the North Pacific. 
Neither Russia nor America would significantly intervene in the harvests until the early 20th 
century. These legacies o f colonial administration and the removal o f large quantities o f animals 
from the waters surrounding Alaska remain in the system, from genetic bottlenecks in the 
bowhead whale population to a re-ordering o f the Unangan-fur seal relationship in modem times 
and the continuity o f Yankee whaling equipment in the modem Alaska Native bowhead whale 
fishery.
Advent o f  Alaskan statehood: 1958 -1972
The American colonial period saw a small but growing population o f non-Native people
(many associated with mining, fishing, and the military) establishing towns and building a system 
o f governance for Alaska, largely without Native influence. The coastal populations and visitors 
began to compete directly for marine mammals as sources of material for commerce, food and 
sport around the state. Prior to Alaskan statehood, marine mammals were treated in American law 
much like terrestrial animals, with the nature of regulations designed depending on their 
perceived utility and threat from overharvesting. Under the International Convention for the 
Regulation o f Whaling, and the Fur Seal and Sea Otter Treaty, the use o f marine mammals was 
increasingly governed at the international level. The Territory o f Alaska, and later the State, 
shared authority with Washington D.C. for day-to-day management o f most marine mammal 
species.
Under Alaska’s second Organic Act o f 1912, federal wildlife managers managed wildlife 
assisted by the Alaska Game Commission, an advisory board. With the passage o f the Alaska
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Statehood Act in 1960, the federal government prepared to transfer its powers o f wildlife 
management to the state except for fur seals and sea otters, which remained federally managed30. 
The transfer o f power at the time was standard for federal-state relationships, as states are 
considered the “owners” o f wildlife (not covered through existing treaties) through the State 
Ownership Doctrine established by the 1896 Geer v. Connecticut Supreme Court decision31 (Bean 
and Rowland 1997). However, the Territorial Governor at the time, Hugh Wade, reported to 
Washington, D.C. that no provisions for Alaska Native use o f fish and game had been protected 
in the new State’s wildlife management statute and the transfer became contingent upon the State 
developing protections for subsistence use o f resources (Norris 2002).
The development of Alaskan bureaucracies
By 1960, Alaska passed a revised statute (Title 16) in which subsistence harvests were
regulated in a way similar to sport fisheries in that hunters were expected to become licensed and 
follow state-administered rules; additionally, all residents could participate in subsistence fishing 
as long as they used allowable technology. No distinction between subsistence and sport game 
hunting was recognized. Although the State promised to expand citizen collaboration in wildlife 
management through regional advisory councils, most o f the active councils were located in 
urban, largely non-Native population centers, reducing any influence rural residents might have 
had (Norris 2002). In the 1950s, there were few Alaska Native organizations involved in formal 
systems o f wildlife management, with the potential exception o f the Alaska Indian Brotherhood 
in the Southeast region and the Tanana Chiefs Conference in the Interior, both formed in 1912 
(Norris 2002) but neither were actively involved in the development o f a state regime.
At the same time, most Alaska Native communities were using local institutions and 
other forms o f  governance with respect to wildlife, save for the occasional visit by a federal game 
warden. One priority o f the incoming wildlife regime, former state officials say, was to create 
legal seasons to reflect local practices so that people would be law-abiding. Oliver “Bud” Burris,
30 These two species were subject to existing international management schemes, although the federal government did allow for revenue sharing from both resources through Section 6 of the Alaska Statehood Act.31 161 U.S. 519(1896).
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a former manager with the Alaska Department o f Fish & Game notes:
One o f  my firs t assignments in the winter o f 1961-1962 was traveling the Yukon,
Kobuk and Noatak rivers to fin d  out what people were doing as fa r  as game was 
concerned... What we found  out was people were necessarily hunting out o f  
season. The federal seasons were so restrictive they couldn’t get the meat they 
needed... We began a process o f  liberalizing seasons on moose to f i t  what the 
local people needed and what the population could sustain...{Mowry 2009).
Moose and caribou were largely managed to promote food security for all Alaskans through 
promoting harvests in abundant populations and restricting harvests in depressed ones based on 
the philosophy o f game management. Many marine mammals, however, were to be managed by 
the state for sport-hunting or other uses, which created some worry in rural communities that 
subsistence would not be considered a priority for the new state. After all, the new State 
constitution described Alaska’s vast resources as commons, meant to be shared by all and 
regulated by the State. Social movements among Alaska Native villages and leaders were 
mobilized in response to the growth o f resource development and increasingly bureaucratized 
systems o f wildlife management that eventually clashed with subsistence resource use patterns. 
The 1961 arrest o f State Representative John Nusunginya for hunting ducks out o f  season lead to 
the renowned Barrow Duck-In of 1961, as hundreds o f Barrow residents demanded to be arrested 
in solidarity with their ducks in hand, protesting the enforcement o f the Migratory Bird Treaty 
(Langdon 1984; Huntington 1992; Sepez-Aradanas 2002; Burwell 2005).
Land transfers and social movements
Statehood brought a boost to resource development, including state lands transfers and oil
development. Under provisions o f the Statehood Act, the new State o f Alaska applied to the 
Bureau o f Land Management for transfer o f title to lands and began a leasing program for oil and 
gas development (Rogers 1969). In response, by mid 1966, Alaska Native regional associations 
had claimed title to two hundred ninety million acres o f land and financial compensation through 
the Bureau o f Indian Affairs for lands already transferred to the Alaskan state (Rogers 1969). 
Eventually, the Secretary o f the Interior32 announced that lands selections would be frozen until
32 Both Bureaus of Land Management and Indian Affairs are located within the Department o f the Interior and have had overlapping jurisdiction for land transfers.
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resolution o f Alaska Native aboriginal land claims (Rogers 1969), giving some time for political 
organizing. Regional organizations developed from the North Slope to Southeast and eventually 
came together to form the Alaska Federation o f Natives in 1966 (Rogers 1969).
The ecological status of marine mammal populations
Prior to the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act, marine mammals in Alaskan waters
were managed in disparate programs based on either international treaties (fur seals, sea otters, 
and whales) or consumptive-use management goals such as sport hunting (polar bear and walrus) 
and predator-control programs (whiskered seals and belugas). In gaining control over wildlife 
management, the new Alaska Department o f Fish & Game set about researching the status and 
uses of the State’s wildlife. By the late 1950s, all o f the great whales were depleted from Alaskan 
waters due to Russian, European, and American whaling (Springer et al. 2006), and the walrus 
population remained depressed from the devastating exploitation o f the colonial era (Fay 1957). 
Fur seals in the Pribilofs, however, had largely recovered by the early 1950s but as the population 
appeared to be near carrying capacity the government initiated a controversial program33 to cull 
females in 1953 (Scheffer et al. 1984).
After World W ar II, polar bears became a prominent trophy game animal on the Alaskan 
coasts; prior to statehood, harvests by sport hunters were tracked to greater or lesser extent 
through the export o f skins (Lentfer 1970). The State o f Alaska classified polar bears as “big 
game” in its 1960 game laws, which limited hunting through bag limits. By 1961 hunters were 
required to present the skins to the State for monitoring harvests (BSFW and Alaska 1965). Early 
on, Alaska Native guides had been successful guides for sport-hunters but their businesses 
suffered under the growth o f aerial bear hunting, which was faster and more efficient but largely 
populated by non-Native guides. In addition, subsistence hunters were prohibited from using 
aircraft to hunt bears. The state did still allow a trade in skins, however.
By 1965, aerial hunting o f polar bears was thought to have seriously affected populations 
around the Arctic and the International Union for the Conservation o f Nature (IUCN) convened a 
meeting o f polar bear experts in Fairbanks, Alaska to discuss developing a pan-Arctic polar bear 
conservation strategy. Alaskan bear biologists had relied on bear sightings by pilots in their 
assessment o f the robustness o f populations in remote regions such as the Chukchi Sea coast, but
33 Unangan sealers and some naturalists protested this program, as they felt it would be disastrous to the herd (Torrey 1978).
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the increasing likelihood o f a shut-down o f the sport hunt affected the working relationship o f 
biologists and guides and the state began to doubt the validity o f the positive population data from 
the pilots (Lentfer 1972). Russia had earlier declared their Chukchi polar bear population (shared 
with Alaska) depleted and had banned hunting in 1954, although Alaskan biologists disputed the 
evidence o f declines or the ability o f the international community to manage polar bears more 
successfully (Lentfer 1970). By 1970, the American representative to the IUCN group reported 
that restrictions in harvest would likely be necessary to counter increased aerial hunting (Lentfer 
1970). In 1973, the parties agreed34 to an end to commercial hunting, protection o f polar bear 
habitat, and scientific studies through a multilateral treaty35 (Fikkan et al. 1993; Baur 1995).
Federal pre-emption and institutional legacies
The State o f Alaska held management authority for marine mammals from 1960 until
1972, when authority for management was pre-empted by the federal Marine Mammal Protection
Act and management functions subsumed by the U.S. Fish &Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The early statehood era was a brief period for marine
mammal management, in which the state began to build its competence in wildlife management
and a regulatory system. The introduction of this wildlife management regime was premised on
the idea that a small department o f biologists and enforcement officers could achieve the
following: effectively survey remote animal populations to assess trends in population dynamics,
effectively manage human interactions across the same vast spaces, and do so in a collaborative
fashion with equal consideration for subsistence and sport interests36. Certain marine mammals
(e.g., walrus, polar bears, Steller sea lions) had been managed as game animals since colonial
times for visiting sport hunters who would report their catch to Territorial officials as they
attempted to export it (Radclyffe 1904). Marine mammals, to the extent they were not already
managed by the federal government, were included in the new state wildlife management system
34 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, TIAS No. 8409, 27 UST 3918 (November 15, 1973)[hereinafter Polar Bear Agreement],35 Interestingly, the United States has been out of compliance to the Agreement since 1972, as it never set aside comparable amounts of habitat in accordance to Article II (Baur 1995). In 2005, the United States representative to the Polar Bear Specialist’s Group (PBSG) suggested that the United States was interested in re-opening the treaty in order to delete habitat provisions, rather than conform to its obligations (Aars et al. 2006). After listing polar bears as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act in February 2008, however, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service eventually agreed to designate critical habitat protections in exchange for settling a lawsuit with environmental groups.36 The State continues to struggle with the second two of these tasks in relationship to wildlife they manage.
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based on utility with the management goal o f maximum sustained yield. A key legacy o f this era 
was the refusal on the part o f the state to distinguish between subsistence and sports hunters in the 
management o f wildlife other than fisheries. Another legacy important to the history o f marine 
mammal management was the mobilization o f Alaska Native organizations defending their 
aboriginal rights to lands and resources and demanding an official role in governing Alaska 
resource management.
Period o f  multiple sovereigns: 1972 - present
The decades o f the 1960s and 1970s were a period o f environmental awakening in the
United States. Many o f the Nation’s key environmental policies including the National 
Environmental Policy Act (1970), the Endangered Species Act (1973) and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (1972) were passed into law during this time. The Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) was the culmination o f a campaign lead by many voices within conservation, scientific 
and commercial circles who believed in a unified approach to marine mammal conservation.
Bean and Rowland describe three different advocacy coalitions involved in the MMPA: a 
sustainable use group made up of commercial interests, some scientists and conservationists in 
the Gifford Pinchot tradition; ecologically-minded scientists and conservationists interested in 
marine mammals’ role in marine ecosystems; and animal welfare-oriented preservationists 
arguing for protection based on individual animal rights and the superior intellect o f marine 
mammals (1997: 110). The diversity o f opinions resulted in a compromise bill that Bean and 
Rowland describe as, “ .. .neither purely protectionist nor purely exploitive but almost always 
complex” (1997: 111). One artifact o f the compromises made was the maintenance o f split 
jurisdiction over marine mammal management between two separate federal bureaucracies (Bean 
and Rowland 1997). The Department o f Interior’s U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) 
oversees resource management relating to the take of polar bears, walrus, sea otters and manatees. 
The Department o f Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) manages a similar 
program for whales and seals (excepting walrus). Both programs involve management functions 
such as research, enforcement, incidental take by fisheries and harassment by other industries, 
and regulating subsistence hunting of “depleted” species by Alaska Natives. Wherever the range 
o f USFWS and NMFS managed species overlap, communities harvesting marine mammals are 
also subject to two different approaches to management led by each agency.
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The burgeoning environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s overlapped with 
another movement towards tribal sovereignty and recognition o f aboriginal rights across Indian 
Country37. New Alaska Native Organizations mobilized to stop indiscriminate land transfers to 
the State without a land claim agreement and prior to expanded oil and gas development, that had 
already displaced people, cabins, and gravesites. Their extraordinary efforts combined with oil 
and gas company pressures to clear title to land culminated in the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act o f 197138 (Mitchell 2001; Hensley 2008), which exchanged aboriginal lands and 
hunting rights for the surface rights o f up to forty-four million acres o f land, the establishment of 
regional corporations to manage lands, and a cash settlement. Human access to terrestrial wildlife 
populations was to be managed by the State; however, Congress intended that subsistence uses 
for Alaska Natives would be a priority in times o f shortage39. Marine mammals were not yet 
considered a special category of wildlife for management purposes. Fur seal harvests and research 
was governed under the Fur Seal Treaty Act, polar bears were managed as large game by the 
State, and whiskered seals were managed as pests.
The politics of defining subsistence in the MMPA
Growing national environmental consciousness and conservation movements propelled
the Congress to develop a categorical way o f managing human interactions with marine 
mammals. Congress debated two major bills that informed the final Marine Mammal Protection 
Act o f 1972. Rhetorical flourishes in the accompanying Congressional report give some insight 
into the political considerations and value orientations o f both the House and Senate committees 
(and personalities on the committees) hearing the bills at the time. The Congressional report on 
House bill (H.R. 10420) begins a section on legislative background this way:
Recent history indicates that m an’s impact upon marine mammals has ranged 
from  what might be termed malign neglect to virtual genocide. These 
animals ...have only rarely benefittedfrom our interest: they have been shot, 
blown up, clubbed to death, run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to a
37 “Indian Country” is a commonly used name to describe lands owned by indigenous peoples in the United States, but also indigenous communities generally.38 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971,43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.39 In 1980, Congress passed provisions protecting subsistence under Title VIII o f the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. Urban hunters challenged this requirement as unconstitutional under the Alaskan constitution and won in the Alaska Supreme Court. Since 1991 dual management systems exist across the state for state and federal lands.
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multitude o f  other indignities, all in the interests ofprofit or recreation (U.S.
House 1971: 11-12).
The same section in the 1972 Senate bill describes the policy problem this way:
The committee has learned that m an’s dealings with marine mammals have in 
many areas resulted in over-utilization o f  this precious natural resource (U.S.
Senate 1972: 1-2).
In both bills, Senator Ted Stevens was able to ensure an Alaska Native exemption from the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act’s moratorium on take, provided that populations were not 
depleted. When the Congressional bill H.R. 10420 and accompanying report was released from 
committee for a vote on the floors o f the House and Senate, Alaska Natives and the Alaska 
Congressional delegation were alarmed at the bill’s moratorium on the production o f crafts and 
foodstuffs for sale from marine mammals (Morgan 1972).
Senator Ted Stevens, through his friend, Commerce Committee Chairman Senator 
Magnuson, was able to secure a Congressional field hearing in Nome during the month o f May 
1972 where hunters, producers and their families flocked to give testimony on the bill (Morgan 
1972). Several remarked that the bill’s key supporters knew little, if  anything, about the Alaska 
subsistence life. A reporter from the Washington Post noted that those testifying struggled to find 
analogies o f the importance o f subsistence that Americans from the rest o f the country might 
relate to:
“I t ’s like telling a coal miner you can only dig enough to heat your house but you  
ca n ’t sell any, ” one said. “Learning to hunt and carve are equivalent to a 
Masters in college, ” maintained Paul Tuilana, a walrus hunter with 35 years 
experience from  King Island. “Now this bill has taken away my diploma. ” The 
status o f  hunters is like that offootball players. In many villages the young  
people look up to them and sometimes they are village leaders, reported Jerome 
Trigg, president o f  the Bering Strait Native Association (Morgan 1972).
The next year’s Senate version o f the bill (S. 2871) included a provision allowing for handicraft 
production as long as it was “authentic” and not highly commercialized. Food derived from 
marine mammal subsistence hunting could continue to be sold, as long as it were either sold in a
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native village or town or sold for consumption by Alaska Natives residing elsewhere. The 
Conference Committee to create a compromise bill adopted the Senate language. The Committee 
also adopted the Senate bill’s allowance for subsistence take o f endangered species, provided it 
was overseen by the Secretary of Interior or Commerce (U.S. House 1972).
The main goals o f the MMPA are to “maintain the health and stability o f the marine 
ecosystem,” and, wherever consistent with this first goal, sustain optimum populations of marine 
mammals within the carrying capacity o f their environment (§ 2(6)). These goals were to be met 
through a general moratorium on the taking o f marine mammals subject to limited exceptions, 
and the protection of important habitat features. The focus on ecosystem functioning and a 
recognition o f animal populations as important units to be conserved within a species were unique 
contributions to wildlife law40. Although the law preempted state laws relating to marine 
mammals, the MMPA (Section 109) allows for a process by which a state may apply to regain 
management authority through a waiver o f the moratorium, and the State o f Alaska prepared 
itself to apply for management authority over nine species of marine mammals in 1973. Under the 
proposed Alaskan management scheme, non-depleted marine mammal species would potentially 
be available for hunting by all, regardless of their prior rights or historical dependence for 
subsistence. The management paradigm was also distinctly different than the Congressional 
intent, based on a maximum sustained yield approach instead o f the more progressive focus on 
ecosystems. The State went even further, though, to promise to manage for abundance o f game 
animals and intensive predator (e.g., whiskered seals, belugas) control in order to maintain high 
populations o f valued animals, while eliminating perceived competition from officially unvalued 
ones.
The State of Alaska bids to manage marine mammals
In 1976, after a review o f the application and a series o f field hearings, a federal
administrative judge ruled that the Secretaries o f Commerce and Interior should transfer authority 
for marine mammals to the state (Interagency Task Group 1978). This conclusion was also 
supported by submitted comment letters from the University of Alaska, the Alaska Professional 
Hunters Association, Inc., the Safari Club; and, curiously, the National Wildlife Federation as
40 Unfortunately, as the years have gone by, neither agency has been able to manage on an ecosystem basis, partially due to statutory requirements for a minimum amount o f information about “strategic” stocks -  depleted populations or those likely to be subject to fisheries bycatch (Robards 2008).
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well as the Wildlife Society. Both the National Wildlife Federation and The Wildlife Society 
testified that since population levels o f the nine species appeared to be stable, and given that 
..Congress never intended that the moratorium on the taking o f  marine mammals be invoked 
any longer than necessary to insure the adequate safeguarding o f  each species.. .” (Interagency 
Task Group 1978: Section IX), the organizations supported the transfer o f  management authority.
Value orientations of policy actors
The Environmental Defense Fund and Monitor, Inc. submitted a joint letter opposing the
transfer based on an inadequate review of the environmental consequences o f the transfer, and a 
questioning o f its data and conclusions. Among other points, they argued that the MMPA does 
not allow a management focus on maximum sustained yield, and that the Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement did not review other kinds o f take o f marine mammals in Alaska, such as 
harassment by industry and animals that are taken but not retrieved (i.e., struck and lost). The 
Society for Animal Protective Legislation argued against the use o f firearms, and killing o f 
animals generally for commercial or sport-related uses. In an attached letter to NMFS, the Society 
argued that prior to the A ct’s passage, the State o f Alaska had opposed it, and sought to have 
itself exempted from the Act entirely through a proposal that was defeated on the floor o f the 
Senate. The Society also argued that the transfer would essentially allow Alaska to manage 
marine mammals in the same way as before the Act was passed with a set o f policy goals opposed 
to the substance o f the Act -  the protection o f all marine mammals. For instance, the Society 
noted that many individuals came forward in Kodiak for hearings on the MMPA who were 
claiming an economic hardship exemption from the Act. Among them were non-Native hunters 
whose sole livelihoods were based on marine mammal products, fishermen taking sea lions, and a 
fiill-time IRS agent who hunted marine mammals in his spare time. Alaska’s proposed regulations 
would have created a legal avenue for the fishermen and IRS agent to continue their current 
practices, which the Society was opposed to41.
41 In its argument against entrusting Alaska with the management of marine mammals, the Society quotes Mr. Vania, the Director of the Alaska Department of Fish & Game, who credited predator control policies for conserving valued resources, saying, “ .. .otherwise we’d be overrun with killer whales or mice or what have you” (Interagency Task Group 1978: Section IX).
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Alaska Native organizations protest the transfer
Newly energized Alaska Native organizations also testified against state management o f
marine mammals. Perhaps in preparation for being accused o f not protecting subsistence rights in 
its proposal, the drafters o f the assessment wrote:
Native subsistence dependency has decreased since the white man began to 
colonize Alaska. The granting o f  40 million acres in fe e  title land and nearly $1 
billion to the Natives under provisions o f  the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) should accelerate this trend. It has been said that ANCSA will have 
as great an impact upon the Alaska N ative’s traditional way o f  life as did their 
early encounter with white m an’s culture (Interagency Task Group 1978: Section 
IX).
The Bering Straits Native Corporation (BSNC) writing from Nome took offense to the 
characterization, writing:
The impact o f  ANCSA on village life style has been very little...The follow ing are 
the individual resident stockholder share from  the ANCSA distribution checks:
1973- $182.00, 1974 - 92.23, 1975-78.41. We d o n ’tforesee any major change in 
the lifestyle and subsistence dependence o f  the Alaskan Native Village Residents 
on marine mammals in the near fu ture  (Interagency Task Group 1978: Section 
IX).
The Corporation summed up its opposition to the proposal this way:
We strongly oppose the proposed state regulations as currently written... as they 
are too restrictive; they do not make special reference to taking o f  seals fo r  
food... We realize that the moratorium and game management is primarily 
designedfor the conservation o f  marine mammals and fo r  balanced ecosystem 
[sic]. We do, however, fe e l strongly that the Alaska Native Needs [sic] were not 
emphasized enough, particularly in the proposed federal regulations and the 
state regulations. I f  all taking was terminated on any species o f  seals or walrus, 
the effect would be to bring to point o f  starvation to these small Alaskan Native 
Villages that depend primarily on sea mammals fo r  food. We ask that other form s 
o f  taking o f  marine mammals be terminatedfirst before you force the Alaska
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Natives to the point o f  breaking the law (Interagency Task Group 1978: Section 
IX).
Nunam Kitlutsisti, the environmental advisor to the Association o f Village Council Presidents in 
the lower Yukon-Kuskokwim region o f  Alaska, provided data on the amount o f subsistence food 
harvested per village per year based on household calendars to track consumption patterns. They 
estimated that the region consumed 12.8 million pounds o f wild foods in 1974.
Nunam Kitlutsisti also cites two core reasons why it opposes state management:
...that the State has fa iled  to meet its obligation to manage its resources in 
regard to beneficial users, and has fa iled  to adequately provide the funds fo r  
support o f  subsistence communities dependent upon renewable resources; 
and...the State o f  Alaska has little regardfor the future consequences o f  massive 
Federal development plans in the Bering Sea that will make all assumptions 
concerning existing ecological conditions in the Bering Sea null... (Interagency 
Task Group 1978: Section IX).
Both the Bering Straits Native Corporation and Nunam Kitlutsisti emphasize fears that the State 
would manage primarily for sport hunts, neglect research in predominantly rural areas, and place 
primary value on resource development over marine mammals. Consistent with the Alaska 
constitution and wildlife management policy at the time, Alaska proposed a management regime 
with equal access to subsistence species by all residents. In creating its management regime, the 
state did not provide an exemption for Alaska Native subsistence as required by MMPA Section 
101(b), which a US District Court subsequently ruled unlawful given the Federal Government’s 
unique, trust relationship to Alaska Natives (People o f  Togiak v. United States). Following the 
People o f  Togiak ruling, the Federal Government amended the MMPA to design a process states 
would have to go through in order to return authority over marine mammals. Alaska would have 
to abide by the People o f  Togiak ruling and by 1980, the newly passed Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act Title VIII42 protection for rural subsistence.
Again, in 1982, the state o f Alaska considered submitting an application for resuming 
management over 10 species it had previously managed. This effort eventually led to a revised
42 Act o f December 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-487, Title VIII, 94 Stat. 2371, 2422, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3111 et seq.
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plan by 1986, this time targeting only those species with commercial value -w alrus, polar bear, 
and sea otters. The Alaska Department o f Fish & Game (ADFG) held public hearings in over 40 
villages from 1984 to 1985, and finding widespread resistance to the proposal, eventually 
abandoned its pursuit (Langdon 1984). Mistrust o f State priorities and practices was widely felt 
across rural Alaska and in Alaska Native political centers. This feeling was not unanimous, 
however, as groups such as the Eskimo Walrus Commission had worked extensively with the 
State in coming up with potential management plans and declined to take a position on the 
transfer (Langdon 1984).
Regulation o f marine mammals in Alaska has followed a similar trajectory to other 
wildlife management politics in that federal and state agencies have held differing positions on 
and reception to protection of rural subsistence uses as the highest management priority, largely 
prohibiting a unified regime for the state’s wildlife on federal and state lands. Alaska has long 
maintained, and its Supreme Court upheld in the 1989 McDowell v. State o f  Alaska43 decision, 
that it cannot discriminate against urban residents in its prioritization o f subsistence hunting due 
to its equal protection clause in the state constitution (Article 1 § 1). In comparison, under federal 
rules for subsistence hunting on federal lands, rural residents with a “customary and traditional 
use” o f a specified resource have the first priority for hunting in the event o f scarcity.
Federal management and Alaska Natives
Life for Alaska Native communities under federal management has also had its
challenges. Tensions between Alaska Native hunters and the federal agencies grew throughout 
the post-MMPA44 period as decisions by federal powers negatively impacted subsistence hunters 
throughout rural Alaska. The first such decision was made by the federal government in its role as 
delegate to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1977. After submitting harvest 
records to the IWC in 1976 that indicated a significant number o f whales struck and lost in 
Alaska during the whaling season, the IWC voted to enact a complete moratorium on bowhead 
whaling at its 1977 meeting (Dept, o f Commerce 1977). The U.S. government did not challenge 
the decision. Despite prior warnings to the U.S. delegation on the potential adverse impact to 
Alaska Native whaling communities (Dept, o f Commerce 1977), the U.S. delegation did not
43 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).44 In the case of bowhead whales, listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the whales and industrial impacts to them are managed under both the ESA and the MMPA.
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inform Alaskan whalers o f the international movement towards a ban. The movement was 
burgeoned by an anti-whaling and sealing environment movement growing in Europe and the 
U.S.; IWC delegates undertook a precautionary stance on the hunt, given a lack o f data indicating 
a sustainable population level (Freeman 1989).
Whalers politically mobilized in Alaska to fight the ban and uphold their aboriginal 
rights, forming the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission in 1977. Whalers pursued their claim in 
the courts on the basis that the IWC lacked jurisdiction over aboriginal whaling and the U.S. 
government did not honor its trust relationship to Alaska Natives. The whalers even visited with 
Vice President Mondale (Langdon 1984). Whalers reacted to the moratorium by imposing their 
own quota system while initiating negotiations with NMFS and Alaska’s Congressional 
delegation. They were assisted in their efforts by a new, politically well-informed group o f  young 
Inupiaq leaders including Marie Adams and the AEWC Chairman Eugene Brower and as well as 
a sympathetic environmental group, Friends o f the Earth (Huntington 1989). In response to the 
whalers’ intention to resume whaling under their own quota system, the federal administration 
convened a grand jury and subpoenaed five prominent whalers, charging Mr. Brower and an 
AEWC staff member with contempt when the whalers refused to testify (Langdon, 1984).
Resource conflicts and the rise of co-management
With whalers and their wives declaring their intentions to go to jail rather than follow
what they considered to be an unreasonable federal quota for whales, the federal government 
eventually invited AEWC officers to Washington D.C. to discuss a cooperative agreement to 
regulate whaling and the grand jury investigation was dropped45. The 1977 IWC action was the 
first attempt to regulate the Alaska Inupiaq and Yup’ik whale harvest, and as the United States 
did not object to the rule change, the IWC has been involved in monitoring and prescribing catch 
figures for subsistence bowhead whaling in Alaska ever since. While the co-management 
agreement is considered to be successful in regulating harvests, the particular politics o f the 
International Whaling Commission require the whalers to mount a defense o f their management 
program, subsistence rights and lifeworld every time the multi-year quota comes up for renewal.
45 Detailed analyses of the crisis and the eventual agreement between the AEWC and NMFS to co-manage whaling is documented by Huntington (1989), Freeman (1989) and Langdon (1984).
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A second crisis and subsequent mobilization emerged in the 1980s surrounding new rules 
proposed by the USFWS to restrict the nature o f “traditional handicrafts” allowed as a subsistence 
activity under the MMPA. The USFWS undertook two high profile enforcement actions: in 1974 
the Service seized clothing made by Marina Katelnikoff, an Aleut sea otter skin sewer; in 1991, 
the FWS prosecuted the “Teddy Bear Case” against Boyd Didrickson, a Sitka-based Tlingit man 
making teddy bear toys out o f sea otter furs. The Service charged Didrickson with violating rules 
regulating what the service considered “traditional” handicrafts {Didrickson v. Dept, o f  the 
Interior)46. The District Court ruled that the FWS did not have the authority under the MMPA to 
regulate the harvest o f sea otters for handicraft production absent a finding o f depletion o f the 
stock and found the Service’s definition o f “traditional” to be arbitrarily set between 1910 and 
1972. Consequently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Service and co-management groups 
such as The Alaskan Sea Otter and Steller Sea Lion Commission and the Eskimo Walrus 
Commission have worked to develop guidelines for handicraft production that would not be 
arbitrary. These efforts have produced mixed results (Robards and Joly 2007-2008).
There were also positive motions towards home-rule in other parts o f the state. In the 
Arctic, policy entrepreneurs such as Ben Nageak, Marie Adams Carroll, Kathy Frost, and Lloyd 
Lowry brokered co-management relationships with Inuvialuit (Canadian) hunters in the late 
1980s to develop interlocal management arrangements such as the Inuvialuit -  Inupiaq 
Agreement on Beluga Whales and Polar Bears (Adams et al. 1993; Brower et al. 2002; Lovecraft 
2007). In general, this period saw a movement towards more contextualized management, with 
significant local and Alaska Native involvement in state management systems.
Co-management is enshrined in the MMPA
The Marine Mammal Protection Act requires re-authorization every five years, but has
not made it to the floor o f the House or Senate since 1994. That year rumors were circulating in 
Alaska that some o f the environmental groups opposed to marine mammal hunting would seek to 
delete the Section 101(b) exemption for Alaska Natives (Anonymous 2006a). The exemption is 
important because it enshrined in law the unique relationship between coastal Alaska Natives and 
marine mammals and aimed to provide unobtrusive management frameworks by only allowing 
the development o f hard policies such as quotas if  species were found to be depleted. In practice,
46 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
the exemption has been a mixed blessing. Because the agencies have not been able to manage 
before populations are found to be depleted, the harvests o f some species (e.g., Cook Inlet beluga) 
were not actively managed until the population began to crash. Governments such as the Sitka 
Tribe have encouraged voluntary management plans in order to reduce the harvest o f harbor seals 
bound for the sealskin market.
Sovereientv and co-manaeement
Recognition o f tribal authority for pre-emptive management at the village or co­
management level has been actively opposed by the State of Alaska, fearing the recognition of 
Alaska Native sovereignty over resource uses and police powers. Alaska’s predominantly non­
native political leadership, including Senator Ted Stevens47 and others, strongly opposed such 
recognition. This view is reflected in the writing of historian and lobbyist Donald Mitchell48, who 
argued to Congress that tribes do not exist in Alaska and therefore cannot manage resources. In 
the run up to the 1994 amendments, a coalition o f Alaska Native marine mammal advocates, the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Council for Marine Mammals (IPCOMM), began working within the Alaska 
Native Federation for not only maintaining the exemption, but to increase the power o f Alaska 
Native Organizations working with the federal agencies through the development o f co­
management arrangements.
In 1994, Congress amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act and directed the 
National Marine Fisheries Service and the US Fish & Wildlife Service to enter into co­
management agreements with Alaska Native organizations (Section 119) in order to make 
government decision-making about marine mammal conservation and subsistence hunting more 
responsive to Alaska Native concerns. Although not a major agenda item, the Alaska Native 
community was able to gain Congressional support for this amendment, and change the structure 
o f the relationships o f agencies to community groups from one o f uneasy conflict to one of 
collaboration. The boards to be established would be eligible for Congressional appropriations, 
directed to flow through NMFS and USFWS.
47 Senator Stevens reportedly supported a limited amendment of the MMPA that would have allowed federal agencies to adopt local tribal conservation ordinances which would then be enforceable. This amendment has not yet become law as the MMPA has not been reauthorized since 1994.48 Notably, Mitchell represented the Alaska Federation o f Natives until a falling out with the organization.
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Although some boards such as the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission predate the 1994 
amendments, many others were able to form following the policy change without having to 
weather crises or other mobilizing events that often precipitate the formation o f community 
groups. One demand many Alaska Natives had was for managers to acknowledge traditional 
ecological knowledge, defined as the body o f collected knowledge held by an indigenous 
community and developed through long-term, intimate interaction between the people and their 
environment.
The growing recognition of indigenous rights
These demands followed an international movement towards indigenous rights, including
the exercise o f co-management institutions in Canada, homerule functions in Greenland, and 
similar developments elsewhere. In the United States, federal-aboriginal relationships gained 
positive boosts from the Clinton Administration through an executive order affirming the 
govemment-to-govemment relationship between federal agencies and tribes, acknowledgement 
o f Alaskan villages as tribes, and a new program to evaluate federally permitted activities for 
their disproportionate adverse impact on minority or poor communities.
Funding for co-management and related activities grew throughout the 1990s, aided by 
Congressional earmarks and driven by new MMPA mandates for assessing subsistence harvests 
in 1994 (see chapter five). New co-management bodies developed at various spatial or social 
scales (e.g., a village or a statewide organization), and existing tribal bodies began to work with 
IPCOMM to further co-management. Many o f the earlier IPCOMM leaders were also involved 
with broader international movements towards aboriginal rights to resources through 
organizations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. Around the world, communities, 
organizations and government bodies such as the UN were debating recognition o f aboriginal 
rights to resources.
In 1997, the responsive federal agencies executed a memorandum o f agreement with 
IPCOMM, detailing the goals, methods, and means for negotiating Section 119 agreements with 
tribes or tribally authorized Alaska Native organizations (ANOs). The MOA outlines core 
management functions o f the co-management agreements: 1) collecting and analyzing population 
data, 2) institution-building, 3) enforcement, 4) regulating harvests, 5) planning, 6) research, and 
7) training (Dept, o f Commerce et al. 1997). By the year 2000, after a tumultuous period
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following the passage o f the MMPA, marine mammal management in Alaska was in a relatively 
steady state. The post-MMPA period saw a shift in the locus o f rule-making from the federal 
agencies to the state, and then back again to the agencies, before being challenged by growing 
policy venues developed by Alaska Native organizations, such as the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission and the Eskimo Walrus Commission.
As most species recovered from the colonial era, marine mammals management in 
Alaska focused on research and tracking the subsistence harvest together with Alaska Native 
organizations. The State, meanwhile, unable to actively manage marine mammals due to its 
endemic inability to recognize Alaska Native harvests as legally unique, began to specialize in 
research, collaborating with the agencies and communities. This decade has also witnessed new 
challenges such as the inability of some populations to recover (e.g., the Western Stock o f Steller 
sea lions) and the negative impact o f sea ice loss on walrus and polar bear populations largely 
recovered from earlier periods o f intensive harvesting.
One recent challenge has been the development o f stable funding streams for marine 
mammal co-management. The relationship between funding and co-management activities is 
complex. The ability o f funding has catalyzed the development o f some co-management groups, 
such as the Ice Seals Committee while drastic reductions in federal funding, such as occurred in 
2006 and 2007 stalled most programs. Additionally, many co-management boards that were 
accustomed to seeking funding through Congressional earmarks have had to scale down as 
Congress changed hands to Democratic control in 2006. The lack o f stable funding also 
challenges collective action.
Time periods as cases: marine mammal management dilemmas
History has a long arc in the story o f marine mammal management in Alaska. Drivers o f
institutional development have included technological progress (e.g., the development o f sea 
mammal hunting) and intense competition for resources in the Native Nations era, quests for 
sovereignty and high commercial yields in the Colonial era ending in nascent conservation 
institutions, “public use” and sovereignty in the early Statehood era, growing demands for 
aboriginal rights to resources and conservation and self-government in the post-MMPA era (table 
3.1). Uses and diversity o f values towards marine mammals have also changed through time for 
both non-Native as well as Native peoples. In this final section, I argue that the combination o f
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sovereignty, mode o f production, and value orientation shaped the adopted dominant mode o f 
governance over human uses o f marine mammals, resulting in relative measures o f ecological 
sustainability.
In the Native Nations era, Alaska was dominated by multiple sovereigns, with often 
carefully defended territories and particular histories o f resource use. Trading agreements 
between Nations and protocols for accessing resources were mainstays in constructing and 
maintaining human-environmental relations. Modes o f  production and value orientation in this 
era can best be described in terms o f relationships as well. Early communities lived largely within 
their regional ecological budget, but also involved in extensive trade networks, and towards the 
colonial period, involved in wage labor as well as subsistence labor generalizing about the 
dominant mode o f production difficult. Although trade between nations in Alaska existed, there is 
not much evidence to suggest that any species were primarily harvested for trade or that if  they 
were, there was an extensive market for goods that could affect relative abundances o f animals. In 
addition, some resources were more valued than others regardless o f their potential for trade (e.g., 
fish in Aleut communities). Local institutions and power relations would probably have resulted 
in de facto  open access regimes for migratory species, but harvests for most animals probably 
were limited and sustainable, as evidenced by abundance for most species during the early days 
o f the Russian colony. It is likely that climate, density o f settlements, harvests largely based on 
subsistence and the resilience o f various species to harvest all aided in achieving sustainability.
Russian traders began to gradually, and later violently, re-define these relationships for 
many Aleut Nations, including those enslaved and sent to the Pribilofs. Colonial control over 
productive Aleutian and later Central and Southeast Alaskan regions were designed to foster 
commercial production o f goods. However, Russians could not muster the strength o f force to 
conquer Tlingit and Tsimshian communities and so had less power in the Southeast. Because of 
the value o f  the furs (i.e., the sole basis o f empire in the Region) and the lack o f centralized 
authority in any but a few settlement regions, this period o f privatized resource management was 
unsustainable, save for nascent rules developed in the latter stages o f Russian occupation.
These rules such as the zapooska, developed by Russians and Unangans, eventually 
became the framework for American control and management as well. Whaling and walrus 
hunting in the North Pacific and Arctic Oceans during the mid-colonial era was uncontrolled and
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obviously unsustainable due to the lack o f  a strong sovereign in the region with authority over 
pelagic whaling. The Americans began their marine mammal commercial enterprise in Alaska 
through privatization, and eventually moved to government control, with poor results in the first 
fur seal lease period, but eventually adopted international institutions and bureaucratic reforms 
that lead to a recovery o f the fur seals. Bowhead whales were also largely recovered over the next 
century due to the loss o f commercial markets, an international moratorium on whaling, a small 
Alaska Native harvest and effective collective action.
The early statehood era lasted long enough for the state to develop a management plan 
based on Euro-American models o f resource management for those species not already managed 
by federal agencies. The short duration o f this period makes generalizations difficult. Efforts in 
marine mammal management were not appreciably different than for other species in the state, 
focused around regulating commercial take such as walrus sport hunts and eliminating predators, 
such as beluga. Management was accordingly most active for the most heavily harvested species, 
resulting in ecological sustainability for desired species. The desires o f the State o f Alaska and 
indigenous hunters conflicted for several species, each with their own acceptable modes of 
production. The irreconcilability o f indigenous subsistence with the state management regime 
eventually collapsed state authority for marine mammals. The mode o f governance differed for 
different parts o f the state. Large game animals such as walrus were managed by the state through 
bag limits and sport guiding licensing agreements. In parts o f the state in which subsistence food 
harvesting was the primary “management goal,” however, communities largely followed local 
norms even as the State tried to enforce new rules. Many hunters did take part, however, in the 
Sate’s bounty program for marine mammals that were thought to compete with fisheries for food.
Changing American values towards marine mammals culminated in a new institution in 
1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, designed to protect marine mammals from industry 
and to re-orient relationships between humans and marine mammals based on ecological 
productivity rather than commercial or other utilitarian uses. Federal control for species other 
than fur seals, sea otters, and bowhead whales was not immediately realized as differences 
between federal responsibilities and the values o f prominent state officials turned into conflicts. 
Federal authorities and Alaska Native leaders initially clashed over what an allowable use o f 
marine mammals should be, especially in light o f the Section 101(b) exemption for the take of 
non-depleted animals. In many cases, federal officials looked back to pre-colonial indigenous
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institutions in order to define an allowable use, such as the ban on teddy bears made from sea 
otters. The officials look back to these institutions with particular understandings and ends in 
mind, however, as they had not actively sought to recreate indigenous rules as well as 
technologies or modes o f use that would limit harvests. The current era has seen management 
hybrids, such as co-management, grow as the sovereign strength o f Alaska Native Nations has 
resurged. In the current age in which squabbles over the definition o f the word authentic have 
been at the root o f many high profile conflicts (Robards and Joly 2007-2008), potential losses 
from climate change and ecological regime changes have begun to take on more urgency, 
necessitating a collective action response in order to redefine and manage for sustainability in 
context.
This historical analysis demonstrates the highly dynamic nature o f marine mammal co­
management in Alaska and the conditions that gave rise to current co-management arrangements. 
The evidence shows that mounting a collective action response to conservation problems depends 
on a whole host o f factors including the values and strategic goals partners bring to the table. 
Securing stable funding is a persistent challenge. Additionally, the strength o f partnerships can be 
influenced by a number o f social processes as well as the power o f institutions designed to 
conserve animal populations. How those social processes create particular action arenas and 
situations is next explored in a comparative analysis o f contemporary marine mammal 
management under the leadership o f two federal agencies, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service.
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Chapter 4: The influence of agency culture, history, and structure on policy choices
Gestalt: A structure, configuration, or pattern o f  physical, biological, or psychological 
phenomena so integrated as to constitute a functional unit with properties not derivable by 
summation o f  its parts. -  (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2009)
Introduction
After two hundred years o f conventional top-down resource management, the 1972 
Marine Mammal Protection Act49 created a window o f opportunity for self-regulation through its 
exemption for Alaska Native use o f marine mammals. Although agencies could not restrict the 
level o f harvest under the law unless there was a conservation concern, the agencies were 
authorized to regulate and monitor the nature o f use. With the vast, rural nature o f the state, the 
costs o f conventional resource management, the growth of Alaska Native organizations and 
changing attitudes towards collaboration, the stage was set for building more collaborative 
wildlife management policies in Alaska.
The literature on resource management is riddled with references to collaboration, mostly 
examining successes and failures in sustaining collaborative resource management venues. In the 
past few decades, American federal agencies in particular have come under pressure to build 
relationships with key constituencies such as non-governmental organizations, resource users, and 
local communities (Koontz 2007). This democratization of resource management can be seen as a 
dismantling o f modernist or rationalized governance (Ansell and Gash 2008), as reformists have 
targeted agencies perceived to be captured by their regulated entities through the creation o f iron 
triangles between administrative agencies, business communities, and Congress50. A movement 
towards more collaborative types o f management programs has made multi-sectoral groups more 
commonplace (Ansell and Gash 2008). Where the stakeholders have unique rights to the 
resources, as tribal entities do, co-management arrangements between the managers o f the 
resources and the users o f the resources have developed (see chapter two and three).
At the same time, scholars have begun to examine the negative or challenging aspects of 
participation in collaborative or co-management agreements, such as cooptation (Hensel and
49 Act of October 21, 1972, 86 Stat. 1027, P.L. 92-522, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361 et seq.50 (O'Toole 1997) and others have disproven the ubiquity of the “iron triangle” concept, focusing on the importance of policy communities -  networks of people interested in the subject matter and able to insert themselves into policy-making venues.
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Morrow 1998; Nadasdy 2003a), transaction costs (Kofinas 2005), management o f relationships 
(Natcher et al. 2005) and, at worst, manipulation by decision-makers (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
Agency leaders and academics have also questioned the “hollowing out” o f agencies to various 
ends (Milward and Provan 2000a). In Alaska, common-place agency constraints like funding and 
enforcement capacity combined with a shift towards community-based program delivery has 
resulted in a proliferation o f participatory governance strategies in Alaska ranging from advisory 
councils to full co-management boards for wildlife management (Huntington 1992; Spaeder 
2005). Resource management agencies follow other trends in federal governance, such as the use 
o f state, regional and tribal governments as well as non-profit agents and networks (O'Toole 
1997; Milward and Provan 2000b) to deliver public policies and programs.
Comparative public policy scholars have long noted that some federal agencies 
collaborate more often, or more effectively than others (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Branch and 
Bradbury 2006). Organizational culture has been identified as one o f the driving forces of 
government agency performance (McCurdy 1992; Mahler 1997; Brewer and Selden 2000; 
McBeath 2004; Butler and Koontz 2005; Branch and Bradbury 2006). Fewer scholars have 
successfully explained how organizational culture acts as a causal force to shape policy 
implementation (Druckman et al. 1997) but see (McCurdy 1992; Howard-Grenville 2006). One 
would think that two federal agencies with similar mandates (wildlife conservation), managing 
marine mammals in the same town using similar policy tools would operate more or less the 
same, with similar levels o f  effectiveness. However, fieldwork reveals this assumption to be 
unfounded. Why are these two policy strategies different? Moreover, do these differences matter 
in terms o f effectiveness or equitable outcomes? Through case studies o f marine mammal co­
management between communities and two separate federal agencies, I illustrate how 
organizational culture, history and structure affect policy approaches and success.
Section one explores the concept o f organizational culture, especially in relationship to 
organizational performance. Following Alvesson (Alvesson 2002), I focus on cultural 
manifestations as a key unit o f analysis and develop a typology o f co-management cultural 
manifestations as a basis for comparison between the two cases. By manifestations, I mean an 
agency’s approach to policy problems. This can include the type and strength o f policies agencies 
tend to pursue in collaborative management. My typology is informed by literature on co­
management and through field experience in an Alaskan context. In the second section, I develop
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a framework to facilitate analysis o f co-management performance through amalgamating 
elements o f Easton’s theory (Easton 1965) o f policy performance, Alvesson’s concept o f cultural 
manifestations (Alvesson 2002), Ostrom et al.’s institutional analysis and development 
framework (Ostrom et al. 1994), and Young’s concept o f policy fit (Young 2002a). In section 
three, I build cultural profiles o f the agencies through a literature review and survey data. I then 
compare institutions for subsistence harvest assessment drawing on field observations, policy 
documents and interviews to illuminate the influence o f  culture on the implementation o f harvest 
assessment policies. I chose to analyze harvest assessment policies because they result in high- 
profile interactions between agencies and the communities and have been the focus o f many 
conflicts in Alaskan wildlife management. Then, in section four, I classify the harvest assessment 
policies using the co-management typology and discuss how these differences affect policy 
outcomes. In conclusion, I discuss the implications and limitations o f this research project and 
offer some suggestions for future research directions.
Theories o f organizational culture
As reviewed in chapter two, organizational culture refers to basic underlying
assumptions, shared perceptions, language and thought processes among a cohesive group of 
people (Schein 1990). The Competing Values Model (CVM, figure 4.1) posits that organizations 
differ in two key dimensions: organizational focus (internal versus external) and the rigidity of 
organization (flexibility versus control) (Cameron and Quinn 1999). This model, operationalized 
through the Organizational Culture Assessment Inventory, has been validated across more than a 
thousand case studies (Cameron and Quinn 1999), including seventy-five government agencies. 
Not surprisingly, most government agencies were found to have a hierarchical culture, which fits 
with the classic bureaucratic form o f organization (Cameron and Quinn 1999). The CVM 
dimensions complement much o f the scholarship on co-management as a governance strategy. 
The extent to which agencies engage with communities (external orientation) and share power 
(flexibility) has been consistently linked to success in co-management tasks that require 
significant community buy-in, such as harvest assessment (Berkes et al. 1991; Pinkerton 2003).
Scholars o f adaptive co-management also emphasize adaptive capacity and flexibility as 
being critical components o f managing for resilience (Westley 1995; Danter et al. 2000; Folke et 
al. 2005; Imperial and Yandle 2005; Hahn et al. 2008). Authors such as Danter et al. (2000), 
Imperial and Yandle (2005); Hahn et al. (2008) explain how problem-focused or adhocratic
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organizations (Mintzberg 1979) can be more successful than traditional bureaucracies in building 
new approaches and coalitions to achieve ecosystem management objectives hindered by 
traditional command and control structures that reward stasis and consistency (Grumbine 1994; 
Knight and Meffe 1997). Armitage (2008) reminds us, however, that contextual forces such as 
power differentials, knowledge valuation, and dominant policy narratives can make institutions 
and organizations resilient to the sort o f cultural change that is prescribed above for governing 
complex, adaptive systems.
Clan
Flexibility and discretion
Adhocracy
Internal focus
Hierarchy
Externalfocus
Market
Stability and control
Figure 4.1 The Competing Values Model (Cameron and Quinn 1999).
Alvesson (2002) recommends researchers avoid sweeping generalizations about culture 
as a whole and instead look at specific “cultural manifestations” and study their consequences, 
which may or may not lead to measurable successful outcomes. Within a resource management 
context, a cultural manifestation could be the type o f collaborative agreements an agency engages 
in, or its arguments in front o f  an administrative law judge. Cultural manifestations are akin to the
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idea o f emergent behaviors, actions arising from complex interactions between people in 
particular contexts. However, cultural manifestations are also physical things left behind -  agency 
logos, press releases, and letters, etc. Anthropologists call these things “material culture.” Schein 
(1990) refers to these things as artifacts o f organizational culture, not the culture itself. Alvesson 
and other organizational theorists use these artifacts to infer values o f an organization.
Cultural manifestations in Alaskan marine mammal co-management include the 
dominant types o f projects the agency supports as part o f the co-management process, and the 
extent to which responsibility and authority for programs is devolved to local leaders. These 
manifestations are important in that they represent how policy is implemented on the ground, and 
so are key in evaluating the performance o f co-management as a strategy for resource 
management. Although agencies make discrete policy choices, I argue that the choices are shaped 
by their cultures as part o f a causal chain that structures those choices at multiple points in time. 
Through case studies o f harvest assessment, I explore the proposition that externally oriented and 
flexible cultural types are more likely to devolve responsibilities to community partners than are 
internally oriented and/or rigid organizations.
Typology of co-management relationships
Co-management agreements have been categorized as falling along a continuum o f
power-sharing (Pinkerton 1989; Berkes et al. 1991; Pinkerton 2003). Carlsson and Berkes (2005), 
however, argue that co-management may have many facets that involve different actors with 
differing levels o f authority at different points in time. In Alaska, as elsewhere, co-management 
has many definitions. Donoghue and Thompson (2003) characterize types o f federal-tribal 
resource management agreements based on an evaluation o f key components o f collaboration. 
Their analysis is sensitive to the methods in which American federal agencies formalize 
relationships with stakeholders.
Out o f a dataset o f ten relationships across the United States, the authors identify five 
distinct types: co-management, contracts, cooperation, working relationships, and conservation 
easements. The types differ on the decision-making authority, transfer o f money, level o f mutual 
dependency, transfer o f knowledge, and implementation (Donoghue and Thompson 2003).
In Alaska, the situation is complicated by vague statutory language as well as the ways in 
which actors contest and define their own participation. While most Alaska Native organizations 
describe their activities as co-management, their funding is packaged into cooperative
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agreements, contracts or grants. Both agencies tout “cooperative conservation” as often if  not 
more than “co-management.” In the recent past, the National Marine Fisheries Service preferred 
to enter into cooperative agreements outlining shared expectations of both co-management 
partners and then offer funding through a separate agreement while the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service has tied funding to contracts outlining particular tasks. Both agencies have increasingly 
specified activities to be funded as a method o f program accountability.
In light o f the complexity o f co-management rhetoric and practice, I propose a typology 
o f co-management manifestations below (table 4.1). The manifestations51 (i.e., policy approaches) 
are particular activities outlined by these contracts and agreements as well as the extent to which 
the agency devolves authority for the task in principle, and the actual power-sharing situation that 
emerges. For instance, even though a regime may allow for joint constitutional-level decision­
making, participation in the regime must still be funded and prioritized. Partners without much 
devolved power may nevertheless take the lead in research programs that are perceived as a form 
o f strong co-management. Devolution is not the only, or best, method o f policy implementation. 
However, local management efforts can be significantly enhanced by the ability to innovate or 
adapt to changing conditions (chapter six). These efforts are supported by greater local 
management power.
Organizational culture and institutional performance
In the organizational studies literature, facets o f culture have been qualitatively correlated
with performance characteristics such as efficiency, teamwork, the development o f shared 
definitions, internal or external focus, participatory nature, and persistence. Given that the early 
organizational culture studies looked mostly at the instrumental rationality52 o f organizations, it is 
not surprising that many analyses o f government performance have dealt with power, resource 
availability and political influence since they are the tools a bureaucracy uses to implement its 
goals (Clarke and McCool 1996). The performance o f government agencies have also been 
measured against the hallmarks of “good government” : efficiency, equity, and effectiveness
51 I will refer to manifestations as policy approaches for the remainder of the chapter.52 Instrumental rationality is generally perceived to be a specific form of rationality focusing on cost- effective means to achieve a certain end, whether or not that end is meaningful. In the case of federal bureaucracies, a focus on implementation of a blatantly flawed policy would be considered a case of instrumental rationality.
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Table 4.1 Co-management policy approaches Approaches are a configuration o f all three columns.
Examples o f activities Degree of power-sharing inprinciple Power-sharing result
Regulatory activities 
Research projects 
Information-sharing
Joint constitutional-level decision­making
Devolved policy implementation through grants
Compacts
Contracts or joint projects 
Consultation
Strong to weak, as perceived by co-management partners
(Lynn et al. 2001). Recent studies have also looked at have also looked at direct outcomes of 
institutional forms on the success o f  conserving resources (e.g., how does a rule affect animal 
population growth?) (Underdal and Young 2004; Young et al. 2008).
Organizational culture has been cited as a barrier to resource management strategies such 
as co-management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Natcher et al. 2005), collaboration (Laninga 
2003), ecosystem management (Kennedy and Quigley 1998), and adaptive management 
(Jacobson et al. 2006). Causal explanations of cultural impact have received less attention (but 
see Watt 2001) but have been addressed by institutional scholars using social-practice models o f 
collective action. In these models (contrasted with more utilitarian collective action models), 
institutions give rise to social practices that structure behavior. Analysts using social-practice 
models assume that organizations make decisions based on what they consider appropriate 
behavior, versus calculations o f utility (Young 2002a).
In order to understand cultural influences on co-management relations, I define agency 
culture as the norms governing behavior (using focus and rigidity as measures o f  these) o f agency 
employees, especially as manifested in external relations with communities in rural Alaska and 
co-management boards. Culture in this sense is intrinsically related to bureaucratic structure and 
agency history because the breadth and diversity o f an agency’s mission affects the extent to
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which co-management is prioritized. Historical relationships between agency staff and Alaska 
Native communities also influence the likelihood that any federal rules will be effective, 
producing a form o f path dependency. Together, these factors produce cultural manifestations in 
the form o f co-management policy approaches.
Development o f a conceptual model
Agency culture is an institutional driver that has not been adequately addressed in the
literature o f  resource regimes. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework developed 
by (Ostrom et al. 1994, also see figure 2.1) helps one to map and understand how users of 
common-property resources build resource management regimes that enhance shared 
understandings o f the resource and create incentives for compliance to rules limiting use o f scarce 
resources. Agency culture can be conceptualized as a key factor affecting actors’ motivations to 
collaborate and therefore, a driver shaping the policy arena -  in this case, marine mammals 
management in Alaska. In the IAD model, the patterns of interaction produced by the policy 
arena affect the outcome and institutional performance.
In order to analyze institutional effectiveness, Young (2002b) and others developed a 
diagnostic approach to institutional analysis which calls for an effort to identify critical features 
o f specific problems followed by an effort to specify institutional arrangements best suited to deal 
with them. One o f these approaches, the “fit” o f a policy to a policy problem, is an examination 
into how well institutions match the ecological and social drivers and conditions o f a resource. 
Building upon this work and others focused on the social context o f resource management policy 
implementation (e.g., Long 1989; McCay 2002; Agrawal 2005), this chapter considers how well 
policies fit social contexts.
Following the early work o f (Easton 1965) as well as recent institutional theorists 
(Underdal and Young 2004), I evaluate performance o f co-management regimes for outputs 
(policies), outcomes (changes in behavior) and impacts on the resource o f  interest. My research 
builds upon institutional theory by investigating agency culture as a key driver shaping outcomes. 
Below, I present a conceptual model o f linkages between organizational culture and performance 
(figure 4.2), based on the above literature and field observations.
Outputs and outcomes are particularly important to understand the potential effectiveness 
o f any particular policy on the ground in Northern Alaska. Outputs include such things as agency 
guidelines, rules, and local harvest management plans. An analytic focus on agency culture
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examines how cultural manifestations affect the design or enforcement o f agency, co­
management board, and local policies. In marine mammal co-management common pool 
resource regimes, feedback between outputs and outcomes relating to social processes such as 
harvest monitoring are observable through co-management board meetings and at local research 
sites. An analysis o f  outcomes examines to which the above polices change any behaviors, either 
in co-management arrangements or at the local level. Additional methods o f conceptualizing and 
examining outcomes are presented in chapters five and six.
Organizational culture is o f course only one variable amongst a suite o f variables 
affecting resource management policy success including leadership, capacity, resource
Agencyculturet
Agencystructure
tAgencyhistory
Agency policy approach/
Output(policies)
1Fit to social context 
Outcomes (change in behavior)
Fit to ecological context1
Impacts to resource
Figure 4.2 Conceptual model of the influence of agency culture, structure and history on policy performance
provisioning, Congressional support, and others. However, the existence o f two federal agencies, 
the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, each developing 
their own interpretations o f federal policy in Alaska and the resulting policy approaches lends a
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unique opportunity to build upon theories o f  institutional performance through a case study of 
organizational culture as a driver o f policy outcomes53.
Methods
Government processes and agencies are notoriously difficult to study because o f problems with 
gaining access to the “field” where key decisions take place. Recognizing these constraints, 
anthropologists have suggested engaging with bureaucracies as constituents (Nader 1972) or by 
conducting multi-sited ethnographies (Marcus 1995; Caulfield 1997) that take into account the 
multiple loci o f influence and decision-making from the individual actor to the world stage. 
Sociologist Norman Long (1989) argues for studying organizations at the interface -  where 
bureaucrats and the public meet to implement public policy. Following Long, I employed 
multiple methods in order to understand the agencies and their relationship to co-management 
partners: observation at public and co-management board meetings, content analysis o f policy 
and historical documents, semi-structured key informant interviews, informal interviews, and an 
organizational culture survey designed by psychologists (Cameron and Quinn 1999). Each of 
these methods relate to one or more particular scales o f management activity -  the federal agency 
involved, cross-scale co-management board meetings, and two villages with active hunting 
populations. I elaborate on each method below.
Document analysis and literature review
In order to build agency cultural profiles, I first compiled a literature review chronicling
the agencies and their relationships to stakeholders. I collected and analyzed historical and 
contemporary policy documents and used the method o f process tracing (George and McKeown 
1985; King et al. 1994) to examine how each agency’s policy choices affect their relationships 
with their co-management partners and resource management outcomes.
Participant observation
Another key source o f data stems from a four-year period o f  observation o f meetings
(2004 -  2008) relating to marine mammal conservation. The meetings involved co-management
53 One critique of many small-N studies is that investigators often start from the dependent variable -  in this case, policy success, and then try to explain that success, rather than adopt a more quasi-experimental approach, in which the policy outcomes are unknown and the differences between outcomes can be attributed more convincingly to independent variables. O f course, as examined in chapter three, historical institutionalists would argue with this approach if  it were used to examine success over a long period of time, as it seemingly discounts human agency, contingencies, and the importance of process.
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relations, Endangered Species Act deliberations, and oil and gas development in Northern Alaska. 
Each meeting was an agency-stakeholder interface, in which both federal wildlife managers, 
whalers, polar bear hunters, and other concerned constituents come together in various 
constellations for a variety o f purposes -  some informative, some deliberative. Observation 
included meetings o f the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (2005 -  2008), the Nanuuq 
Commission (2006), the Indigenous Peoples’ Council for Marine Mammals (2004 -  2008), and 
others.
During the meetings, I took notes and digitally recorded selected portions o f the meeting 
open to the public. Notes were qualitatively analyzed for themes relating to the degree of 
collaboration, evidence o f conflict, and agency cultural manifestations such as policy 
announcements or approaches, and emergent themes. Recordings were consulted for additional 
details.
Interviews
I conducted formal and informal interviews with wildlife managers with marine mammal 
management sections o f the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service. Formal, semi-structured interviews were conducted with two FWS management 
biologists and three NMFS management biologists focused on co-management activities, 
conservation challenges, and success. The interviews ranged in length from twenty minutes to an 
hour and a half. Informal54 interviews and discussions were conducted with three additional FWS 
management biologists and three NMFS management biologists as part o f my period of 
participant observation. Taken together, I spoke with five out o f eight present and past FWS 
managers and six out o f seven present and past NMFS managers responsible for bowhead whales, 
beluga whales, harbor seals, ice seals, polar bears, walrus, and sea otters.
I also interviewed co-management directors, chairmen and local officials involved with 
USFWS regimes (two formal interviews and two informal interviews) and NMFS (three formal 
and two informal) to ask about their relationship with the agencies, their definitions o f  co­
management, and their opinion o f management challenges and successes. These interviews 
ranged from half an hour to two hours. Interviews were transcribed and analyzed for themes
54 Informal discussions were initiated at the request of two biologists who did not want to speak on the record. Two other biologists consented to a formal interview but subsequent attempts to schedule the interviews failed. I spoke at length to two other biologists in the course o f public meetings.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
relating to agency culture, co-management, and effectiveness of the policies in question. Formal 
interviews were not a particularly rich source o f data for analyzing agency culture so they were 
predominantly used to supplement policy histories and the perspectives o f  actors involved in the 
regimes.
Internet survey
The third method o f data collection included a survey o f Alaska-region FWS and NMFS 
staff by email. The survey was designed to measure employees’ perceptions o f their agency 
culture following the Organizational Culture Assessment Inventory (OCAI) methodology 
(Cameron and Quinn 1999). Each question offered respondents four choices representing how 
closely their organization resembled four organizational archetypes: clan, adhocracy, market and 
hierarchy. Respondents were asked to divide one hundred points among the types based on their 
experience working within USFWS or NMFS. Mean scores were plotted on satellite graphs to 
determine the predominant culture. The scoring method does not lend itself to statistical analysis; 
in keeping with Cameron and Quinn (1999), differences in scores over ten points were viewed as 
significant discrepancies.
In addition to the six standard OCAI questions about characteristics, leadership, 
management style, social glue, organizational emphasis, and definitions o f  success, I included 
three additional questions relating to dealing with uncertainty, seeking information, and working 
with stakeholders. These additional questions are especially relevant to managing wildlife in 
Alaska because o f challenges associated with climate change, the challenges o f federal agencies 
in managing resources in rural, predominantly indigenous areas with thousands o f years o f self­
regulation or no regulation, and a lack o f baseline information on the status o f many resources. I 
also asked survey respondents to evaluate outcomes o f collaborative activities they were involved 
in.
The survey was conducted via QuestionPro software on the internet. The survey was pre­
tested for face validity (whether the questions appear valid to the target audience) by six resource 
managers from a different agency and revised based on their feedback. The rate o f survey 
response was lower than expected (n=12, N=127 for NMFS, n=57, N=508 for USFWS), likely 
biased by the survey mode (Sheehan 2006), agency directives to forward the survey to a private 
email account, and the targeting o f too broad a population that did not find the survey salient. 
However, the survey results did correspond to other internet surveys in the literature in that
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although survey responses were low, respondents were more candid with their open-ended 
responses than they were in personal interviews (Joinson 2001; Grandcola et al. 2003). In 
addition, 75% o f survey respondents reported being actively involved in collaborative 
management and this figure included many senior managers.
Case study evaluations using the conceptual model
In this section, I begin by giving an overview o f each agency with a focus on co­
management relationships. I then build a cultural profile drawing on prior studies o f each agency 
and present the results o f the organizational culture survey. Next, I explain the roles o f culture, 
history and the development o f stakeholder relationships in the development o f harvest 
assessment policies. The policies and the success o f  each are compared.
National Marine Fisheries Service
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is the chief federal agency regulating
both commercial and subsistence-harvested marine animals. This agency has conflicting 
missions: the development o f a sustainable fishery industry and the protection o f cetaceans and 
seals, many o f whom depend on the same fisheries for food. Moreover, NMFS's mission in 
fisheries development and management brings it into close association with the fishing industry, 
which critics argue has “captured” the agency (see McBeath 2004).
Management responsibilities for marine mammals began within the Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries, as marine mammals were exploited for various commercial goods but 
were shifted to the Office o f Protected Resources after the passage o f the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, largely designed to prevent fisheries bycatch o f marine mammals (Bean and 
Rowland 1997). Key management duties relating to marine mammals are shared between four 
offices: the Alaska Regional Protected Species offices in Anchorage and Juneau, the Protected 
Resources headquarters office in Washington, DC, and the Alaska Fisheries Science Center in 
Seattle. The director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration typically is 
appointed one o f the American Commissioners to the International Whaling Commission, 
supported by an interagency team from the Departments o f State, Commerce, and Interior 
(Peterson 1992). The majority o f staff working with bowhead whale management within NMFS 
are wildlife biologists. Even though NMFS is responsible for most marine mammals in Alaska 
and maintains co-management agreements with eight partners, several respondents familiar with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
both agencies report that NMFS has a low prioritization for co-management activities as 
compared to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) and point towards its tendency to fund 
research through the State o f Alaska’s marine mammal division.
Contemporary co-management agreements with Alaska Native organizations set out co­
management goals and activities for blocks o f  time. The amount o f time covered depends on the 
program goal. For instance, the Cook Inlet beluga whale co-management agreement is re­
negotiated approximately every year whereas the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission 
cooperative agreement typically spans the same amount o f years as the quota authorized by the 
International Whaling Commission (e.g., 2008-2012). Funding packages are developed separately 
through cooperative agreements or grants. During the period o f study (2004-2008), several boards 
spent significant time lobbying Congress to receive base funding through budgetary earmarks. 
Co-management agreements have been developed at multiple scales: through NOAA 
headquarters for internationally relevant regimes like the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, 
the NMFS regional office, and through the Alaska Fisheries Science Center for research-oriented 
agreements.
NMFS culture
The culture o f the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in 1998 was described by 
McBeath (2004) as one which was politically risk-averse (e.g., when restricting fisheries) but 
scientifically risk-tolerant when weighing the value o f the fisheries to the value o f the recovery of 
the Steller sea lion populations under the Endangered Species Act55 (ESA). During a hearing on 
agency management o f fisheries in Steller sea lion habitat, a federal judge chided NMFS for 
ignoring relevant factors (such as the impact o f allowable fisheries catches that may nutritionally 
stress sea lions) and admittedly failing to analyze them in biological opinions required under the 
ESA. After a series o f legal challenges, fisheries were effectively managed by the federal court 
until NMFS could meet the challenges o f managing Steller sea lions in a commercially valuable 
area. By 2003, McBeath notes, and in reaction to losses in the court, NMFS underwent a cultural 
change and became more transparent in its process, gained more staff dedicated to environmental 
assessment, and worked more effectively across programs for fisheries and protected resources 
(e.g., marine mammals) in order to avoid political surprises to powerful fisheries interests and the 
agency itself.
55 Act o f December 28, 1973, 87 Stat. 885, Pub. L. No. 93-205,16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531 et seq.
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A panel convened by the National Academy o f Public Administration (Gade et al. 2002) 
found that the federal fisheries management system is in crisis, as ten times as many decisions 
were being challenged in the courts in 2002 as compared to the early 1990s. The panel writes:
The councils and NM FS often fin d  it difficult to impose austere measures, and  
they are reluctant to act in the fa ce  o f  strong opposition and political clout that 
can be brought to bear on fishery management issues (p. x).
Part o f the problem, the panel notes, is a proliferation o f mandates, coupled with a lack 
o f prioritization by Congress:
Existing statutory mandates convey multiple and often conflicting 
responsibilities, giving a sense that each is a priority, and reconciling these laws 
fa lls to the Assistant Administrator. N M F S’ ability to reconcile these varied  
mandates— to conserve fisheries, preserve protected species, protect the 
environment, promote U.S. economic interests, encourage recreational fishing, 
and address socio-economic issues— would be enhanced i f  Congress were to 
clarify their relative priority. Doing so would improve the prospects fo r  meeting 
critical objectives (p. xiii).
The Magnusson Fishery Conservation and Management Act o f 197656 created an unusual, highly 
participatory system o f fisheries councils. Gade et al. (2002) notes that members o f the councils 
were primarily the states, commercial and recreational fishermen. NM FS’ original duties towards 
research and information collection went towards “industry self-management” (Gade et al. 2002: 
3), which became the foundation for the council system. This sort o f iron triangle was eventually 
breached by the addition o f environmental groups. The highly participatory nature o f fisheries 
management may make NMFS biologists more familiar with collaborative management processes 
than other agencies, even if  they may feel that too much collaboration can subvert management 
decisions based on science (see UCS and PEER 2005).
NM FS’ program for marine mammal management in Alaska has several different 
institutional histories (see chapter three) that may differentiate cultures within the marine 
mammal program in the Protected Resources division from the Sustainable Fisheries division. 
NM FS’ fur seal program in the Pribilofs began as a very top-down program (chapter three), in 
which fur seal agents dictated residents’ personal lives as well as their harvesting activities. On
56 Pub. L. 94-265, U.S.C.A. 16 § 1801-1882.
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St. George, this program is now experienced as a shared observation and management strategy, 
supported by strong federal-tribal relationships. When asked about anachronistic Fur Seal Act57 
rules relating to how seals must be taken, a respondent noted that the partners talk about it, but 
changing the rule seems like a difficult prospect, so mostly both sides ignore it (Anonymous pers. 
comm.). For the agency biologists’ part, some have expressed their dissatisfaction at the 
consistency or perceived accuracy o f harvest assessments conducted by their various partners. 
However, the dissatisfaction is often framed as a problem to be resolved, rather than something 
the agency plans to take on itself.
Adams et al. (1993) describe the early years o f the Alaska Inuvialuit Beluga Whale 
Committee (now known as the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee). Key activities included 
developing enough baseline information in order to defend hunters against a potential move by 
the International Whaling Commission to bring small whales under its jurisdiction. The early 
program involved harvest assessment as well as biological information-gathering, based on 
partnerships between hunting communities, ADF&G and NMFS, all full members o f the 
committee. Adams was one o f the early directors o f the AEWC, so her shrewdness in regards to 
working with agencies and the IWC helped shape the committee’s pro-scientific collegial nature. 
In a 2006 article, Femandez-Gimenez et al. (2006) describe the ABW C’s efforts as focused 
primarily on research about beluga stocks and harvest levels. Information from these activities 
has fed directly into NMFS analyses. Significantly, issues over management control have not 
been especially salient topics at the ABWC:
In the ABWC, the struggle fo r  sovereignty has been played out at a fa irly  low 
level o f  intensity, both in assertions o f  and negotiations over knowledge, and in 
early negotiations over the structure o f  the organization. Although native ABWC  
members openly discussed the use o f  science as a tool o f  state control generally, 
they were supportive o f  A B W C ’s research programme and perceived benefits to 
belugas and beluga hunters from  the knowledge it has generated  (Femandez- 
Gimenez et al. 2006: 312).
57 Pub. L. No. 89-702, 80 Stat. 1091, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151 et seq.
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The authors credit the ABW C’s organizational culture for creating space for joint production o f 
knowledge:
The ABW C appears to be a strong example o f  the way in which a co-management 
organization can provide opportunities fo r  relationship-building andjo in t action, 
particularly jo in t inquiry about beluga populations. These jo in t research 
activities in turn have reinforced communication and trust among participants 
leading to increased commitment to and involvement in research by hunters, and 
increased appreciation fo r  and use o f  TEK by scientists and managers 
(Femandez-Gimenez et al. 2006: 313).
Positive relationships developed through research and joint work have not necessarily translated 
into the devolution o f local management authority, in the way envisioned by agencies and 
founding members o f  the ABWC. Femandez-Gimenez et al. (2008) credit this disparity to the 
cognitive dissonance beluga whale hunters and others have when they support the development of 
locally developed, but public and potentially federally enforceable, de ju re  rules but continue to 
operate by norm-based de facto  rules.
It would be erroneous to assume that NM FS’ external orientation is a sufficient cause in 
creating more harmonious co-management relationships. One need only look at the Cook Inlet 
beluga whale battles between various factions to realize the fallacy o f that argument (Moore and 
DeMaster 2000). However, all o f the NMFS-associated boards, with slight exception to the Cook 
Inlet Marine Mammal Commission and the Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission, appear to 
have less contentious relationships with their agency partners than do USFWS boards.
The 2002 Gade et al. report noted that mandates and data deficiencies around stock 
assessment reporting demanded a large proportion o f NM FS’ scientific expertise, precluding 
many staff from working on other projects. The panel recommended that NMFS prioritize 
budgeting to expand its scientific expertise to cover other critical information needs, such as 
habitat requirements, food web dynamics, and the health and reproductive status o f populations.
In addition, the panel recommended that the agency contract out work where it could not hire 
additional staff. McBeath notes that by 2004, the Alaska Regional office had accomplished 
several o f these and other goals in relation to its Steller sea lion responsibilities under the 
Endangered Species Act. Notably, creating a co-management regime was not one o f these 
priorities, as the subsistence harvest was considered an insignificant driver o f species decline.
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Alaska Native organizations, including the Alaska Native Sea Otter and Steller Sea Lion 
Commission, were involved in the recovery plan process.
Finally, in response to the National Academy report, in line with Administration goals 
across resource management sectors, NMFS also adopted the Bush Administration’s cooperative 
conservation program. By 2008, NMFS had created a Partnerships and Communication Division 
to streamline this approach.
NMFS agency culture survey results
Agency cultures change through time, so any one-time survey o f organizational culture is
by definition a snapshot. However, the Competing Values Model focuses on general tendencies 
and can be a good source o f information to use in predicting general aspects o f future 
performance, barring significant changes to the agency’s culture, legal authorities and structure. 
NMFS staff were surveyed during the summer o f 2008 (n=12, N=127). The majority o f staff 
surveyed perceived the agency to have a market culture (figure 4.3) overall with a mean score o f 
29.34, followed by clan (25.35), hierarchy (23.79), and adhocracy (20.40). This result means that 
the staff considered the agency to be externally oriented but also a controlled place. Respondents 
recognized many different cultural characteristics across the nine questions, so the market culture 
result is not appreciably stronger than other cultural types. NM FS’ existing fisheries programs, 
co-management priorities, and history o f contracting work is consistent with the Competing 
Values Model market archetype.
Figures 4.4 to 4.6 represent staff perceptions regarding working with stakeholders, 
dealing with uncertainty, and seeking information. The strength o f the market response in Figure 
4.4 (35.00) represents agreement with the following statement, “When working with 
stakeholders, [NMFS] builds support from stakeholder partners who we work with to implement 
and monitor our preferred solutions to resource management issues.” Concerning dealing with 
uncertainty (Figure 4.5), respondents ranked NMFS as an adhocracy (32.50), meaning that the 
organization is flexible, innovative and looks to external sources for inspiration. When seeking 
information (figure 4.6), respondents ranked NMFS as a clan (32.08), followed closely by
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adhocratic (27.03), emphasizing the agency’s flexibility and use o f a variety o f resources to 
achieve its mission.
History of bowhead whale harvest assessment policy
The first co-management arrangement that NMFS negotiated significantly affected later
relationships with Alaska Native hunters, and the agency approach to subsistence harvest 
assessment. The late 1970s was a period o f conflict between the National Marine Fisheries 
Service and the Alaska Eskimo whalers, culminating in civil disobedience o f the IWC 
moratorium (and NM FS’ enforcement o f it) and a subsequent indictment o f the leaders o f the 
Barrow Whaling Captains’ Association (Langdon 1984; Freeman 1989; Huntington 1992) by a 
federal grand jury in Anchorage. Law enforcement officers were often seen up in Barrow, 
intending to enforce an internationally recognized quota on the aboriginal bowhead hunt. It was 
noted that there were improvements to be made in the efficiency o f  the hunt, but the command- 
and-control resource management strategy was not felt to be an optimal solution by Barrow 
whalers. Eventually, NMFS realized that it was unlikely to receive the sort o f information it 
needed to effect the international treaty by force alone, as the officers relied on whalers to report 
their catch and communications were strained between NMFS and the whalers. A respondent 
knowledgeable o f the history o f the AEWC describes the chain o f events that brought NMFS to 
the table:
A nd then finally ...through the work o f  the lawyers in Washington, D.C., NOAA 
fo lks agreed to come and talk to us in Seattle. So the agreement was... 
because...the Federal Government was having trouble managing Natives! To 
them we were a big liability at the IW C  (Anonymous 2006b).
The eventually adopted management plan for the bowhead hunt relied on a devolved enforcement 
regime made up o f whalers, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, and tribunals for any 
violations. The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission was the first co-management institution in 
the United States in which management o f a subsistence resource was devolved to the subsistence 
users, and it has endured as a policy monopoly over bowhead whale subsistence management 
since its inception with no credible challenges to its authority.
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The former member credits the reporting and enforcement authorities for building legitimacy in 
the agreement:
There were some hairy situations back then... the NM FS people who were trying 
to observe what was going on out on the ice, it, ju s t even having a gun. That was 
a scary situation. I  sa id ... they ’re going to misinterpret that. You ’re an 
enforcement officer, even i f  that gun was usedfor bear protection, the 
interpretation would be, you ’re an enforcement officer, you know, get out o f  here.
A nd it was testy. So... [NMFS] agreed to them, that all the reporting goes 
through the Whaling Commission. So...we wanted those things and... we 
also... sort ofparallel to this agreement with the federal government, we were 
also working ways to have a clear lines... o f  communication and representation 
in...the community, local community to establish AEWC as a...real organization 
that represented the whalers (Anonymous 2006b).
NM FS’ early conflict and conflict resolution with the AEWC led to the adoption o f  a devolved 
harvest assessment program. When the IWC deleted its exemption for aboriginal whaling in 
1977, NMFS lacked a management plan for bowhead whales (Freeman 1989). This gap allowed 
the whalers a window o f opportunity to design a policy they could accept without having to fight 
an existing institution. The quote above illustrates not only how NMFS initially handled conflict 
and harvest assessment (e.g., on-site law enforcement officers), but also N M FS’ willingness to 
adapt to the AEWC proposal. The whalers developed their own plan, which NMFS agreed to in 
1982. Other influential factors include the resolution o f conflict, brokered by Senator Ted 
Stevens, and evidence o f the whalers’ powers o f collective action (e.g., civil disobedience 
towards the ban on whaling).
Structure of relationship with stakeholders
NM FS’ tendency to contract out aspects of its work affects its policy choices in working
with co-management groups. Although NMFS is responsible for protecting all whales, dolphins, 
porpoises, seals, and sea lions under the MMPA (and where relevant, the ESA), bowhead whales 
remain one o f their largest cross-scale management programs, with a significant commitment to 
regional management, research and international diplomacy. The eventual success o f the AEWC 
management plan led several other co-management groups to adopt their own strategies for 
managing harvests before federal rules were in place. At a 1991 (prior to the founding o f
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IPCOMM) conference on marine mammals in Alaska, NMFS representative Steve Zimmerman 
noted NM FS’ responsibility for thirty species o f marine mammals in Alaska. He said that in order 
to determine the removal rate for fisheries, NMFS needed to have good subsistence harvest 
numbers to work with. According to a report from the conference, Zimmerman planned to 
contract out this work (RuralCap 1991).
In 1994, the MMPA was amended to require harvest assessment programs for subsistence 
species. In most cases, NMFS outsourced harvest assessment programs to the State, and later, to 
co-management bodies. Many NMFS-related co-management bodies developed after 1994 were 
organized as a way for hunters and indigenous leaders to gain influence and control over how 
management functions such as harvest assessment would be implemented.
Because NMFS often contracts out harvest assessment work, the organizations 
submitting proposals have some freedom to experiment with harvest assessment methodologies 
and co-management processes. The Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, for instance, developed 
management plans and harvest assessment methods based on a strong working relationship with 
the Alaska Department o f Fish & Game (ADF&G). Marie Adams Carroll, an early director o f the 
AEWC, worked with marine mammalogist Kathy Frost o f ADF&G to develop the organization 
into the successful co-management body it is today (Adams et al. 1993). The group came together 
with the primary goal o f learning more about beluga whales and establishing a research plan that 
everyone could agree upon before a crisis required draconian methods (Huntington 1992; Adams 
et al. 1993; Anonymous 2006b). The Alaska Native Harbor Seal Commission also adopted a 
working relationship with the ADF&G division o f subsistence to develop its harvest assessment 
methodology.
The State o f Alaska has limited jurisdiction over marine mammal -  human interaction, 
the most involved example o f this relates to walrus haul-outs and subsistence hunting on Round 
Island, which they cooperative manage with the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC), the 
Quayassuq Walrus Commission58, and the USFWS. However, the State has significant research 
capacity and aids many o f the co-management boards or scientific staff in their collection o f data 
and research. In the case o f successful operational collaboration, this question o f whether or not
58 This Commission was developed around the Round Island sanctuary, and is funded through a sub­agreement to the USFWS-EWC agreement.
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the state has a legitimate interest in marine mammal management is usually not an ongoing 
topic59.
Another co-management body, the Cook Inlet Marine Mammal Council, assessed its own 
beluga whale harvests from 1995 until the species was declared depleted in 1999; an extremely 
limited hunt was allowed afterwards. NMFS had originally awarded ADF&G a contract to assess 
Cook Inlet beluga harvests; Cook Inlet hunters demanded a hearing with the NMFS Regional 
Director and they eventually secured a contract to assess their own harvests. Their effort 
dramatically improved NM FS’ reporting reliability, especially in the estimation o f the number o f 
animals that were struck and lost (Anonymous 2007a). This late collaboration was too late to 
reverse the decline o f the beluga population, which has stagnated in recent years. New co­
management agreements such as that with the Aleut Marine Mammal Commission include 
harvest assessment along with a suite o f other observations shared with NM FS’s research arm, 
the Alaska Fisheries Science Center. These observations are part o f an effort to build joint 
knowledge.
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) is the premier agency in the United States
regulating activities that may impact wildlife on federal lands, and protected species on other 
lands. The USFWS is predominantly a terrestrial agency as part o f the Department o f the Interior, 
but also has jurisdiction over walrus, polar bears and sea otters in Alaska (as well as manatees in 
Florida). It has a strong presence in Alaska as federal wildlife refuge managers and have a 
substantial staff o f social scientists within their terrestrial division, as required for work 
implementing federal land acts such as the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 
198060 (ANILCA PL 96-487) which requires an analysis o f a development’s impact on 
subsistence if  federal permits or funds are involved. Its marine mammal division has its own 
office in Anchorage but also works with the marine mammal research specialists at the U.S. 
Geological Survey’s (USGS) office in Anchorage. The Biological Resource Discipline (BRD) at 
the USGS is a science agency for all o f the Department o f Interior agencies and operates a client- 
driven approach to science. Its staff has not entered into any co-management agreements.
59 This topic does come up frequently at policy-oriented venues such as IPCOMM meetings.60 Pub. L. No. 95-487, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101 et seq.
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The USFWS and co-management partners generally develop MOUs for general 
statements o f co-management goals. However, at the moment, only one o f the three co­
management bodies has an MOU. The Nanuuq Commission does not have one and the Alaska 
Sea Otter and Steller Sea Lion Commission (TASSC) no longer has a co-management 
relationship with USFWS, as sea otter hunting communities have been re-organizing that board61. 
Co-management tasks are outlined in cooperative agreements that are contracts for services. The 
three key co-management bodies are budgeted within USFW S’ annual appropriation from 
Congress, thus tying the co-management boards to their partner agency more fully than most 
boards working with NMFS.
USFWS also has international projects with Russian counterparts and other countries 
involved in international treaties protecting animals with special conservation needs. The 
department enforces the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES). In addition to export/import permits, under the MMPA, the department 
maintains its own program for collecting information from harvested marine mammals called the 
Marking, Tagging and Reporting program and has a large enforcement team to fight trafficking of 
endangered or threatened species. The enforcement division has a separate chain o f command, 
and reports to the Service’s headquarters office in Washington, DC. This separation gives the 
division independence from the management staff, but also causes some tension with co­
managers who may not have control over how the enforcement staff will use information it 
shares.
USFWS agency culture
The internal orientation o f the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service influences the way the
agency approaches and conceptualizes co-management. A U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 
(USFWS)-sponsored program evaluation for the implementation o f an ecosystem management 
approach in 1998 (Mullins et al. 1998) contains several findings that support the proposition that 
the agency is internally oriented and tends towards hierarchical decision-making. When 
discussing how the agency has approached partnerships for implementing ecosystem management 
programs, the authors noted that interviewees and survey respondents did not readily discuss 
partnerships as part o f their daily work.
61 One respondent characterized sea otter co-management as a “loveless arranged marriage.”
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A theme also emerged:
...that suggested partnerships are being pursued with stakeholders that 
essentially agree with Service opinions. There was a strong cry that the Service 
p u t more effort into reaching out to stakeholders who have not traditionally been 
their friends...It was obvious from  the data that the Service is still struggling to 
be flexible in creating and participating in worthwhile partnerships with a wide 
variety o f  stakeholders (Mullins et al. 1998: 5).
Since the evaluation was published, the Service has engaged it what it calls “Cooperative 
Conservation.” Bush Administration DOI Secretary Gail Norton defined62 this term as a 
partnership-based approach to stewardship through a process, “ . ..called the 4C's - conservation 
through cooperation, communication, and consultation.''’ The Bush Administration also passed 
guidelines requiring federal natural resource and environmental agencies to include cooperative 
conservation principles in mechanisms for hiring, training and rewarding employees.
The running joke in Alaska co-management circles is that this approach translates to, 
“You cooperate, and we manage.” In many programs in Alaska, the cooperative conservation 
model appears to emphasize the communication and consultation elements, resulting in programs 
predominantly managed by the Service. Importantly, cooperative agreements are also federally 
recognized mechanisms for transferring funds to external groups.
Ohlson et al. (2008) examined the cooperative agreement between USFWS and the Nez 
Perce Tribe in central Idaho and found the agency cautious in sharing authority, but willing to 
devolve operational tasks. The Tribe assumed operational management o f the recovery plan; both 
the Tribe and the agency found the collaboration to be a success. Where they disagreed was on 
the institutional authorities that would underlie a cooperative versus a co-management agreement. 
The Secretary has authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to manage listed species 
and so defined the relationship as a cooperative agreement. The Nez Perce have treaty rights to 
local resources and so saw their authority as vested in their treaty relationship to the federal 
government; consequently, the Tribe considered the agreement to be one o f co-management. In 
an interview, Ohlson et al. (2008) found that one o f the USFWS’ concerns with calling the 
relationship a co-management agreement was that it may signal to non-cooperating partners (e.g., 
the State o f Idaho, which refused to participate) that the federal government is ceding
62 This approach is outlined at www.fws.gov/partnerships/ and was accessed on March 22, 2009.
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sovereignty. Additionally, the agreement allowed the Tribe to take over operational management 
o f  the program, but not have an equal seat in higher-level policy decision-making.
The authors note that despite the Service’s Native American Policy (USFWS 1994), 
ostensibly explaining the Service’s authority to co-manage63, the word and its implications proved 
to be a disconnect between both partners’ goals for the program. This relationship is similar to 
most co-management arrangements in North America, in which the federal sovereign maintains a 
veto over decisions made by a co-management group. In this case, the Service was responsive to 
external partners, innovative and adaptive, although it did not go as far towards shared decision­
making as the Nez Perce Tribe felt was warranted under their treaty. Thompson (2006) described 
the same relationship as a cooperative one, rather than a co-management one due to that 
difference.
Three studies in Alaska (Chambers 1999; Watson 2007; Robards 2008) characterize 
relationships between Alaska Natives and the Service’s Alaska Regional Office. Chambers 
(1999) documented the evolution o f the Eskimo Walrus Commission and its relationship with the 
USFWS. Even though the EWC developed its own management plan in 1984, modeled on the 
AEWC plan adopted by NMFS, it was never operationalized. The 1984 plan, though, did lead to a 
1987 MOU that built the foundations o f the relationship between the agency and hunter 
representatives, focusing on communications and statements o f joint values. The Executive 
Director at the time, Caleb Pungowiyi, conceded that the EWC did a lot o f cooperating, and not 
much managing at this point, but did successfully begin to build a relationship with USFWS. This 
spirit o f cooperation turned sour in 199064, when the Service initiated Operation Whiteout, a law 
enforcement raid on several walrus hunting villages, hunters, and ivory buyers (Chambers 1999). 
The investigation was initially supported by some Alaska Native leaders concerned about
63 The policy states, “The Service recognizes that as a result o f treaties, statutes, and judicial decrees, certain Native American governments, along with State governments, may have shared responsibilities to co-manage fish and wildlife resources. In such cases, the Service will cooperate with Native American governments and affected resources management agencies to help meet objectives of all parties” (USFWS 1994: 4). The policy also declares that the Service will retain primary authority to manage resources on Service lands.64 Around the same time (1993), the Service was in tense discussions with Central Yup’ik Eskimo communities in the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge about developing a brown bear co-management agreement (Spaeder 2005) after the Regional Director approved a brown bear study against significant local opposition. Although leadership is not treated separately to organizational culture in this study, conflict resolution obviously requires agency buy-in at high levels in order to succeed (see Pomeroy and Berkes 1997).
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growing alcohol and drug abuse tied to ivory sales, but the media sensationalism o f the “head­
hunters” investigated caused much anger in the Native community. Pungoyiwi (1997) notes: 
Things worked well until 1991 when USFWS conducted Operation Whiteout and  
did not inform EW C until they had issued a press release on the operation... An 
angry meeting was held in November o f  ’91 with Native leaders charging 
USFWS o f  not living up to the cooperative agreement. The relationship remained 
tenuous between 1991 and 1993 until a new [USFWS] Regional Director was 
appointed  (Pungowiyi 1997 as cited in Chambers 1999:49).
By 1999, Chambers reported the EWC involvement in multiple management programs and 
projects, some directed by the EWC, some involving joint work, and many directed by the 
agency. In USFWS projects, he notes, “ . . . the role o f  the EW C is to facilitate greater Native 
participation in USFWS projects by encouraging Native hunters to cooperate.” EWC is expected 
to help USFWS assess harvests, remind hunters o f wasteful take guidelines, and engage in 
cooperative enforcement efforts. Both the EWC and the USFWS encouraged the development o f 
local ordinances and local management capacity, but by 1999, only one village ordinance had 
advanced. The agency in 1999 seemed open to the possibility o f  devolved management authority, 
with the agency taking a back-up role in the case o f egregious violations or involving other 
crimes. The W hiteout Operation set back the aspirations o f  both communities and managers.
By the mid-2000s, Robards (2008) found the situation essentially unchanged from 1999, 
but with flagging local interest in management activities65. The MMPA has not been reauthorized 
since 1994, so no additional funding or authorities have been available to effect an AEWC-style 
management plan. In addition, conservative factions within the State o f Alaska government have 
bitterly fought tribal sovereignty over the actions o f their own members, including lobbying 
Congress against new management authorities proposed for the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
reauthorization process.
Robards (2008) describes the relationship between the Eskimo Walrus Commission and 
the USFWS as one in which Alaska Native hunters lack a meaningful role in problem definition 
and decision-making. He describes a regime more focused on the “authentic” uses o f walrus 
according to MMPA regulations than the ultimate scale o f  the harvest (Robards 2008), which the
65 But see Femandez-Gimenez et al. (2008) for a discussion about social and cultural barriers to formalizing local management plans in beluga whale hunting communities.
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federal courts limited purview o f in People o f  Togiak v. United States66 absent a finding o f 
depletion o f the resource. Robards (2008) also describes walrus co-management decision-making 
as being situated primarily at the collective-choice level, whereas conflict between hunters 
(manifested at the day-to-day operational level) and the agency are generated by vaguely defined 
constitutional-level rules that hunters do not have deliberative purview over. Furthermore, the 
focus on authenticity alienates the practical realities o f the hunters from the constitutional level 
rules, constraining meaningful dialogue with hunters. Three other current and former executive 
directors o f the EWC have also described the relationship as predominantly top-down (Pungowiyi 
1997; Anonymous 2006c; Anonymous 2006d).
Watson (2007) followed the interactions between Koyukon elders and the Service’s 
Migratory Bird Program. She notes that during her fieldwork, a regional refuge manager had a 
friendly, collegial working relationship in producing knowledge about avian ecology with locals 
and elders. However, local villages experience the regulatory program for migratory birds67 as 
well as other subsistence resources such as moose as top-down processes. In her study, regional 
subsistence advisory councils are predominantly platforms for the exchange or reception o f 
information, and not typically a deliberative space. Research methods and findings may be 
debated or clarified, but policy-level discussions are not typically engaged. A 2007 multi-agency 
“listening tour” is an example of this approach.
USFWS agency culture survey results
Staff members o f the Alaska Regional Office o f  USFWS were surveyed during the
summer o f 2008 in order to further examine agency tendencies towards policy approaches. The 
majority o f respondents ranked USFWS as a hierarchy culture overall (figure 4.7) with a mean 
score o f 33.76, followed by clan (25.76), market (22.23), and adhocracy (16.17). This result 
indicates that the agency is perceived to be internally oriented and with moderate levels o f 
flexibility as compared to other organizational types. The cooperative conservation model 
adopted by the Service is culturally consistent with the hierarchy and clan archetypes, as they 
both emphasize an internal orientation. USFWS respondents considering how the agency works 
with stakeholders (figure 4.8) were split between two archetypes, hierarchy (27.87) and clan
66 470 F. Supp. supra at 428.67 The subsistence harvest o f migratory birds in Alaska are co-managed between the Service and regional government representatives through the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-management Council.
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Figure 4.10 USFWS seeking information The mean response(n=57) is “hierarchy.
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(26.76), representing an organization that tends to work with close partners and trusted allies. 
These profiles align with the statement representing clan behavior, “When working with 
stakeholders, our organization develops solutions to resource management issues through a 
trusted group o f employees and allies” and the statement representing hierarchical behavior, 
“When working with stakeholders, our organization works with stakeholders to the extent that 
standard procedures and efficiency allow.”
The strength o f the hierarchy response in Figure 4.9 (36.82) represents agreement 
with the following statement, “When dealing with uncertainty, [USFWS] turns to standard 
procedures, internally produced information, and efficiently executes its plan.”
Finally, Figure 4.10 illustrates the strength o f USFW S’ hierarchical (31.93) and clan-like (29.30) 
cultural attributes in relationship to seeking information. These results also 
emphasize an internal orientation.
History of walrus and polar bear harvest assessment policy
Cultural approaches to problem solving and a history o f prior interactions combine to
affect agency and community expectations o f future collaborations. The history o f conflicts 
between USFWS, Alaska Native hunters, and policy choices in the early 1970s continue to affect 
the design o f harvest assessment programs and their success. After the passage o f the MMPA, the 
USFWS decided to institute its own harvest assessment program, the Marking, Tagging, and 
Reporting Program (MTRP). After the Togiak case, which effectively struck down federal and 
state attempts to regulate subsistence, takes of walrus before the population was threatened, the 
Department of the Interior decided to develop a monitoring program so that they could determine 
how many walrus were taken, and what level o f harvest was sustainable. According to a 
Congressional report o f the era:
The general accounting office, in its recent report on the act, notes that a 
monitoring program would provide essential management data on the status and  
condition o f  the walrus population. Unfortunately ...it is less than clear under the 
existing Act whether the appropriate federal agencies have the authority to 
monitor the nature and extent o f  the native take o f  marine mammals. In addition, 
it is feared  that the prohibition section contains a loophole that will allow fo r  the 
commercialization o f  marine mammal products by Natives, which goes fa r  
beyond the obvious intent o f  the Act (U.S. House of Representatives 1981).
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The MTRP was introduced as a method for not only assessing harvests, but also in tracking trade 
in commercial animal goods, in fulfillment o f American responsibility under the 1973 Agreement 
on the Conservation o f Polar Bears and the 1975 international Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species o f Wild Flora and Fauna68 (CITES).
Although walrus were the target o f the monitoring program, the USFWS decided to adopt 
the same program for polar bears and sea otters as well69. The program was included in the 1981 
amendments to the MMPA, but not launched until 1988. Before preemption by the MMPA, the 
State o f Alaska tracked polar bear harvests largely by reports from sport hunting guides as well as 
self-reported subsistence harvests. After the 1972 law went into effect, the State worked to 
develop a more robust harvest assessment method in anticipation o f regaining management 
authority over marine mammals (see chapter three). Eventually, the State dropped its bid to regain 
management authority and the program was turned over the USFWS. When the Polar Bear 
Agreement came into force (1976), the American Government pointed to rules within the MMPA 
as satisfying their treaty obligations (Baur 1995).
In 1987, the government o f  the Netherlands proposed to list walrus under CITES, 
Appendix II, in response to the decline of the Atlantic walrus and reports o f wasteful hunting 
practices in Alaska. In response, an Alaskan delegation composed o f Eskimo Walrus Commission 
leaders Matthew Iya, Ron Nalikak, and State biologists John Bums and Lloyd Lowry traveled to 
the meeting and managed to have the proposal withdrawn after discussions with the Dutch 
delegation (Chambers 1999). Even if  the CITES proposal had been accepted, the trade regime 
does not have the same operational oversight as the IWC and would not likely lead to enhanced 
local authorities.
68 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, with appendices, March 3, 1973, TIAS 8249, 27 UST 1087, 993 UNTS 243 (March 3, 1973) [hereinafter CITES],69 One drawback to having a comprehensive plan is that in communities with both walrus and polar bear, the presence o f USFWS enforcement officers during an investigation often results in negative feelings, towards USFWS as a whole and may deter harvest reporting. During a recent heavy period of law enforcement activity in a village in Southeast Alaska, for instance, no tribal member could be found that was willing to become a tagger for sea otters, and eventually someone from NMFS ended up with this task (Anonymous pers. comm.).
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Structure of relationship with stakeholders
The way the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service engages with stakeholders affects policy
choices. USFWS has authority for three marine mammal subsistence species and maintains 
harvest assessment as an in-house program. The stated goals o f the program are threefold:
...1) monitoring the subsistence and handicraft harvest o f  polar bears, sea otters 
and walrus; 2) obtaining essential biological data needed to manage these 
species or stocks; and 3) helping to control the illegal take, trade, and transport 
o f  specified raw marine mammal parts (USFWS 2009).
USFWS has also experimented with additional harvest assessment programs, such as the Walrus 
Harvest Monitoring Program (WHMP), in which agency biologists work with hunters in the 
villages with the largest walrus harvests to estimate the amount o f walrus harvested in real time 
(i.e., on the day o f the harvest). This program has been considered a success in the past and has 
been used as baseline data to compare hunter compliance to the MTRP (Bum 1998). In a 2005 
meeting o f the Eskimo Walrus Commission the Chairman noted that even though the WHMP is 
voluntary, it has had a higher rate o f success than the statutory MTRP and yet as a voluntary 
program, was subject to budget cuts. In 2004, USFWS undertook an internal evaluation o f the 
MTRP, including asking questions to taggers about their evaluation o f the program. The program 
report is unpublished, but was reportedly used to reform the program. It is unclear to what extent 
the USFWS could or would experiment with the MTRP, as it is a statutory requirement under the 
MMPA and is a budget line item, meaning that the program is institutionalized within the 
Regional Office and supports staff that the agency would otherwise have to find additional 
funding for. The agency’s preference has been to strengthen the MTRP program, rather than 
enhancing their programs that have been proven more effective, like the WHMP.
The USFWS and their research partner the U.S. Geological Survey Biological Resources 
Division maintain a strong polar bear research program that tracks many other indicators o f polar 
bear population status, such as capture and re-capture studies, as well as surveys o f denning sites 
and modeling the potential impacts to bears from climate change. It is unclear how much o f this 
polar bear research involves the Nanuuq Commission or specific villages. Contracts in the past 
for the Nanuuq Commission specified particular research projects. Board meetings were observed 
to be a place for the agency and commissioners to exchange information about harvests, 
population monitoring, research projects, and interactions with industry. The USFWS consults the 
Commission on regulatory programs but they have also together developed new programs such as
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the new treaty70 between Russia and the United States relating to the conservation of the Chukchi 
Sea polar bear population.
The Commission has spent significant time building the new Alaska-Chukotka treaty and 
relationships with Chukotkan partners. They have not yet begun to implement the agreement. In 
comparison, most o f the NMFS boards are either engaged in implementing specific rules or 
undertaking specific management tasks like research and harvest assessment. At an IPCOMM 
meeting in 2006, the commissioners discussed the downside o f NM FS’ co-management model: 
some boards have taken on more agency-specific tasks versus their own priorities, and do not 
have the same financial security as the three USFWS co-management boards. However, there 
have been years in which a large portion o f funds dedicated to the Nanuuq Commission and the 
Eskimo Walrus Commission went towards USFWS priorities, such as aerial population surveys 
(Meek et al. 2008).
Policy outputs and outcomes
This section compares key policy outputs and outcomes between the two agencies using
the co-management policy typology. I describe performance across tasks generally and 
specifically for tasks related to quotas and harvest assessment. The impacts o f  the two programs 
to systemic resilience will be discussed in chapter six. Bowhead whale management in Alaska is 
accomplished largely through the existing research and monitoring programs, many o f which rely 
on subsistence harvest for data. The management program is largely ad-hoc, as neither a recovery 
plan nor critical habitat was ever declared for the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort stock o f bowhead 
whales (Anonymous 2007b). Despite the lack o f a comprehensive plan, management activities 
and, until recently, low levels o f development in its habitat have been successful in recovering 
bowhead whales to the point at which senior NMFS biologists have suggested de-listing the 
species from the Endangered Species Act (Shelden et al. 2003). The ad-hoc nature o f the 
management regime, however, combined with NMFS ’ external orientation and the institutional 
legacy o f the AEWC management plan, have created conditions conducive to a devolved 
management program. To this day, the regime for bowhead subsistence management remains 
most active at the local levels, where whaling captains and AEWC officers manage and report to
70 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Conservation and Management o f the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Population, United States T. Doc. 107-10.
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their federal partners (figure 4.11). An example o f specific policy outputs relating to quotas and 
related power-sharing manifestations are found in table 4.2. Linkages to federal partners seem 
strongest in terms o f the ongoing biological research plan and in negotiations with industry over 
offshore oil and gas exploration. Enforcement officers or other NMFS staff are rarely seen in 
Barrow. Under the stewardship of the AEWC, the efficiency o f the hunt has improved 
dramatically, from an estimated efficiency rate o f 50% caught whales in the late 1970s (NMFS 
1977) to an average efficiency o f 78% caught whales between 1995 and 2007 (IWC 2008). Most 
significantly, the AEWC harvest reporting program is estimated to achieve a 98-100% rate o f 
reporting (IWC 2008). The AEWC has also been successful in regulating the harvest to achieve 
particular results, such as reducing the taking o f large old whales (Bodenhom 2001)71 and 
punishing any intentional take o f whale calves, against NMFS and AEWC regulations. Infractions 
have been rare over the period of the AEWC management era. In addition, all o f these outcomes 
have positive implications for the sustainability o f the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort (BCB) bowhead 
whale population, as well as for the whaling communities, who are dependent upon bowhead 
whales for significant cultural, nutritional, and social needs.
Several respondents credit the scrutiny o f the IWC as well as improved technology and 
training for the improvement. However, most whalers interviewed expressed frustration in that 
whalers are so heavily regulated, while oil and gas companies seemingly do whatever they would 
like to. To date, once permitted, industrial operators have been allowed to operate in whale 
habitat, provided that they coordinate their exploration with subsistence whaling activities 
through the AEWC and monitor the impact o f their activities on marine mammals within a 
particular radius o f their operations. The task o f negotiating these Conflict Avoidance 
Agreements has largely fallen to the AEWC, who must coordinate with an increasing number of 
oil and gas companies.
A NMFS biologist expressed concern over the increasing responsibilities of the AEWC 
when discussing key challenges of co-management:
Well, I, the, the one I  sense most recently is that... [the] AEW C...in addition to 
ju s t managing the harvest which is...a huge effort...in itself, and instead i t ’s 
being forced  more and more into deal with...management 
issues...like...developing,... negotiating, ...and issuing...Conflict Avoidance
71 But note that large whales are still preferred in some communities such as Gambell and Savoonga.
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Figure 4.11 Bowhead whale harvest assessment network in Barrow, Alaska
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Table 4.2 NMFS and USFWS policy outputs Regime Outputs Level ofdecision­making
Power-sharing Top-down orbottom-updynamics
NMFSBowheadRegime
Development o f Constitutional quotas AEWC is part o f  US delegation to IWC but does not have executive power over decisions
Top-down but quota informed by nutritional need
Bowheadharvestassessment
Operational Devolved policy implementation Bottom-up
Enforcement o f Operational quotas Devolved policy implementation with federal back-up
Bottom-up
Enforcement o f Operationalnon-wastefulhunt
Devolved policy implementation with federal back-up
Bottom-up
USFWS Polar Development o f Constitutional NSB-IGC develop quota Joint activity*Bear Regime(SouthernBeaufort)
quotas
Polar bearharvestassessment
Operational
with technical support from USFWS and DFO
Contracted local taggers Top-down
Enforcement o f quotas Operational USFWS gives a set amount o f tags to local taggers
Top-down
Enforcement ofnon-wastefulhunts
Operational USFWS patrols craft fairs Top-down
*Quota cannot exceed federal definitions o f sustainability (e.g., in the U.S., rate o f potential biological removal (PBR)) expressed in the Marine Mammal Protection Act that implements the Agreement on the Conservation o f Polar Bears.
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Agreements, or CAAs, which is... a kind o f  a big part o f  the coinage o f  what goes 
on up there in these days. That is...something the National Marine Fisheries 
[Service] uses to demonstrate that they have reasonably complied with the 
subsistence requirements on these MMPA authorizations ...that they 
haven’t...unreasonably...interfered with the subsistence...needs. But by doing 
that...AEWC, while they’re looking out fo r  their...the interests o f  their 
subsistence hunters... and you know, people in the community ...it places huge 
demands on them in terms of... time and staffing and going to meetings, all that 
stuff, and you ju s t kinda see... those paths diverging (Anonymous 2007b).
The responsibility o f coordinating with many oil and gas companies is a downside to devolved 
policy arrangements as NMFS could potentially bring more regulatory weight to bear on the 
negotiations, if  the agency chose that direction.
The Nanuuq Commission has been involved in a range o f management activities, 
including: mapping polar bear habitat in Alaska and Chukotka through traditional knowledge 
studies, high level treaty negotiation and design o f co-management structures for implementation 
o f  the Agreement on the Conservation and Management o f the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear 
Population, and harvest guidelines for hunters and handicraft makers (Johnson 2001; Meek et al.
2008). The Agreement creates a new management regime for the Chukchi Sea polar bear 
population, including an international commission and enforceable quotas on harvests. On the 
U.S. side o f the border, these enforcement powers can be legally devolved to the Nanuuq 
Commission or local entities, which would create the political conditions for active management 
o f  the polar bear harvest. To date, the USFWS has not had the policy tools to actively manage the 
harvest due to the Marine Mammal Protection A ct’s exemption for Alaska Native harvesters 
unless a marine mammal population is officially found to be depleted. This exemption has 
empowered Alaska Natives in some ways and bound their governments in other ways. For 
instance, the exemption has enabled de facto  institutions around harvesting to persist parallel to 
federal institutions. However, the lack o f clarity in management rules has also lead to conflict 
between local hunters and enforcement personnel (Robards and Joly 2007-2008; Anonymous
2009).
To manage this type o f conflict, many co-management bodies and their federal partners 
have sought the power to manage before depletion, with the thought that active local management
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would reduce the likelihood that populations would become depleted or threatened (e.g., under 
the Endangered Species Act). This policy change would require an amendment to the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, something the State o f  Alaska has actively lobbied against (see chapter 
three). The subsistence72 take o f Southern Beaufort Sea population o f polar bears is managed 
through an interlocal agreement between the Inuvialuit Game Council in the Northwest 
Territories (Canada) and the North Slope Borough Fish & Game Management Committee (IGC- 
NSB agreement). Both parties agreed to a voluntary quota system developed in 1988 (Brower et 
al. 2002; Lovecraft 2007). During joint meetings, the parties set and divide the quota based on 
technical advice from federal and territorial biologists and other considerations such as economic 
return for sport hunting on the Canadian side. On the American side o f the border, the quota is 
distributed through hunters reporting their harvests to federally authorized taggers through the 
USFW S’ Marking, Tagging and Reporting Program. Polar bear management in Barrow is a 
diffuse network (figure 4.12), as compared to the vertically integrated workings o f the bowhead 
regime. Taggers reside at several local government organizations and include a few at-large 
operators in the community.
The Fish and Game Management Committee o f the Borough provides a potential forum 
for collective action on polar bear management, but in 2006 was not systematically connected to 
the Nanuuq Commission. The previous chairman o f the Committee was also chairman o f the 
Nanuuq Commission but many o f these boards were in flux after a new mayor o f the North Slope 
Borough was elected and promoted the deputy director to the leadership o f the Dept, o f Wildlife 
Management. A previous director described pulses o f polar bear policy activity, especially around 
the development o f the IGC-NSB agreement. As o f 2007, the situation o f staffing had 
normalized. However, with a drop in the USFW S’ funding for co-management and other 
activities, connections between the Nanuuq Commission and Barrow remained weak.
Harvest reporting is encouraged by Borough staff and USFWS personnel, who in times 
past had threatened enforcement action in order to improve compliance. Now taggers and 
borough staff are more likely to call on successful hunters to come and report their catch if  they 
have not yet done so. However, the estimated rate o f compliance is low as compared to reporting
72 Subsistence includes the right o f Inuvialuit communities to sell a certain portion of their polar bear quota to sport hunters, as per their land claim agreement with Canada.
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under the Inuvialuit regime on the Canadian side (Anonymous 2006b). USFWS personnel, 
including biologists and harvest monitoring staff, periodically visit town to discuss ongoing 
studies and enforcement issues. It is important to note that the USFWS is also responsible for 
several other subsistence-harvested species, such as birds protected under the Migratory Bird Act, 
and walrus. Residents o f Barrow have responsibility for following hunting regulations enforced 
by USFWS for all o f these species. Visits to Barrow by enforcement staff became more 
conflictual in 2007 and 2008, as they conducted a series o f investigations into wildlife 
management issues.
The Southern Beaufort Sea stock o f polar bears has not been actively managed in Alaska 
for years, as harvests on the American and Canadian side have not been substantial since the 1972 
Marine Mammal Protection Act ended sport hunting in Alaska and the 1973 Polar Bear Treaty 
came into force in Canada. Barrow polar bear management activities in recent years have 
involved public safety and food management issues. Polar bear patrols were organized in the past 
to assist residents in keeping bears out o f town. Now the Borough sends out polar bear guards on 
an on-call basis. Polar bear guarding is also an entrepreneurial activity; many residents work part­
time guarding industry or researchers in the field. Hunters report that the numbers o f  bears 
coming ashore in Barrow and other North Slope communities have increased in recent years; 
biologists predict this number to increase as habitat pressures push bears o ff the pack ice towards 
near-shore environments. With the May 2008 federal decision to list polar bears as threatened 
under the ESA, an increase in active management is likely. At the time o f this study, though, the 
government had not publicly proposed any new rules affecting the Alaskan harvest.
Discussion
All federal agencies are constrained from sharing ultimate authority by governing 
institutions and executive policy interpretations. Agencies often have discretion, though, in 
developing new approaches, reforming old ones, and creating operational rules sets that work 
from a position o f power sharing, given the resources to do so. Where agencies do have 
discretion, their organizational cultures, history and structures shape policy adoption and 
implementation. Table 4.2 illustrates how the choices adopted earlier in an agency’s history (e.g., 
harvest assessment method) shape the everyday experience o f these policies at the operational 
level -  where villages hunt subsistence resources and interact with agency rule sets.
Agency reactions to crises in the resource reveal key differences. In the case o f the 
whalers, to reduce conflict NMFS devolved enforcement powers to the whalers themselves as
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legal threats were a significant source o f distrust and conflict. When faced with a similar crisis, 
USFWS reached inward to develop a harvest assessment program, even as distrust and conflict 
were intensified. The cases also illustrate how the intense focus on international relations can 
create windows o f opportunity for innovation. For instance, it is conceivable that NMFS may not 
have devolved management functions to the AEWC if the resource had not been under such 
intense scrutiny. In addition, it is plausible the AEWC may not have formed if  there had not been 
an intense threat from international regulation. Polar bear hunters do not yet have access to 
international decision-making structures in ways similar to the whaling captains.
Even though the polar bear quota-setting exercise is a shared process (within federally 
defined limits o f sustainability), the day-to-day experience o f most people interacting with the 
agency is in a top-down fashion. In contrast, as a part o f  the U.S. delegation, the AEWC strongly 
influences the quota-setting process at the IWC. The U.S. government has the final say in how 
they implement IWC quotas73. Despite this limitation, the AEWC is largely experienced day to 
day as a community-organized regime. That is not to say that whalers accept the jurisdiction of 
the IWC in theory (in practice, however, IWC regulations are more internalized into local 
discussions than are polar bear rules developed by USFWS, their international partners to the 
1973 Polar Bear Agreement, and the Nanuuq Commission). In Barbara Bodenhom’s (2001) 
analysis o f local decision-making among whalers in Barrow, many respondents related how they 
are making decisions about sharing, waste, and other local rules to how “they” will see it if  
Inupiaq don’t follow the rules. With the 2008 Endangered Species Act Listing decision for polar 
bears, this type o f cross-scale rhetoric has become more evident in Barrow for polar bears as well. 
Whether or not polar bear hunting communities will be able to control their fate in relationship to 
international scrutiny is an open question.
The weight o f evidence presented points to agency cultures as an important factor in how 
the USFWS and NMFS interact with stakeholders. When placed in historical and structural 
contexts, the externally oriented culture o f NMFS has shaped co-management regimes to be more 
open, scientifically oriented, with local management authorities. USFWS has relied on working 
with a small group o f trusted allies, and so its co-management relationships often focus on joint 
activities and information sharing. With a more hierarchical organization, and management 
authority over species with high commercial value, USFWS has had a more contentious
73 In 1977, the U.S. could have objected to the IWC’s deletion o f the aboriginal whaling exemption but it did not due to its stance promoting a moratorium on commercial whaling. In doing so, the U.S. recognized Alaska Native whalers as under the jurisdiction of the IWC.
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relationship with its boards in general. The Nanuuq Commission and the USFWS seem to have 
worked out a relationship at the international and regional scale that works based on largely 
autonomous activities pursued by the Nanuuq Commission, Co-funded by the National Park 
Service. These high-level policy dialogues have not yet translated into greater autonomy at the 
local scale. In Barrow, relationships between USFWS and local hunters remain strained by heavy 
enforcement actions.
Scaling up from the local level, regulatory regimes for marine mammals exist across 
scales and interact with other institutions for both commerce and conservation. Additionally, 
exogenous forces such as climate change may significantly affect Arctic marine mammals. A full 
analysis o f institutional effectiveness, therefore, must also address the larger political, ecological 
and economic contexts such as international policy regimes, industrial development, and 
environmental change. These drivers o f policy impact will be analyzed in chapter six.
Implications, challenges, and limitations
This chapter attempted to empirically evaluate the affect o f agency culture, history and
structure on policy choices and general outcomes (e.g., whether or not the policy has its intended 
social effect). Data on this topic was difficult to access, and the low rate o f  return on the agency 
culture survey from both agencies makes inference a complicated affair. However, I have been 
able to rely on multiple sources and methods in constructing my analysis, the most important o f 
which has been to observe interactions at multiple co-management boards and relate those 
discussions to conversations with hunters in Barrow and Wainwright.
I suggest future research at the board-level scale, with a retrospective o f co-management 
through a longitudinal analysis of meeting minutes; additionally, a period in observation at the 
international level for both polar bears and bowhead whales would help to discover how problems 
and management visions are framed at the international scale, in comparison to the local scale. 
Unfortunately, the polar bear policy regime at all scales is insular and difficult to collect data on. 
Part o f this difficulty arises from the development o f the regime itself, as the agreement was 
developed among a small group o f polar bear specialists, the quasi-govemmental International 
Union for the Conservation o f Nature (IUCN), and negotiated during the cold war when there was 
considerable mistrust between the Soviet Union and the other Arctic states (Larsen and Stirling
2009). Consequently, the parties decided to create a regime without implementation protocols 
(Fikkan et al. 1993) and in the United States, there is a limited paper trail on program 
accomplishments or benchmarks for evaluating policy success against except for their
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participation in the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist’s Group74. The new international regime designed 
for the Chukchi population shared with Russia establishes a more formal commission structure, 
open to public scrutiny. This format may allow a more transparent process than exists at present, 
one that could easily be followed and analyzed. At the present time, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service and the Nanuuq Commission co-manage through funding contracts, as they have not 
negotiated an agreement describing roles, responsibilities and authorities. Consequently, 
governing through contracts for services results in a fragmented public record that is difficult to 
access for constituent villages and the interested public. The formalization o f the process as a 
governing board may give co-management partners more certainty as to their standing in the 
management scheme, leading to more openness and data sharing, as is common with the 
International Whaling Commission. At the present time, however, the status o f the Russian- 
American Polar Bear Commission is unclear, as it has not been appropriated funding and its 
power to regulate resources now listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act is in 
question.
This chapter described and analyzed interactions o f agency culture and relationships with 
stakeholders in the post-Marine Mammal Protection Act era in order to predict patterns of 
interactions. The most concrete techniques o f wildlife management take place at a local level, 
however. Most laws related to subsistence hunting o f marine mammals require hunters to report 
their catch, although none o f the programs uses permit systems familiar to other resource 
management regimes. Harvest reporting programs for subsistence, then, require dedicated 
cooperation from hunters. Whether or not these policy programs fit into existing community 
patterns o f interactions is the focus o f the next chapter.
74 The USFWS is a particularly opaque agency, even though it has presented a lot o f Q&A pages on the polar bear listing, twice staff pointed me to information about their programs on other federal or foreign partners’ websites, as the staff considered their agency’s website uninformative. During the study period, the Bush Administration was evaluating the polar bear as a candidate for listing under the Endangered Species Act and this fact, combined with the Administration’s antagonism towards climate change, the obstruction o f oil and gas and the ESA reportedly left many staff members with low morale across the Department of the Interior line agencies. One respondent described the political pressure felt within some of the agencies, “/  could feel [Vice President] Cheney’s claws in my frickin ’ back."
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Chapter 5: Harvest assessment networks in Barrow, Alaska: the relationship of agency preferences, policy devolution and harmonious outcomes
The task o f  network managers is to increase the stock o f  trust and reciprocity by creating 
incentives (using resources) and to increase their collaborative skills to build relationships within 
the network to accomplish network goals, whether it is environmental cleanup, alleviating 
homelessness, reducing teen pregnancy, or responding to a natural disaster. -  H. Brinton 
Milward and Keith G. Provan, A M anager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborate Networks 
(2006: 10)
Introduction
Previous chapters have traced modem developments o f Alaskan marine mammal 
governance in order to explain why agencies with similar missions choose different policies. In 
this chapter, I orient my analysis o f the effectiveness o f each policy choice at the local level, in 
two Alaskan marine mammal subsistence hunting communities. The local level, after all, is where 
wildlife management policies most materially affect the world.
Successful policies shape the management o f living marine resources through structuring 
human behavior in a way that is meaningful to social and ecological drivers o f population 
dynamics. A current thread in institutional analysis is to examine how well institutions “fit” 
ecological dynamics (Folke et al. 1998a; Young 2002a; Galaz et al. 2008); other works have 
examined the fit between institutions and social dynamics (Ebbin 2002; McCay 2002; Olsson et 
al. 2007). Wildlife management policy usually focuses on the ecological dynamics (see chapter 
six), assuming that persuasion, scientific data, and outreach will encourage compliance to 
government rules. In this chapter, I describe and compare two different institutions for harvest 
assessment, one for bowhead whale and another for polar bear subsistence hunting, in order to 
examine how effective each is in encouraging participation. The social processes behind such 
effectiveness are also explored.
As discussed in chapter two, many resource management scholars have touted co­
management as a method in which user organizations or representatives are part o f the decision­
making, and therefore will have more buy-in to the policy-making process (Pinkerton 1989; 
Berkes et al. 1991; Singleton 1998). Stakeholder buy-in and a belief that the policy-making 
process is fair (Tyler 1990) leads to more legitimacy, and, ultimately better congruence between 
rules in force  (i.e., what the law requires) and rules in use (i.e., what people do).
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Local actors in a co-management regime often implement particular policies, such as 
those requiring hunters to report their harvests. Policy networks can map how this implementation 
happens on the ground, as well as determine which actors are most influential. The difference 
between rules in force  and rules in use is a measure o f policy fit to the social environment in 
which implementation takes place (Eckstein 1969; Jentoft 1989; Meek et al. 2008). Many 
communities with longstanding use and occupancy o f a place will have indigenous rule sets. 
Additionally, resources may be governed by multiple rule sets, for instance, international, federal, 
state, tribal and local. Co-management often aims to bring these rule sets closer, either through 
harmonization, persuasion, or sometimes coercion (Nadasdy 2003b).
Where federal or international authorities apply new rules to a common pool resource 
that already has other local or institutional legacies attached to it, local communities often resist 
(Spaeder 2005). In this situation, some communities have argued for devolution, the transfer o f de 
ju re  authority from the federal to the state or local level, so that the local community gains control 
o f the policy implementation process. Devolution as a policy strategy arguably allows for the 
development o f local implementation capacity as well as the fostering o f local norms relating to 
the social goal o f the policy in focus. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and Cardenas et al. (2000 as 
cited in Ostrom 2005) have studied the impact o f the imposition o f new, external sets o f rules and 
monitoring efforts on existing patterns of cooperative behavior. These and other authors working 
with game theory find that social norms can work as well or nearly as well at generating 
cooperative behavior as external rules and monitoring efforts (Ostrom 2005). Ostrom argues that 
norms often reinforce the desire for cooperative behavior while cooperation driven by external 
efforts is difficult to sustain without consistent efforts from the external actors (2005). She notes: 
...the worst o f  all worlds may be one where external authorities impose rules but 
are able to achieve only weak monitoring and sanctioning. In a world o f  strong 
external monitoring and sanctioning, cooperation is enforced without any need 
fo r  internal norms to develop. In a world o f  no external rules or monitoring, 
norms can evolve to support cooperation. In an in-between case, a low level o f  
external monitoring discourages the formation o f  social norms, while also 
making it attractive fo r  some players to deceive and defect, given the low risk o f  
being caught (pg. 130-131).
Federal agencies in Alaska have engaged in collaborative processes, in no small part because of 
the great distances and costs to implement wildlife law in remote parts o f the state. Arguably,
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devolution o f wildlife management tasks such as harvest assessment can be an effective method 
o f  supporting local social norms relating to resource use, engaging with federal agencies and 
broader governance agendas. Devolution may not succeed in furthering agencies’ goals, however, 
if  the rules are not salient or they contradict local understandings. Skeptics may still follow local 
rules, regardless, because they are involved in other social relationships that acculturate norms o f 
trust or helpfulness. One persuasive argument for devolution is that policy that follows local 
social patterns requires less o f an effort (i.e., less cognitive dissonance) for a local participant to 
understand the informal norms surrounding interactions with distant others (Eckstein 1998). 
Relevant norms include an understanding o f sanctions. Relevant questions include the following: 
whom can residents talk to about sanctions, when are rules likely to be legally enforced or are 
people generally motivated to participate?
Analytical framework
Social network analysis maps interactions between people (or organizations) and can
empirically measure the strength o f linkages (i.e., ties) between members in the network. Social 
scientists have utilized social network analysis to examine the structure o f social relationships and 
derive a measure o f social capital75. For instance, network researchers use density, or the extent to 
which actors are connected to each other, as a proxy for social cohesiveness (Scott 2000). The 
concept o f network centrality describes the power and control structure o f the network, or who 
has the most influence within the group (Freeman 1979). Structural holes, or the absence or 
weakness o f a connection between actors, is another key concept, based on sociologist Mark 
Granovetter’s pioneering work, “The Strength o f Weak Ties” (Granovetter 1973). Much o f the 
original work on social networks took place in the sociological literature, focusing on business or 
friendship ties. Public policy researchers have only recently begun to use social network analysis 
to examine policy implementation structures such as co-management or inter-agency 
collaboratives. Carlsson (2000) likens network analysis to an empirically based model of 
collective action76. Each policy community, the group of people involved in public policy, can be 
conceptualized as an interactive network o f participants.
75 Social capital is used in the sense o f Putnam (1993) to identify the value of relationships in making collective decisions.76 For purposes o f this discussion, collective action is defined qualitatively as the totality of purposeful joint activity a group of people engage in while trying to achieve some particular end.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
Policy researchers have also examined how network structure affects policy success. In 
their landmark study o f health policy networks and outcomes, Pro van and Milward (1995) 
examined how the network structure and functioning o f community mental health systems in four 
cities affected the successful delivery o f services to clients. The authors found that stakeholders 
were most likely to rank networks with a centralized active node as successful. Networks with 
decentralized authorities were less successful than those networks with a centralized node, 
especially one with direct authority and local systems of monitoring and sanctioning. Schneider et 
al. (2003) compares two networks o f estuary conservation stakeholders and argues that central 
federal coordinating programs, such as the National Estuary Program, can act as a central node 
even if they act as an informational rather than a regulatory force. The authors find that the 
estuary program catalyzed linkages between multiple scales o f government, integrated experts 
into discussions, nurtured stronger interpersonal ties between stakeholders and generally created 
greater confidence in the fairness o f policy. Networks can also act to diffuse innovation among 
policy actors. Lubell and Fulton (2008) found that exposure to policy networks significantly 
increased the likelihood that a farmer would implement best management practices on his or her 
farm.
Borgatti and Foster (2003) note that studies examining why networks form a particular 
way are lacking, whereas more studies have been devoted to the consequences o f network shape 
for actors within the network. The formation o f co-management networks are interesting to study 
because structures can be intentionally designed, emergent, or some combination (Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005). Connections between partners are shaped by the interplay of: institutions, history, 
the power of key actors, funding resources to mobilize activities, and agency cultures. Carlsson 
and Sandstrdm (2008) define co-management networks as a variety o f actors participating in a 
management system in which the central government may not be the central player. The authors 
also note the increasing overlap between conceptions o f policy communities as co-management 
regimes, networks, and governance structures. Building on empirical studies o f co-management 
(e.g., see chapter two), they theorize that networks characterized by many ties (density), diversity 
o f actors and ties (heterogeneity), and number o f ties to central actors (centrality) perform better 
than those not having those qualities (2008). Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) consider co­
management bodies performing a range of tasks; the primary goal o f  these bodies is learning 
about the system. In contrast, the participants in this study are homogeneous groups of hunters 
and whalers in two communities in Alaska who perform one o f many tasks: harvest assessment.
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A key assumption in social network analysis, Mizruchi notes, is that ..the structure o f  
social relations determines the content o f  those relations" (1994: 330). Accordingly, successful 
policy networks for harvest assessment would have active linkages between hunters and those 
responsible for collecting harvest information. This study compares ideal networks, those 
connections between policy actors established in federal mles in force, to advice networks, those 
connections between policy actors that are self-organized in response to particular issues. The 
closer the ideal and the advice network resemble each other, I argue, the better the social fit 
between federal rules and existing social networks.
Drawing on the policy network literature cited above, I test the following hypotheses 
through a comparison o f the marine mammal harvest assessment policies o f two agencies 
(described in chapter five):
(1) network structures are affected by policy and agency preferences;
(2) devolved networks have more active local centers than decentralized 
networks;
(3) devolved networks are closer in shape to self-organized networks than are 
decentralized networks; and
(4) differences in network shape affect support for and participation in policy 
implementation.
Methods
To examine harvest assessment policy in practice, I conducted cases studies o f whale and 
polar bear subsistence hunting in Barrow and Wainwright, Alaska. Data were collected through 
multiple site visits to Barrow between 2006 and 2008 and to Wainwright in fall 2007 .1 
investigated local institutions (formal and informal) related to harvest assessment through an 
analysis o f policy documents, observation of transactions at co-management meetings, a six week 
period o f participant observation in Barrow during the Fall o f 2006 during the whaling season, 
and a survey o f whalers and hunters. I observed whalers successfully harvesting whales, 
distributing the shares o f meat and discussing the process of harvest reporting with members o f 
the Barrow Whaling Captains’ Association and the Wainwright Whaling Captains’ Association. I 
investigated social dynamics of community engagement and perceptions o f co-management
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through a social network analysis framework. In this study, I use networks for harvesting rules as 
a proxy for harvest assessment and participation in resource management in general77.
In order to compare ideal and advice networks within the bowhead whale co-management 
regime to the network within the polar bear co-management regime, I first identified local 
subsistence hunters participating in each regime with help from the Barrow Arctic Science 
Consortium. In 2006 to 2007, there were 52 whaling crews registered in Barrow, Alaska, with the 
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC). Since a crew must be registered with the 
Commission and the local Whaling Captains Association in order to participate in either fall or 
spring bowhead whaling in Barrow, the 52 crews represent the known universe o f respondents 
eligible to whale in 2006 to 2007. My research assistant, a local elder, and I contacted potential 
respondents. After the whaling season ended in early October, we attempted to contact captains or 
co-captains o f every registered whaling crew via phone or through a relative if  the captain did not 
have a published phone number. Non-respondents were contacted an additional time by phone or 
in person. O f the whaling captains we were able to contact, I interviewed 22 (43%).
In contrast to the registration requirements for whaling captains, any "Indian, Aleut or 
Eskimo in Alaska and who dwells on the coast o f the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean" 
(MMPA § 101(b)) may hunt polar bears for subsistence. The take must not be wasteful and 
guidelines only allow artisans to make particular types of products for sale from the bear’s fur, 
claws, and meat. Accordingly, my research assistant and I took a different strategy in order to 
identify the universe o f polar bear respondents. We first contacted federal and local wildlife 
officials to develop a list o f individuals who were known polar bear hunters in the community. 
Pursuant to the Privacy Act, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service is barred from publishing names o f 
subsistence hunters, but it does employ local agencies and individuals to mark and tag subsistence 
hunted polar bear and walrus. Those individuals were contacted in order to generate additional 
names, who were then contacted by telephone and in person. In addition to research questions, we 
asked respondents to name additional persons they knew o f who had hunted polar bears in the 
recent past. These respondents were interviewed in a second round, until no new names were 
generated. One polar bear hunter volunteered to be interviewed after he heard about the study.
Using a snowball technique, I sought to identify and interview as many polar bear hunters 
in Barrow as possible. However, if  the snowball technique was less effective in identifying 
hunters than the registration process with the whalers, then some o f the differences discovered in
77The advice network is assumed to approximate “rules in use.”
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the study might be attributable to sampling techniques. O f the identified pool o f respondents, 6 
(N=13) hunters agreed to be and were interviewed, with a response rate o f  53%. Two additional 
hunters agreed to be interviewed but were unavailable at the time o f my fieldwork. We also 
interviewed two hunters outside o f the network; their experiences are discussed in the analysis. 
The number o f identified respondents is similar to U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service reports that the 
mean harvest in Barrow for 2003-2006 was 15.75 bears (USFWS 2007).
An important difference between the population of bowhead whalers and the population 
o f polar bear hunters lies in the mles and opportunities to hunt for both groups. Generally, anyone 
can hunt polar bears, and a significant proportion o f bears are taken each year as opportunistic 
harvests. W haling carcasses are known bear attractants; if  a whaler or other “coastal Indian,
Aleut, or Eskimo” takes a bear for the purpose o f defending life or property, it generally counts as 
a subsistence hunt as long as it is salvaged and reported. Subsistence harvests o f Southern 
Beaufort Sea polar bears are subtracted from the yearly voluntary quota for the North Slope 
Borough and the Inuvialuit Game Council (Brower et al. 2002).
This open opportunity to take bears creates a larger potential pool o f  respondents, but for 
the purpose o f this analysis, the network represents hunters who intentionally take bears for 
subsistence purposes. I talked to whalers and polar bear hunters about their networks o f self­
organization; in this chapter, I compare these networks to ideal policy networks. Ideal networks 
were constructed from policy documents. Respondents were asked about whether they felt policy­
making was accessible to them as constituents and if  they felt policies conserving whales and 
polar bears are effective. In field research, I took care to ask questions in a culturally sensitive 
manner, meaning that it was more appropriate to ask questions o f how hunters interacted with 
others in different resource management situations, rather than ask directly, “Do you report your 
catch to the proper authorities?” Hunters were asked whom they would talk to about questions 
relating to harvesting mles, animal health, and industrial impacts (see the appendix). This type of 
question is used in many social network analyses to illustrate so-called advice networks (Knoke et 
al. 1996).
Finally, during the study period, a whaler in Barrow violated an Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Committee (AEWC) and International Whaling Commission (IWC) mle and was questioned by 
an enforcement tribunal. This event was well known among whalers and combined with rumors 
o f Japanese plans to obstmct the Alaskan whaling quota at the next IWC (see chapter one) ; it 
created a stressful social environment in which to conduct my social network analysis.
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To validate my findings, I added a round o f interviews78 for both policy networks in Wainwright, 
Alaska. Whalers in Wainwright likely knew about the Barrow incident but were not actively 
involved in the incident. The Wainwright interviews were all conducted over a four-day period 
with a local Inupiat contact to help identify and recruit respondents. O f the identified pool of 
respondents, six whaling captains (N =l 1) and three polar bear hunters (N=undetermined) agreed 
to be and were interviewed, with a response rate of 55% among whaling captains. The population 
o f  polar bear hunters in Wainwright is variable but respondents noted that anyone is a hunter 
when a bear comes into town. Although there are few self-identified polar bear hunters in 
Wainwright, most harvests are now opportunistic in that the bear is killed in self-defense, but then 
salvaged as a subsistence hunt. As a comparison to the three polar bear hunters we identified, the 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service reports the he mean harvest in Wainwright from 2003-2006 was 4.5 
(USFWS 2007).
Results
Bowhead whaling harvest assessment networks
The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) is responsible for assessing the
harvests o f bowhead whales in member communities. This responsibility is detailed in periodic 
co-management agreements signed by the AEWC and their partner agency, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS). The harvest assessment program is also published as a federal rule in 
the federal register whenever the IWC issues a new quota for bowhead whale harvests (ideal 
network). The AEWC in turn relies on local associations of whaling captains to gather harvest 
reports from individual captains at the close o f each whaling season (two times per year for 
Barrow). The AEWC developed the harvest assessment institution as a compromise with NMFS 
after the IWC asserted its authority over the bowhead whale hunt in 1977 (Langdon 1984; 
Freeman 1989; Huntington 1989). NMFS agreed to co-manage the hunt after realizing that 
accuracy in reporting was dependent upon its relationships with whalers79, whose expertise in 
building ice trails and navigating potentially treacherous ice conditions during the spring hunt is 
required for safe travel (Eicken et al. 2009).
781 thank F. Stuart (Terry) Chapin for this suggestion as a way to adapt my fieldwork in response to shocks in the system.79 One NMFS enforcement agent reportedly learned this lesson the hard way when he lost his snowmachine out on the ice in a card game and had to negotiate a ride back to Barrow (Anonymous 2006e).
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Although there have been occasional violations o f law and the agreement, whalers 
consistently report their catches to NMFS at an estimated rate o f 98-100% (IWC 2008). The 
consistency o f harvest assessment is influenced by the following factors: 1) the intensity o f 
international scrutiny, 2) the dependence o f whaling communities upon bowhead whales, 3) a 
tightly interconnected multi-generational network o f whalers, 4) the public nature o f the harvest 
(e.g., it is difficult to hide your catch), and 5) a comprehensive bowhead whale research program 
that involves measuring and sampling in many villages. These relationships have been 
institutionalized into a governing network through the close working relationships between 
NMFS, the whalers, Borough Department o f Wildlife Management biologists and a few State 
biologists. Figure 5.1 presents ideal and advice networks for bowhead whaling in Barrow. Figure 
5.2 presents ideal and advice networks for bowhead whaling in Wainwright.
Polar bear harvest assessment networks
Polar bear harvest assessment is conducted through an institution o f the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service called the Marking, Tagging, and Reporting Program (MTRP). The MTRP was 
launched in 1988 in order to track harvests and authentic handicrafts made from harvested marine 
mammals under the jurisdiction of the USFWS (Bum 1998). For polar bears, hunters must 
present the skin and skull o f a bear to a registered tagger within 30 days o f  harvesting it. Many 
coastal villages have registered taggers; in 2006 and 2007, the North Slope Borough Department 
o f Wildlife Management, the Native Village o f Barrow, and several individuals were listed as 
registered taggers in Barrow (ideal network). This program had an estimated 75 to 94% success 
rate for tagging walruses in 1994 to 1995 in the most active walrus-hunting communities when 
compared to an experimental, more extensive harvest assessment program and known lost 
animals (Bum 1998). A local expert familiar with the program estimated that in Barrow in 2006, 
35% o f harvested bears were reported (Anonymous 2006b)80. USFWS reported in 2007 that polar 
bear harvests reported through the MTRP were believed to be as low as 30% to as high as 80% in 
the communities most affected by industrial development (USFWS 2008a).
80 By 2008, a larger number o f bears came into town and two irregular bear harvests brought the bear harvest under more federal scrutiny. Reporting appears to have decreased during this period.
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Location and type Ideal Network Reported Advice Network
Barrow whaling captains
1. AEWC2. Village whaling captains’ association3. Borough4. National Marine Fisheries Service5. Elders6-26 Whaling captains
Barrow polar bear hunters
1. Nanuuq Commission2. Village Council3. Borough4. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service5. Elders6-11 polar bear hunters
Figure 5.1 Policy networks among whalers and polar bear hunters in Barrow, Alaska (2006-2007)
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Location and type
W ainwright whaling captains
1. Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission2. Village whaling captains’ association3. Borough4. National Marine Fisheries Service5. Elders6-11 Whaling captains
Wainwright polar bear hunters
1. Nanuuq Commission2. City3. Borough4. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service5. Elders6-8 Polar bear hunters
Ideal Network Reported Advice Network
Figure 5.2 Policy networks among whalers and polar bear hunters in Wainwright, Alaska (2007)
4^
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Several respondents during interviews recounted past incidents o f bears killed in self-defense that 
were not intended to be used for food or handicrafts and so were not reported. Similarly, 
occasionally one hears of bears reported as, “struck and lost81” -  meaning shot and not recovered 
before sinking in open water. The consistency o f reporting bear harvests in Barrow is related to 
the following factors: intentionality o f the hunt, whether the person is prepared to skin and bring 
back the bear parts with them82, connection to other bear hunters, and whether or not the 
community learns o f the harvest. Because anyone can potentially harvest a bear, when compared 
to whaling networks, there is no comparable group o f all hunters in Barrow that engage in 
management activities. When seeking advice, polar bear hunters in Barrow are most likely to talk 
to the Borough Department o f Wildlife Management rather than co-management or federal 
partners, illustrating a difference between self-organized and ideal policy networks (figure 5.1). 
Wainwright hunters do not have a central point o f contact (figure 5.2). However, respondents 
mentioned that the VHF radio serves the same function83. Wainwright hunters reported taking 
few bears intentionally; harvests are mostly opportunistic.
Policy outcomes
To discover satisfaction with and participation in resource management decision-making, 
I surveyed whaling captains and polar bear hunters about policy process fairness, hunter 
representation, and effectiveness o f policy. Outcomes are listed in table 5.1. Whalers in both 
villages had more confidence in the fairness of the policy-making process when compared to 
polar bear hunters; additionally, they were also more likely to report that their concerns would be 
addressed in rule making. The questions (A ppendix) were open-ended; a significant amount o f 
hunters answered “maybe” when asked their opinion o f the policy process and policy 
effectiveness. If  those who answered “maybe” are combined with the “yes” group, then both 
groups in both towns are approximately equal. Barrow whalers were more likely than Barrow 
polar bear hunters were to report harvesting rules as effective; in Wainwright, the result was 
reversed. Again, if  the “maybe” answer is added to the “yes” group, then the answers o f both 
groups in both towns are approximately equal. I emphasize the “yes” answers due to the
81 This term is most often associated with the unintended loss of seals and walruses.82 This process can take up to 72 hours, according to several respondents.83 One respondent noted that when guided sport hunting was still legal (before 1972), hunters were very well organized as a group.
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Table 5.1 Comparison o f whalers and polar bear hunters in their perception of policy
Are harvest rules made fairly? Would your concerns Are harvesting rules be addressed in rules? effective?
Barrow whalers
Barrow polar bear hunters
Wainwrightwhalers
Wainwright polar bear hunters
50% yes 64% yes 64% yes
9% no 5% no 5% no
14% maybe / DK* 5% maybe / DK 5% maybe / DK
27% NA 27% NA 27% NA
33% yes 33% yes 50% yes
0% no 17% no 0% no
33% maybe / DK 17% maybe / DK 17% maybe / DK
33% NA 33% NA 33% NA
50% yes 67% yes 33% yes
0% no 0% no 17% no
17% maybe / DK 17% maybe / DK 33% maybe / DK
33% NA 17% NA 17% NA
0% yes 33% yes 67% yes
0% no 0% no 0% no
67% maybe / DK 67% maybe / DK 0% maybe / DK
33% NA 0% NA 33% NA
*DK means “do not know”; NA means “no answer”
potential bias from the small size o f the Wainwright sample of polar bear hunters and the number 
o f respondents across groups who did not answer84. The lower level o f participation and support 
expressed by polar bear hunters is likely influenced by the fact that at the time o f the 2006 
interviews, the only new rules contemplated by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service were related to
841 did not subject results to an analysis o f variance because for polar bear hunters, the sample size was small and several respondents stated that they did not know or did not answer the question, complicating the comparability of the data sets.
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the concept o f introducing hard quotas under a treaty for the subsistence hunt o f the Chukchi Sea 
bear population shared with Russia. In 2006, the treaty was awaiting ratification by the U.S. 
Senate, which had not yet acted for six years since the U.S. and Russian governments had signed 
the treaty (Meek et al. 2008). Village consultations for this treaty had taken place in 1996, and 
updates had been given periodically through the Nanuuq Commission thereafter as it developed 
an interlocal agreement with Chukotkan partners. Therefore, rule sets for polar bear harvesting in 
2006 were not an active agenda item in Barrow or at the Nanuuq Commission, the co­
management body for polar bears at a statewide level. By 2007, however, when interviews in 
Wainwright took place, the USFWS had proposed to list the polar bear as a threatened species 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which stimulated an active discussion.
There were many uncertainties around what, if  anything, a listing would mean for 
existing harvest and harvest assessment institutions, including the new treaty with Russia, that the 
Senate finally ratified in December o f 2006. The combination o f significant institutional change 
and uncertainty among polar bear hunters and communities at large in how to influence the 
direction o f change likely made polar bear hunters less confident o f their role in any new rule 
making. One polar bear hunter in Barrow lamented how “ ... these rules come down on 
m s ,’’(Anonymous 2006f) reflecting common sentiment that hunters do not control their own fate 
or have a meaningful role in wildlife management rule making. During an official public hearing 
on the ESA listing process in Barrow in February 2007, many community members expressed 
frustration that the process seemed to be moving so fast that there was not adequate time to build 
a plan from the bottom up. Instead, many in the meeting expressed a sense that they were being 
treated unfairly by the imposition o f rules from above. The Borough Mayor Edward Itta later 
compared the fates o f automobile drivers in Los Angeles, California to those o f polar bear hunters 
in Alaska under an ESA listing:
The real tragedy would be ifpeople in the lower 48 hear that the polar bear is 
now being protected and they...they fee l good and they fee l reassured while 
they ’re listening to their radio sitting in traffic. A nd they d on’t have any idea that 
they ’re letting the Inupiaq Eskimos take the heat while nothing changes down 
there where the problem comes from  (Southern 2008).
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For the USFWS, the time constraints come from the ESA (§4(b)(3)), as it has statutory deadlines 
for publishing findings on the merit o f a petition and then again on publishing rules for a 
proposed listing or a declination to list85.
Although tribal and local governments do have the opportunity to be specially consulted 
on the ESA decision, the decision to list or not to list is the decision o f the Secretary o f the 
Interior alone. This type o f constitutional rule-making is not co-managed, although the 
implementation o f the rule itself may be co-managed through the development of “special rules” 
designed to balance the joint responsibilities o f the government to the resources and to protected 
tribal uses o f those resources.
Whalers were not without their own uncertainties and challenges in controlling their own 
fate. In 2006, when interviews began, whalers in Barrow knew that representatives o f the 
Japanese government had threatened to use the Alaska aboriginal bowhead whale quotas as 
leverage for achieving their whaling policy goals at the 2007 International Whaling Commission. 
This fact made some whalers nervous when talking about rules with me; one whaling captain 
cited the threat as the reason he declined to participate in my survey. Additionally, the 
circumstances regarding the whaling captain who harvested a calf during the 2006 fall season also 
created tension in the community. However, in both Barrow and Wainwright, whaling captains’ 
associations meet consistently, reinforcing social capital and their roles in the policy 
implementation process. The whalers’ 2007 successful collective action in securing another five- 
year block quota for bowhead whaling in Alaska together with their partner federal agency, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), contributed to the sense that whalers have a large 
degree o f control over their policy fate when it comes to subsistence harvesting.
Discussion
The study described in this chapter was designed to compare self-organized and federally 
sanctioned policy networks in the relative success o f harvest management programs for marine 
mammals. A devolved management program such as the harvest assessment program for 
bowhead whales is highly successful because o f the importance o f the species to the community, 
as well as the ability o f local networks to capitalize on a variety o f ways o f  achieving their goals.
85 The USFWS did not willingly publish its findings; it was directed to do so by a federal court ruling Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthome (2008 WL 1902703 N.D. Cal 2008) on a lawsuit brought by environmental groups.
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For instance, if  a whaler is late in reporting his harvest, there are multiple channels his co­
management representatives can use to ensure the report is submitted. These efforts create a 
“nagging” network with local powers o f persuasion. A strong local co-management group, such 
as the local whaling captains association, maintains active linkages among whalers and between 
scales o f government.
In contrast, an official familiar with the USFWS harvest assessment program noted that 
reports are more likely to return to USFWS if  the agent responsible for the program has a good 
relationship with local taggers. The taggers themselves, however, may not have a sufficient 
network among all possible hunters in order to rely on informal means o f ensuring reporting. 
Agency staff also periodically make the rounds to households in villages to talk with known polar 
bear hunters, as well as to remind them to report and tag their animals. The ideal polar bear 
network shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2 lack a central coordinating hub other than the agency itself, 
and so the network cannot capitalize on other informal networks in the village to achieve greater 
efficiencies86.
These results support Provan and M ilward’s (1995) findings that strong local 
coordination results in better outcomes. The ability o f whalers to act collectively is enhanced by 
having a local whaling captains’ association linked to a high-profile regional co-management 
body to regularly discuss issues and reinforce social norms. Polar bear hunters, on the other hand, 
self-organize towards a central actor (the North Slope Borough) but neither the Borough nor any 
other local actor have authority for the MTRP program; control is maintained by the agency. The 
agency, in order to achieve high returns in tagging, must use its connections to taggers and 
hunters to encourage compliance. The USFWS realizes the strong local role the NSB plays, but 
has not devolved authority to the Borough or a regional tribal government to date87. New rule sets 
developed under the polar bear treaty with Russia for the Chukchi Sea population allow for such a 
transfer to co-management partners but have not yet been enacted, as the program has not yet 
been appropriated funding from Congress. USFWS does periodically appeal to the Borough for
86 During one visit to Barrow, a USFWS staff member called as I was interviewing one respondent, in order to persuade him or her to go look after some tags.87 The Environmental Impact Assessment for the Polar Bear treaty with Russia noted that devolution for statutory activities is possible, but made easier by explicit authority amended into existing or new laws. Other reasons the Service has not devolved authority may include a preference to maintain its lead agency status for activities on federal lands, the desire to avoid conflict with the State o f Alaska over tribal sovereignty, the maintenance o f program lines and budgets, potential disinterest at the local level, and potential mistrust o f  co-management partners.
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help in increasing returns. I f  unsuccessful, the Borough may be then contacted by enforcement 
agents who operate under separate lines o f authority (they report to a division in Washington, DC 
rather than the regional agency head) than management biologists and so may have even fewer 
network contacts to draw on to discover the true rules in use.
Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) proposed that co-management networks would be most 
effective with a central node and many connections across diverse actors. This study supports the 
importance of a central node as a coordinating body, especially when the network is 
implementing a particular policy. Depending on the role the co-management body plays, density 
and diversity o f actors may be less important than centrality. If  a co-management body is a 
platform for group learning or a model o f governance over a broad set o f responsibilities, density 
o f connections and diversity can be important for diffusion of policy ideas, technology, and new 
knowledge. However, networks responsible for implementing contentious or unpopular policies 
(such as a quota or harvest assessment) require mutual trust and are enhanced by familiarity. I 
argue that centrality, the extent to which a network has a central actor, is fundamental to 
maintaining participation among the group.
Finally, this study tested four propositions relating to network structure and outcomes:
(1) network structures are affected by policy and agency preferences, (2) devolved networks have 
more active local centers than decentralized networks, (3) devolved networks are closer in shape 
to self-organized networks than are decentralized networks, and (4) differences in network shape 
affect support for and participation in policy implementation.
I found that the choice of each agency to devolve or maintain its harvest assessment 
function played a necessary, if  not sufficient, role in determining network structures. For instance, 
NMFS has not followed USFWS in creating a specific agency-controlled harvest assessment 
methodology. Part o f the reason for this is that when the AEWC proposed its original 
management plan in response to the IWC moratorium on bowhead whaling in the 1970s, NMFS 
did not have any plan or institutions in place to conduct the assessment itself. The trust built 
between the whalers, the biologists and NMFS over the next 30 years in addition to the intense 
international scrutiny o f native whaling has created the foundation for highly effective, 
coordinated management. USFWS made the opposite choice in determining to implement its own 
harvest assessment program. This program comes up for renewal periodically, but USFWS has 
not publicly analyzed alternative methods for harvest assessment, except to determine how many
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animals are likely unreported (Bum 1998). Few incentives for hunters (other than not going to 
jail) exist for improving polar bear harvest assessment. A key difference is also important to note 
in terms o f effective reporting; the dependence o f  people in Barrow upon bowhead whales is 
significant and structures the seasonal activities, making the stakes o f policy implementation 
extremely high88.
The devolved whaling networks -bo th  ideal and advice— have an active local center 
node, the local W haling Captains’ Association. These centers are important in creating sustained 
collective action. The center node, combined with real management authority, provides whalers a 
sense o f control over their own fates, at least as far as harvesting rules go. Polar bear hunters in 
Barrow seek information through local organizations, but have little influence over many policy 
initiatives relating to polar bear conservation. Responsibility for harvest assessment is fragmented 
along many levels o f social organization and results in an ad-hoc ideal network that can not 
capitalize on local social networks to enhance rule compliance. This model o f agency engagement 
in Barrow may work well with other management functions such as research and outreach. 
Specific policy implementation through an ad-hoc network with low capacity for monitoring but 
with an aim to achieve collective action is not effective in this case, as predicted by Ostrom 
(2005) and others.
The devolved whaling networks in this study are closer in shape to their ideal networks 
than are the decentralized polar bear networks. Although the small sample size limits the strength 
o f the analysis o f polar bear networks, the similarity between whaling ideal and advice networks 
is striking. Findings support the proposition that the devolved networks result in a greater social 
fit. The co-management network has become the official policy venue for bowhead whaling 
management activities and is perceived as a source o f local power. W hether or not this model 
would work for polar bear harvest assessment is unclear, given suggested antecedent conditions 
for success (Ostrom 2005) including high dependence upon the resource. Nevertheless, even 
dependence upon the resource is not sufficient, as the walrus harvest assessment program 
challenges (Bum 1998) illustrate in other parts o f Alaska.
Finally, differences in network shape correlate with participation in and support for 
policy, as measured by the rates o f harvest reporting and perceptions that the policy-making
88 The Chairman o f the North Slope Borough Fish and Game Committee underscored this point at a meeting in Barrow after hearing a presentation of this study.
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process is fair, addresses local concerns and is effective. The routine nature of whaling 
deliberation and collective action institutionalize policies that whalers may not particularly 
support as individuals, but will implement as a network. Peer monitoring and sanctioning around 
Barrow and Wainwright are effective means for achieving high rates o f  harvest reporting and lead 
to whalers (in most cases) having more confidence in their role in policy-making. In contrast, the 
ad-hoc polar bear network does not encourage routine deliberations and does not affect other 
modes o f decision-making.
Limitations of the study
Limitations to the study include the small sample size o f polar bear hunters, as well as the 
equivocal answers many respondents expressed to the questions o f  policy fairness, representation, 
and effectiveness. In addition, the population o f self-identified polar bear hunters does not 
represent the known universe o f potential polar bear hunters, as anyone can kill a bear in self­
defense. I f  one is an Alaska Native, then such a defense kill can be counted as a subsistence hunt 
as long as the bear is salvaged and used according to the law. I addressed these limitations 
through attending public meetings including a USFWS hearing and a local meeting of the North 
Slope Borough Assembly where any concerned person in town could discuss policy relating to 
polar bears. I also attended two meetings o f the Barrow Whaling Captains’ Association and a 
discussion o f polar bear management with hunters in 2008 during a meeting o f the North Slope 
Borough Fish and Game Committee. Polar bears and whaling camps were also briefly discussed 
at the Alaska Eskimo W haling Commission Mini-Convention in 2008. These experiences support 
my conclusions that the whalers have a stronger network that is more active in policy-making and 
whalers have a greater sense o f  control o f their own fates in relationship to harvest assessment 
policy.
Conclusion
The key goal o f this chapter was to examine policy success through its fit to the social 
environment. Drawing from the policy network literature, I tested four hypotheses relating to 
social fit. I described and compared two different institutions for harvest assessment, one for 
bowhead whale and another for polar bear subsistence hunting, in order to examine how effective 
each is in encouraging participation as well as to examine the social processes behind such 
effectiveness. Using social network analysis I mapped the ideal harvest assessment policy
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network (what the law says) for both cases and compared it to reported social advice networks 
(what people actually do). I found that the advice network of whalers in Barrow and Wainwright 
were more similar to their ideal networks than were the advice networks o f  polar bear hunters. 
Findings demonstrate that this congruence between networks is a measure o f policy fit to the 
social environment. Support for policy appears to track with having a more congruent network. In 
these cases, devolved policy results in networks that meet regularly and consistently reinforce 
social norms relating to participation in harvest assessment.
After the field work for this study was complete, Barrow and Wainwright experienced a 
heavy ice year with many more bears coming into town. This event coupled with a few negative 
bear-human interactions and the nomination o f a new Nanuuq Commissioner for Barrow led to a 
mobilization o f polar bear hunters and wildlife managers to re-invigorate local polar bear 
discussions. The mobilization o f stakeholders in an ad-hoc network is an efficient response for 
these types o f management issues. The more routine issues, however, like harvest assessment 
require sustained interaction in order to cultivate and maintain norms.
The analysis o f individual actors at a community level is the most relevant scale for 
understanding the effectiveness o f  particular wildlife management policies as guides to human 
behavior. Unless the resource in use is bounded at the same scale, a local analysis cannot assess 
the broader effect o f policy regimes at an ecologically relevant scale. An ecologically relevant 
approach is one at which critical drivers are addressed at the appropriate ecological scales. In the 
next chapter, I build an analysis o f policy effectiveness at the scale o f a social-ecological system 
in order to examine the fit o f American bowhead whale and polar bear policy regimes to broader 
policy problems.
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Chapter 6: Institutional fit through successful coupling: an analysis o f bowhead whale and polar bear conservation policy
I f  ecosystems were simple, ecological-economic research would consist offinding  
accurate production functions fo r  ecological resources and services and fitting  those functions 
into economic models. Complex institutional arrangements governing ecosystem management 
would not be necessary fo r  solving ecological problems although they might be necessary fo r  
solving social problems; institutions would chiefly govern the level or intensity o f  use. -  Folke et 
al. (1998a)
Introduction
As a solution to contentious international resource conflicts o f the 1970s, bowhead 
whales and polar bears, as well as Inupiaq use o f those animals, have been governed by a 
complex, cross-scale system o f local, interlocal, regional, federal, and international institutions. 
Management o f these two species is complicated by rapidly changing ecological, political and 
economic conditions. In the absence of new institutions, as sea ice retreats, the projected 
increasing trends in shipping and oil and gas operations will require communities and their 
management partners to use existing institutions in reflexive ways to manage valued resources in 
a changing environment. To date, the design o f institutions to manage human interaction with 
living marine resources have, for the most part, not addressed complexity in ecological, social, or 
coupled systems (Wilson 2002)89. Considering these policies were not designed with current 
conditions in mind, it is reasonable to evaluate how well they match policy problems as they exist 
today. This idea o f policy match, or “fit,” has developed in political and other social sciences to 
examine the relevance o f particular policies towards sustainability.
In chapter five, I proposed that policy implementation strategies that fit local social 
patterns are more efficient and successful. However, human activities at the local scale are only 
part o f a broad system encompassing multiple ecological and human scales congruent to life 
histories and migratory paths o f bowhead whales and polar bears. This chapter examines several 
aspects o f policy fit. The theoretical goal o f the chapter is to examine the concept o f policy fit at a 
system level, examining policy feedback loops. The applied goal o f this chapter is to analyze
89 The Steller sea lion recovery plan developed by NMFS is a promising move towards incorporating uncertainty into decision-making, and using an adaptive management approach to discovering system drivers. Most marine mammal management plans lack sophisticated analyses of linked social and ecological dynamics beyond analyses o f nutritional need and subsistence harvests to fulfill those needs.
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bowhead whale and polar bear conservation with efficacy and feasibility as a combined measure 
o f policy effectiveness. Additionally, I aim to evaluate to what extent these institutions enhance 
resilience o f the system. Through qualitative, in-depth case study evaluations o f conservation 
policy affecting both species, I answer three questions: 1) which activities affecting ecosystem 
services are addressed by existing policy, 2) how do these policies affect social-ecological 
systems dynamics and resilience o f these systems, and 3) how successful are these institutions in 
sustaining ecosystem services?
These three questions lie at the intersection o f writings on social-ecological system 
dynamics, institutional fit and governance. A successful policy approach must arguably fit the 
policy problem, but fit is only half o f  the solution. Policies must also be efficacious, in that they 
must have the power to effect sustainable use o f ecosystem services. I argue that efficacy is a 
measure o f the magnitude o f fit o f policy to policy problem. Whether the most efficacious 
policies will be adopted depends on social processes such as competing uses, understanding, and 
the political process. The political process in turn shapes the feasibility o f  policy solutions.
The chapter proceeds in the following way: in section one, I draw on the following 
literatures to orient the reader: resilience, institutional fit, and feedback channels. I argue that the 
extent to which institutions operate as an effective feedback channel between both ecological and 
social subsystems is a measure o f  policy fit. In section two, I describe historical and current 
drivers o f system dynamics for both regimes. I utilize Chapin et al.’s (2006a) social-ecological 
system model to characterize both systems. In section three, I compare institutional responses for 
the governance o f both systems, using the Endangered Species Act five-factor analysis model and 
report on the relative effectiveness and scale o f policy approaches given system vulnerabilities. 
For this analysis, I draw on the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s 2006 Range-wide Status o f the 
Polar Bear report, biannual reports o f the International Union for the Conservation o f Nature 
(IUCN) Polar Bear Specialist Group (PBSG) spanning the years 1965 -  2005, the 2008 National 
Marine Fisheries Service Environmental Impact Assessment for awarding bowhead whaling 
quotas to Inupiaq whalers, annual reports from the International Whaling Commission from 1969 
to 2007, interviews and supporting materials. In section four, I examine governance gaps and 
analyze the extent to which these gaps affect the system’s ability to recover from or resist 
disturbance (i.e., systemic resilience).
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Defining and bounding the systems for analysis
The interactions between many, if  not most, ecological and social systems are so tightly
linked that they can be recognized as a coupled social-ecological system (Berkes and Folke 1998; 
Chapin et al. 2006a). Marine ecosystems are spatially and temporally complex (Wilson et al. 
1994; Walters 1997; Jentoft 2000; Levin and Lubchenco 2008); and thus subject to significant 
uncertainties in assessing the cause o f population growth, or decline o f interrelated complexes o f 
marine animals. Wilson (2002) argues that mismatches between the spatial organization o f 
complex marine systems and contemporary management approaches inhibit the collection o f 
information that is essential for moving towards systems management. At the present time, 
formal marine mammal management in the United States is organized around a single-species 
approach (as opposed to an ecosystem-based approach), largely driven by federal population 
assessment research (Robards 2008), programs for reducing bycatch, and subsistence harvest 
monitoring programs. Additionally, all three populations of animals o f interest in this study (the 
Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort stock o f bowhead whales, the Southern Beaufort Sea stock o f polar 
bears, and the Chukchi Sea stock o f polar bears) are managed internationally, interlocally, and 
across scales through co-management agreements (Freeman 1989; Brower et al. 2002; Lovecraft 
2007; Meek et al. 2008). Parallel to increasingly complex governance arrangements, many 
subsistence communities in Alaska maintain local institutions and norms traditional regarding 
harvests (Spaeder 2005; Femandez-Gimenez et al. 2008). These mles may or may not be 
congment to federal policy regimes90.
The social-ecological system o f interest in this chapter includes the social and ecological 
drivers acting upon human uses o f bowhead whales and polar bears as ecosystem services in 
Barrow, Alaska. The place and people are described as part o f a system to place an emphasis on 
the interactions o f human and ecological components -  here called subsystems. Due to an 
institutional legacy dating from the reorganization o f marine governance in the 1970s91, bowhead 
whales and polar bears are managed by two separate agencies, the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS). Although the systems for both 
animal populations are linked, they are managed under different institutional and social contexts. 
The analysis in this chapter is drawn from a comparison o f both systems, as they exist in Barrow 
and Wainwright, Alaska. The human subsystems are reflected in contemporary accounts o f  the
90 The use of the word congruent is meant to convey the fact that the local and non-local sets o f mles complement or work together as compared to the "two solitudes" of many co-management arrangements.91 See the 1969 report of the Stratton Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources.
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nature o f interaction between humans and bowhead whales and humans and bears. The 
description of the ecological subsystem is a contemporary account o f key ecological features 
affecting bowhead whale and polar bear population ecology.
Social-ecological systems and resilience
Social-ecological systems are spatially heterogeneous and temporally dynamic (Berkes et
al. 2003; Turner et al. 2003; Steffen et al. 2004). Interactions between state factors and multiple 
drivers o f change create emergent, systemic change (Lambin et al. 2001). As a result, the 
production o f ecosystem services92 and human uses o f those services change over space and time, 
often in non-linear ways (Holling 1986; Hughes et al. 2005; MEA 2005; Liu et al. 2007; Chapin 
III et al. forthcoming). Chapin et al. (2006a) describe social-ecological systems through a 
schematic illustrating slow and fast drivers as well as the institutions linking human uses and 
ecological conditions. Among other policy strategies, the authors recommend the strengthening of 
negative (stabilizing) feedback through policy focused on slow variables that structure 
ecosystems rather than focusing on the intensity o f use o f one ecosystem service. As an example, 
the authors note that state and federal agencies in Alaska’s interior boreal forest region are most 
likely to have the mandate, funding, and capacity to address a single type o f ecosystem service, 
such as subsistence resources like moose. The authors further note that few managers have an 
equal ability to address critical slow or medium variables, such as habitat degradation (2006a).
Similarly, marine ecologists recommend ecosystem-based management approaches that 
support biodiversity, redundancy in function, and modularity (Ruckelshaus et al. 2008). 
Modularity refers to the compartmentalization o f the system in space, time, or organizational 
structure (Levin and Lubchenco 2008). These concepts apply to both ecological and social 
subsystems; a focus on modularity in bowhead whale conservation would protect multiple pulses 
o f migration (e.g., making sure that cows and calves are protected as well as other age classes o f 
whales) and within the management framework, strengthening self-organization at multiple social 
scales. Maintaining ecosystem modularity as a management strategy tightens feedback loops 
(Levin and Lubchenco 2008) and can foster conservation through better information, incentives 
and rewards, but can also increase greed (Levin 2003) or discounting o f future benefits from 
ecosystems if all actors in the system exploit the system simultaneously at high levels o f removal 
(Satake et al. 2007).
92 Ecosystem services are the processes and material benefits humans derive from ecosystems (MEA 2005).
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Institutional fit
Fit is a measure o f institutional effectiveness, focused on how well institutional 
characteristics match the socio-ecological system characteristics (structure, processes and 
linkages) they seek to address (Young 2002a). Sources o f misfit include imperfect knowledge, 
institutional constraints and rent-seeking behavior (Young 2002a). Types o f misfits between 
governance systems and ecosystem dynamics include spatial misfits, temporal misfits, and a lack 
o f provisions for thresholds or cascading effects (Galaz et al. 2008). These categories of 
evaluation are diagnostic, in that they aim to discover problems in order to design better 
solutions. I consider efficacy, the power to effect change, as a measure o f the magnitude o f  fit o f 
a policy tool to a policy problem. However, social and political forces affect the likelihood of 
implementing any public policy. Policy effectiveness, then, requires a further look at how the 
institution is accepted, adopted, or considered possible at all. Marine resource managers from the 
National Marine Fisheries Service and stakeholders developing recovery plans for northern 
marine mammals have begun to evaluate policy tools for their efficacy and feasibility (NMFS 
2008a). Rapid ecological change in the North makes fit a particularly important factor for 
addressing the conservation o f ice-dependent species as the northern seas become warmer. In this 
chapter, I am interested in the extent to which institutions address key drivers related to the 
conservation o f bowhead whales and polar bears. The social-ecological system (SES) model also 
recognizes both species as being important to people not directly involved in policy 
implementation, but with important feedbacks to the governance drivers (e.g., public support for 
the listing o f both species on the Endangered Species Act list).
Institutions as policy feedback mechanisms
Levin (1999) argues that tight feedback between social and ecological processes are an
important component o f sustainability. Chapin et al. (2006a) illustrate how different categories o f 
institutions create functional linkages between ecological and social subsystems. Anderies et al. 
note that effective institutions, “...transform information about the state o f  the system into 
actions that influence the system”  in desired ways (2004: 12). I propose that the strength o f these 
linkages, the extent to which social goals93 are actively promoted through the coupling o f the 
system, is also a measure o f policy fit. Institutions that are only recognized on paper or do not 
shape behavior would obviously not fit this description.
93 Keeping in mind that social goals are dynamic and change through time and under varying circumstances (see chapter three).
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Much writing on feedback within coupled systems has focused on how and whether or 
not the social subsystem is processing ecological feedback (Adger et al. 2005; Beier et al. 2008). 
Social theorists also discuss the way in which political processes and policies can change slow 
social variables. Institutionalist Theda Skocpol describes policy feedbacks as the ways in which 
“ ...policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes” (Skocpal 1992). Two 
processes drive such transformation. First, state capacities may be affected when new policies 
reinforce or undermine existing ways o f doing business. Second, policies may affect the 
identities, political goals, and capabilities o f  social groups (Skocpal 1992; Putnam 1993). In 
questions o f natural resource management, Westley reminds us that systemic interactions can 
produce emergent conditions or behavior that do not resemble the dominant traits o f either social 
or ecological conditions (Westley et al. 2002). For instance, the rapid pace o f resource 
development may trigger a surprising failure o f critical ecosystem services that then feeds back 
into political change94.
Cumming et al. (2006) note the importance o f  matching monitoring efforts to the relevant 
spatial or temporal scale in order to access useful feedback that includes the most critical kind and 
amount o f information. The authors note that incorrect or incomplete information may obscure 
the type or magnitude o f problems occurring in the system. Mismatched governance efforts 
sometimes collect too much information of the wrong kind, Cumming et al. (2006) argue; data 
gathering and analysis can become a trap that distracts an agency from critical problem-solving. 
For instance, the Marine Mammal Protection Act mandates frequent population assessments 
(annually for vulnerable stocks and every three years for others) (§117) despite the considerable 
difficulty in surveying stocks with extensive home ranges or associated with sea ice. In seeking to 
conserve species, arguably too many resources can be directed towards this "numerology" 
(Kareiva et al. 2006) instead o f strategies that focus on reducing known vulnerabilities (Robards 
2008).
At the same time, managers have many sources o f uncertainty to grapple with in 
designing interventions; these uncertainties also effect to what extent the right feedback is 
collected. Francis and Shotton (1997) identify four sources o f uncertainty in fisheries 
management with relevance for learning about marine system dynamics. The first kind, 
observation error, arises from mistakes in sampling and monitoring o f resources. The second
94 The development of the oil and gas industry and its effects on the political organizing of Alaska Native regional associations (and later, corporations and tribal governments) is an example of this phenomenon.
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kind, model structure error, arises from a lack o f knowledge o f population dynamics: 
reproductive rate, sex-ratio, stock structure, key sources o f mortality, inter-species competition 
and carrying capacity o f the environment. The third source o f uncertainty, process error, arises 
from natural variability in population parameters affecting abundance. The fourth source, 
implementation error, arises from problems in enforcing policies designed to manage wildlife.
Hanna (2001) argues that in ignoring social drivers as sources o f uncertainty across these 
categories (rather than simply lumped into the implementation error box), that fisheries policy has 
largely failed to develop the ability to understand and anticipate human behavior in advance of 
regulation, or to craft regulations that effectively shape human behavior in ways that promote 
management goals. In these cases, institutions do not serve as effective mechanisms to take 
socially defined management goals (e.g., appropriate level o f harvest vis a vis estimated 
population size or an acceptable level o f risk to the population o f  extinction) and transform 
individual or group behavior to accomplish those goals95. Drawing from the above literature, I 
propose that an effective feedback channel decreases positive feedback that is potentially 
destabilizing, relies on a suite o f indicators that inform actors about ecological and social 
conditions at multiple scales (e.g., information about thresholds is particularly important), and 
uses this information about the system to design policy corrections.
Drivers o f  ecosystem service provision and use
Drivers for both species o f interest are listed in figures 6.1 and 6.2. As with Chapin et al.
(2006a), I characterize drivers in both temporal and spatial dimensions. Drivers affecting the 
production o f whales and polar bears as ecosystem services include the following: the fastest 
drivers are either temporally limited to seasons or spatially limited to home range or migratory 
paths; the slowest drivers are either temporally long such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
time horizon for determining extinction probabilities -  “within the foreseeable future” (§ 
4(b)(l)(B)(ii)). Slow drivers can also be spatially vast such as the broader oceanographic 
conditions that affect ecosystem productivity. Social drivers are categorized similarly: the fastest 
drivers are temporally limited to the seasonal rounds o f subsistence harvesting and spatially 
limited to traditional use areas; the slowest drivers are temporally limited to the rate o f change in 
whaling policy and Inupiaq population dynamics and spatially limited to ideas o f nationhood and
95Rice and Connolly (2007) note that social, economic and governance drivers can be so dominant in shaping actual fishery system dynamics that, “ . ..the implementation phase may be characterized as the place where most good ideas o f fisheries biologists simply die” (p. 578).
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Figure 6.1 Polar bear social-ecological system (both Chukchi and Beaufort Sea populations) Figure adapted from Chapin et al. (2006a).
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Figure 6.2 Bowhead whale social-ecological system Figure adapted from Chapin et al. (2006a).
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Arctic North America. Below, I briefly contextualize the system and describe ecological and 
social drivers involved in the provisioning o f bowhead whales and polar bears as ecosystem 
services as well as linkages between the two.
Since the 1940s, the Arctic has been experiencing rapid systemic change, such as climate 
forcing (Arctic Council 2005) with the resulting loss o f multi-year sea ice, (Richter-Menge et al. 
2008) and internationalization of resource management (Young and Osherenko 1993). Arctic 
Alaska has also been changed through social and political processes such as the oil boom in the 
1960s (Chance 1990), military activities (Hughes 1965), and change in political and cultural 
boundaries through the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act o f 1971 (ANCSA) (Berger 1985; 
Mitchell 2001; Hensley 2008). Fieldwork in Barrow during this study took place during 2006 to 
2008, and in 2007 in Wainwright. During 2006 and early 2007, several fast social drivers were 
negatively affecting the communities: the proposed reauthorization o f bowhead whale strikes by 
the International Whaling Commission and Japanese threats to block passage o f the rule; growing 
oil and gas exploration in the Beaufort Sea; and the Endangered Species Act listing process for 
the polar bear. Pronounced fast environmental drivers included an unprecedented (in the modem 
era) loss o f summer sea ice in 2007, increasing numbers o f grey whales migrating along the 
Beaufort Sea coast, and a low level o f polar bear activity on land. By 2008, ice conditions for 
polar bears had changed and many bears were seen directly offshore o f Barrow; more bears than 
usual were seen near and into town (Eicken pers. comm.).
Drivers of bowhead whale population change
As one manifestation o f climate change, marine mammals are projected to and have been 
observed to be responding to climate change in proportion to their dependence on multi-year sea 
ice (Laidre et al. 2008). As ice-associated species (Laidre et al. 2008), bowhead whales are 
thought to be somewhat resilient to the loss o f multi-year sea ice, but vulnerable to other changes 
such as the growing acidification o f the oceans or projected increased competition from seasonal 
migrants such as humpback, minke, gray and killer whales (Moore and Huntington 2008). Due to 
favorable ecological conditions (slow drivers96) and a successful international moratorium on 
commercial whaling (fast driver), bowhead whales in the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas (BCB)
96 The Bering Sea, where the whales are believed to overwinter, is undergoing a significant ecosystem regime shift from a benthic-dominated to a pelagic-dominated state (Grebmeier et al. 2006).
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population as well as some other Arctic areas have seen a recovery97 from colonial whaling. 
Ecologically, bowheads play an important roles in the near-shore environment by maintaining 
leads in the seasonal ice zone, consuming zooplankton, vertically mixing nutrients, making 
plankton available to other species at the water surface, and providing energy to predators and 
scavengers (all fast drivers) (Moshenko et al. 2003). Bowhead whales have done well in the 
Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort Seas as benthic-dominated ecosystems; a projected shift to a 
pelagic-dominated ecosystem with the reduction o f sea ice may increase competition for plankton 
through increased fisheries biomass (Hunt et al. 2002; 0 ien  2003; Bluhm and Gradinger 2008). 
The BCB population has a broad migratory path, wintering near marginal ice fronts and polynyas 
in the Central and Western Bering Sea, and migrating North and East into the Eastern Chukchi 
beginning in April, following leads in the sea ice. In the summer, whales are found in the 
Beaufort Sea, along outer continental shelf and slope habitats (NMFS 2008b and references 
within; Moore et al. 2000; George et al. 2003; Galginaitis and Funk 2004).
Linkages between bowhead whale and polar bear systems
Ideally, one could present both bowhead whale and polar bear system in one graphic to
indicate linkages between ecological and social drivers. I have split the Barrow SES into two 
figures (figure 6.1 and 6.2) due to the complex, separate governance o f each species and the fact 
that bowhead whales and polar bears have very different life histories. However, there are 
obvious linkages between the two systems. For instance, whale carcasses harvested by Inupiaq 
whalers provide a significant source o f nutrition to polar bears before and after the summer sea 
ice minimum (Miller et al. 2006). In addition, although the demographic characteristics o f most 
self-identified polar bear hunters and whaling captains in Barrow are different, whaling captains 
and crew do take a portion o f the polar bear subsistence harvest each year, partly as a defense 
against bears and a protection of their bowhead catch before they can finish butchering it, and 
partly for direct uses. Dead whales that float ashore often provide a draw for bears98. A significant 
proportion o f harvests have been attributed to defense kills in recent years (Schliebe et al. 2006a),
97 The BCB stock has recovered to an estimated 10,545 whales (Zeh and Punt 2005), between 46 and 101% of its estimated historic maxima (Woodby and Botkin 1993). The IWC estimates that the Davis Strait stock consists o f 6,344 whales (95% CI=3,119-12,906) and that this estimate is negatively biased due to survey methodology (IWC 2008).98 In 2006, a whale that had been struck and lost near Barrow appeared onshore with polar bear claw marks on its back. In the case of these “stinker” whales, the crew that struck the whale will salvage the muktuk (blubber and skin), but leave the meat for bears and other foragers out at the carcass dump towards Point Barrow (see Bodenhom 2001).
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as bears have been found on shore more frequently as the distance to the ice pack in summer 
increases (Schliebe et al. 2006b).
Drivers of polar bear population change
Polar bears, an ice-obligate species, are more dependent upon sea ice than bowhead
whales. They rely on multi-year sea ice as a platform for a whole host o f activities including 
hunting, resting, and denning (Stirling and Derocher 1993) although they have exhibited 
successful adaptation in using more terrestrial denning sites over the past 20 years (Fishbach et al. 
2007) as sea ice conditions have become more variable. Inupiaq observers note the bear’s 
adaptive use of the seasonal ice as well (Glenn 2008). Alaska polar bear biologist Jack Lentfer 
noted in 1976 that the severity o f sea ice conditions seemed to be related to the density and 
number o f bears encountering people in the near-shore environment and on land (Lentfer 1980). 
Sea ice physicist Hajo Eicken (pers. comm.) noted that in the summer and fall o f 2008, an “ice 
finger” lodged into the shore near Barrow and was potentially a vector for a large number of 
bears observed in and around town that summer and fall.
In other locations, ice floes carrying bears have been known to transit great distances, 
potentially confounding management boundaries". In the Bering Sea, floes have traveled south to 
the Pribilof Islands (Tikhmenev 1978); on the East coast o f Greenland, bears occasionally ride 
floes to the South Coast and occasionally show up in Iceland, as noted in one o f the Sagas and 
Icelandic press. W hether the traveling floe in Barrow during 2008 delivered mostly Southern 
Beaufort Sea or Northern Beaufort Sea bears is unknown. In addition, the management boundary 
between these putative populations is under negotiation in response to a reduced population 
estimate for the Southern Beaufort Sea population, bear movement data, and reduced economic 
opportunities for Canadian bear hunting guides (Ashley 2008).
Drivers of bowhead whale and polar bear harvests
Social drivers o f harvests for these two species reflect the relationships people have with
each. Inupiaq communities have structured major cultural, social and economic activities around 
the bowhead whale harvest for thousands o f years (Chance 1990; Stoker and Krupnik 1993; 
Braund and Associates 1997). Anthropologists describe this type o f relationship as a complex, 
meaning that human communities and the animals they are dependent upon are highly
99 Apart from the Arctic Basin population, which very little is known about, management boundaries are qualitatively supported by movement data and genetic analyses.
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interconnected. Harvests are affected by social drivers: the number o f whaling crews taking to 
sea, the efficiency o f the hunt, and the quotas allowed by the International Whaling Commission. 
Fall whaling is generally more successful than spring whaling in Barrow (IWC 2008) as whalers 
have faster, larger boats. Working with Cross Island whalers from Nuiqusut, Galginitis and Funk 
(2004) documented the role o f equipment malfunction, variable effort and time to butcher whales. 
Whalers consistently report interference from oil and gas activities; however, success in whaling 
despite the presence o f industry can be positively affected by the dedicated use o f a negotiated 
conflict avoidance agreement100 even if  it the offshore activity is largely unacceptable to the 
whalers.
Biologists working with the North Slope Borough note that successful whale harvests per 
unit effort also depend on a variety o f ecological factors, including variability in sea ice 
conditions (e.g., choked ice leads), high winds and other aspects o f poor weather, (George et al. 
2003), and migratory path distance from shore. Whales that are struck may also be lost due to 
some o f the same (fast) factors. Whalers from Nuiqusut have also reported whaling success as a 
function o f variability in whale behavior (e.g., “spooked” whales hiding in-between ice floes) 
(Galginaitis and Funk 2004). Below, figure 6.3 illustrates the catch history and population 
estimates o f the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas stock o f bowhead whales since 1848. Scientists 
and Inupiaq experts have been working together to census the population since 1978. The figure 
illustrates the recovery o f the population under a consistent but low level o f  harvest after the end 
o f the Yankee whaling period (1912).
Inupiat and polar bears, however, have a different type o f relationship, one that has 
changed through time depending on economic opportunities for using bear products, the number 
o f bears near town, and the dominant economic mode o f the village. In 1976, Lentfer noted that 
the increase in the wage economy around Barrow reduced the amount o f bears harvested, as well 
as the amount o f skins and products in the local economy (Lentfer 1980). Limited economic 
opportunity from bear hunting, skins, and handicrafts, as well as the decline in polar bear meat 
consumption have shaped relationships between people and bears101. As compared to the 
bowhead whale complex, these relationships between people and polar bears in Barrow resemble 
the “respectful co-existence” model developed by (Clark 2007) based on grizzly bear-human 
relationships in First Nations territories in Canada.
100 Personal observation from whalers’ reports at multiple AEWC meetings.101 This observation may not translate to other communities with fewer wage-oriented jobs or a different relationship to bears, such as on St. Lawrence Island or Point Hope.
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Figure 6.3 The Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort Seas bowhead whale catch history, 1848-2007Sources: (Zeh and Punt 2005), (IWC 2009), (Brandon and Wade 2006).
Inupiat and polar bears, however, have a different type o f relationship, one that has 
changed through time depending on economic opportunities for using bear products, the number 
o f bears near town, and the dominant economic mode o f the village. In 1976, Lentfer noted that 
the increase in the wage economy around Barrow reduced the amount o f bears harvested, as well 
as the amount o f skins and products in the local economy (Lentfer 1980). Limited economic 
opportunity from bear hunting, skins, and handicrafts, as well as the decline in polar bear meat 
consumption have shaped relationships between people and bears102. As compared to the 
bowhead whale complex, these relationships between people and polar bears in Barrow resemble 
the “respectful co-existence” model developed by (Clark 2007) based on grizzly bear-human 
relationships in First Nations territories in Canada.
Polar bear harvests are also affected by ecological conditions. Inupiaq hunters have 
described migratory paths for polar bears, following the development o f shore-fast ice in the fall. 
In Barrow, bears are known to forage near persistent leads in the offshore environment. Oil and 
gas platforms can also create areas o f open water in the ice, due to the flow o f currents around the 
structures; these areas o f open water then attract seals and bears, creating a feedback between the 
social system responsible for placement and monitoring o f infrastructure and the ecological 
system (Lovecraft et al. unpublished data). Polar bear harvest statistics (figure 6.4) represent a 
modest level o f harvest but within a much smaller population than the BCB bowhead whale
102 This observation may not translate to other communities with fewer wage-oriented jobs or a different relationship to bears, such as on St. Lawrence Island or Point Hope.
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Figure 6.4 The Southern Beaufort Sea polar bear harvest, 1954-2008 Sources: PBSG reports (1970-2005), MTRP data (1994-2008).
population. Additionally, although the polar bear population assessments have large confidence 
intervals, the population is believed to be in decline. I f  the bears are declining and reduced in 
population, then the harvest would typically be reduced in order to foster a population recovery. 
However, rapidly changing habitat conditions makes determining a precise allowable level o f 
take difficult, if  not impossible.
Institutional Responses
Polar bear policy dynamics
The modem American polar bear policy regime has been described elsewhere (Fikkan et
al. 1993; Baur 1995; Lovecraft and Meek 2007) so I will simply summarize its features here. 
Modem American polar bear policies stem from the original Agreement on the Conservation o f 
Polar Bears, which was signed by all Arctic countries in 1973. The Agreement defined the policy 
problem as one o f both overuse and habitat modification at a global scale. At the time of 
ratification, both the U.S. Department o f State and the President noted that although they were 
recommending that the Agreement be ratified by the U.S. Senate, it would not dictate American 
policy because key provisions of the agreement were already adopted into the newly passed
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Marine Mammal Protection Act. The Agreement was ratified by the Americans unanimously and 
without fanfare (Baur 1995). The commercial moratorium for polar bear sport hunting was 
successful, largely because it was a blunt policy instrument and effective social norms and legal 
enforcement were brought to bear on a small population o f resource users (Lentfer 1980). A black 
market for polar bear skins does exist103, but it not thought to be significant in the United States 
(Schliebe et al. 2006a).
Over the years, parties to the Agreement and conservation groups have questioned 
whether or not the U.S. has fully implemented provisions of the Agreement related to habitat 
protection (Baur 1995). In Alaska, habitat protection for the polar bear is intricately tied up in the 
political debate around opening the remaining part o f the Arctic coastal plain within the Alaska 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) as well as the politics of oil and gas development generally. 
The majority o f on-land denning sites are located within the refuge, and female bears have been 
trending towards denning more often on land, likely in response to poor sea ice conditions 
(Fishbach et al. 2007). While the coastal plain o f ANWR is not currently open to drilling, 
allowance for drilling has been up for debate within most Congressional sessions and Alaska’s 
governors and Congressional delegation have consistently supported drilling.
American delegation reports to the 1976 meeting o f the Polar Bear Specialist Group 
indicated that oil and gas exploration and development onshore and offshore, as well as multiple 
land managers based in different departments, were a major impediment to protecting habitat in 
Alaska (Lentfer 1980). Lentfer discussed a proposed system o f dynamic protected areas based on 
limiting exploration and development to active development zones, surrounded by areas o ff limits 
to development until the first zone was completed (Lentfer 1980). A similar proposal was the 
focus o f  a multi-stakeholder workshop in the early 1990s. Amendments to the MMPA in 1994 
directed the USFWS to examine ways to more effectively meet habitat protection requirements o f 
the 1973 Agreement (§113(c)). As o f 1999, USFWS was studying a proposal to link protections 
for habitat to oil and gas development mitigation permits. The proposal included the creation o f 
dynamic conservation measures in relationship to industrial projects in bear habitat. It is unclear 
what the ultimate fate o f the proposal was, but neither the Clinton nor the Bush administration 
adopted the approach. During the twilight hours o f the Bush administration, however, the 
USFWS settled a lawsuit with environmental groups over the administration’s decision not to 
dedicate critical habitat for polar bears. Details o f that agreement have not been made public to
103 Past illegal harvests in Chukotka have fed the black market for polar bear skins.
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date. At the same time, oil and gas leasing and exploration activities significantly increased 
during the Bush administration, especially after the Congressional moratorium against 
development o f the Outer Continental Shelf was lifted.
At the National level, polar bear managers and researchers have been focused on an 
assessment for listing polar bears as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) largely 
due to the loss o f its summer sea ice habitat. After a long period with several missed deadlines, on 
February 11, 2008 Department o f the Interior Secretary Dirk Kempthome announced the polar 
bear would be added to the list o f threatened species under the ESA104. The decision was a partial 
victory for environmental groups and a large segment o f the American public supporting the 
listing. When announcing the decision, Kempthome cautioned that the Endangered Species Act 
was not an appropriate policy tool to solve climate problems and that he was instmcting his staff 
to only initiate ESA consultations on projects with a direct, tangible (as opposed to indirect or 
cumulative) connection to polar bear populations. In addition, as many o f the ESA’s provisions in 
regards to marine mammals are duplicative of those under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 
USFWS published regulations allowing industrial mitigations and subsistence harvesting to be 
conducted in accordance with MMPA standards (USFWS 2008b). The listing decision was 
immediately appealed by environmental groups in court. A key provision o f the MMPA regarding 
the importation o f polar bear skins from Canada was pre-empted by the ESA, ending the ability 
o f American sport hunters to bring back their polar bear skins to the United States, and 
threatening dire economic consequences for communities in Canada dependent upon hosting 
hunters105.
Harvest assessment, another management task, is largely accomplished through the 
USFWS Marking, Tagging, and Reporting Program (MTRP), developed in the 1980s as a way to 
monitor harvests simultaneously with monitoring the trade in marine mammal ivory and fur. The 
MTRP has taggers identified in many villages along coastal Alaska who are qualified to tag and 
report harvests. The taggers may be, but are not always, involved in the formal co-management 
structure, the Nanuuq Commission, which operates as a liaison between polar bear hunters and 
the USFWS as well as a policy venue in its own right.
104 Up until the day of the decision, Secretary Kempthome had two proposals on his desk: to list or not to list, with arguments for each. The Vice President’s Office was particularly vocal in regards to its opposition to the proposed listing (Bush Administration official 2008).105 See Freeman and Wenzel (2006).
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Policy bear policy in the United States and within shared ecosystems with Russia and 
Canada is cross-scale, but with reduced local opportunities for self-organization (see chapter five) 
and policy experimentation. The key polar bear management policies currently in place with 
significant local community involvement include the following: 1) managing the subsistence hunt 
o f polar bears together with the Nanuuq Commission, the North Slope Borough and other 
partners, 2) exchanging information with counterparts and developing the U.S.-Russia Polar Bear 
regime to share the Chukchi Sea subsistence harvest, 3) mitigating industrial development in 
polar bear habitat areas, 4) managing the Southern Beaufort Sea population hunt shared with the 
Inuvialuit in Canada, and 5) working with local partners to manage nuisance bears. Co­
management within the MMPA is significantly different from its Canadian counterparts bom out 
o f land claims in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The MMPA includes a provision, 
Section 119, allowing for the USFWS to enter into cooperative agreements with Alaska Native 
Organizations to, “ . ..conserve marine mammals and provide co-management o f  subsistence use 
by Alaska Natives” (§119(a)). The section allows for grants for collecting and analyzing data on 
marine mammal population, harvest monitoring, participating in marine mammal research, and 
developing co-management structures (§119(b)).
Table 6.1 represents examples o f threats to the production o f polar bears as an ecosystem 
service, combined with existing institutional remedies and an assessment o f the relative 
effectiveness o f those policies to conserving polar bears as part o f regional ecosystems. The 
threats assessment and analysis o f effectiveness follows the NMFS recovery plan process for 
Steller sea lions in Alaska (NMFS 2008a), as it is one o f the most innovative, transparent and 
reflexive plans for marine mammals management in recent years with a critical analysis o f policy 
failures to date. Threats are categorized through the five factor analysis required by the 
Endangered Species Act:
1. present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment o f species’ habitat or 
range;
2. overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
3. disease and predation;
4. inadequacy o f existing regulatory mechanisms; and
5. other natural or man-made factors affecting the species’ continued existence (16 USC 
1533).
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Table 6.1 Institutional analysis o f polar bear conservation in the United States
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Table 6.1 Institutional Analysis o f Polar Bear Conservation in the United StatesFor efficacy o f  approach, a rating o f “low” is based on no or few demonstrated or projected benefits o f policy against the associated threat, “medium” indicates demonstrated moderately positive benefits, and “high” indicates highly effective, demonstrated or theoretical benefits necessary for a viable population in the future. Feasibility o f approach is similarly ranked for “low,” “medium,” and “high,” but is independent o f efficacy. Effectiveness is rated as the addition of both categories and weighting efficacy higher than feasibility. Sources: Meek et al. (2008), Lovecraft and Meek (2007), Schliebe et al. (2006), Fikkan et al. (1993). * indicates that the United States is not a signatory to this policy or has not ratified it.
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Otherfactorsaffectingspecies’continuedexistence
sameIllegal trade
Fast,Medium or Slow Driver
Fast
same
InstitutionalResponse
National plansInternationalAgreement
Convention on International Trade in Endangered SpeciesMMPA Marking, Tagging, and Reporting Program
Scale of Response
NationalInternational
Efficacy of Approach
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High
FeasibilityMitigation
MediumMedium
Efficacy + Feasibility = Effectiveness
HighHigh
International High Medium High
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The policy problems, existing institutions, and analysis draw from the ESA determination for 
polar bears (USFWS 2008b) and documents o f the IUCN Polar Bear Specialists’ Group (1970­
2005), M eek et al. (2008), Lovecraft and Meek (2007), Schliebe et al, (2006), and Fikkan et al. 
(1993).
Institutions as feedback channels
Institutions relating to polar bear management have varying success as feedback 
channels, according to my heuristic: channels reduce destabilizing positive feedback, are 
informed by a suite o f  relevant indicators o f fast and slow drivers, and use information to make 
policy corrections. The Agreement on the Conservation o f Polar Bears was successful in 
decreasing positive feedback through the initial moratorium, cutting off financial markets for 
polar bear guiding and criminalizing trade in skins. The scale o f activities was amenable to 
tracking and monitoring at key airports. Protections for habitat were successful in many other 
countries, but not in the United States. The parties to the agreement have met irregularly, even as 
the Polar Bear Specialist Group has created norms for polar bear management, such as for the 
development o f quotas. Because the parties have not regularly met, they have not made policy 
corrections at a global scale related to stickier issues such as habitat. Habitat provisions in the 
Agreement, the ESA and the MMPA are not designed to and have not been successful at reducing 
positive feedback related to climate change, with ultimate consequences for bear populations 
dependent upon multi-year ice. Institutions related to fast drivers such as oil and gas development 
have been largely successful, even as these institutions do not operate at the scale relevant for 
proactively safeguarding key refuge areas.
Bowhead whale policy dynamics
Bowhead whale conservation is a cross-scale enterprise. Quotas for aboriginal whaling
are modeled, deliberated and decided upon at the International Whaling Commission under the 
authority o f the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Inupiaq whalers 
are part o f the American delegation, but operate under diplomatic constraints imposed by the 
State Department106. At the national scale, NMFS is responsible for whale conservation under the 
Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Bowhead whales were one o f
106 Within this capacity, they can not lobby other countries with their positions (Anonymous 2006c). However, many North Slope Borough officials and whaling leaders also attend as non-profit delegates, and can lobby within that role. '
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eight endangered whales listed in 1970. At the time, the United States was importing an estimated 
20% of the world’s whale-based commodities, from dog meat to automotive lubricants (DOI 
1971). Because bowheads were listed before the habitat provision was established under the ESA 
in 1978, the designation for critical habitat under the ESA is a discretionary act. In 2000, NMFS 
was petitioned to designate critical habitat for the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort bowhead whale 
population. The agency declined the petition in 2002, with the following reasoning:
(1) the decline and reason fo r  listing the species was overexploitation by 
commercial whaling, and habitat issues were not a factor in the decline; (2) there 
is no indication that habitat degradation is having any negative impact on the 
increasing population in the present; (3) the population is abundant and  
increasing; and (4) existing laws and practices adequately protect the species 
and its habitat (FR 55767 August 30, 2002).
Despite reason number four above, the fact that habitat was not protected initially has negative 
consequences for the subsequent assessment o f industrial activities permitted by other agencies, 
such as the Minerals Management Service.
Section 7 o f the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1536) requires federal agencies to consult with the 
Interior or Commerce Secretary with regards to whether or not an activity will jeopardize any 
ESA listed species or result in destruction or adverse modification o f designated habitat. Without 
a habitat designation, essentially, there is no mandate to consider proposed modifications or other 
habitat effects in a precautionary, versus reactionary way. This provision erodes an agency’s 
capacity to manage for slower variables and has cascading effects through other divisions of 
government. For instance, as a legacy o f the State losing marine mammal management authority, 
the State defers to federal assessment o f habitat when it considers the environmental impact o f oil 
and gas development, even if  the federal government has not considered habitat issues.
Environmental mitigation strategies to date typically focus on dynamic and temporal 
restrictions on sound and activity, rather than absolute spatial restrictions, although ships are 
required to keep a safe distance from marine mammals. NMFS and the Minerals Management 
Service have analyzed significant impacts relating to the impact o f an activity on biologically 
meaningful activities o f whales, such as socializing, feeding, mating and seeking refuge as 
defined by McCauley et al. (2000). Additionally, the agencies addressed special vulnerabilities 
whales encounter when they are squeezed into relatively narrow migratory paths, such as during 
the spring lead system in the Chukchi Sea (NMFS 2006). The agencies have not explicitly
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considered habitat using the Large Marine Ecosystem concept107, in which NOAA proposes to 
understand activities through a focus on bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and trophic 
relationships. These characteristics would meet (Chapin et al. 2006a) requirements for exogenous 
and slow variables.
NMFS does, however, have the following mandates (among others) in relationship to 
bowhead whales: population assessment under the MMPA, evaluating industrial and fisheries 
interactions with bowheads in order to permit activities that may harass them, and ensuring that 
industrial activities have no “unmitigated adverse impact” on subsistence harvesting o f  whales 
(MMPA § 101(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)). Additionally, mandates stemming from the IWC include genetic 
analyses for stock structure determination (e.g., whether or not the Bering-Chukchi-Beaufort 
bowhead whale stock is one or two populations), nutritional need analyses for justifying 
particular aboriginal catch levels and more. Respondents involved with the bowhead whale 
program estimate it costs millions o f dollars per year, even though the BCB population o f 
bowhead whales is considered by experts to be functionally recovered from Yankee whaling days 
(Gerber et al. 2007).
At the regional scale, the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission coordinates, monitors and 
manages reporting from the subsistence bowhead whale harvest in the eleven member 
communities and with its Chukotkan counterparts, with whom the AEWC has an interlocal 
agreement to share the IWC quota. This information is shared with NMFS and the IWC. The 
AEWC also organizes enforcement tribunals in the event of IWC infractions (e.g., someone 
harvests a cow/calf pair, too many whales are caught above quota). The AEWC has another 
(unfunded) mandate to improve their weapons in order to improve catch efficiency and reduce the 
whale time to death for humane reasons This program, the Weapons Improvement Program, 
involves testing and training whaling captains to use penthrite weapons. These weapons are 
considered dangerous and many whaling captains prefer the Yankee whaling equipment, which
107 Large marine ecosystems are a framework for learning about systems bounded by ecological criteria: bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and trophic relationships (http://www.lme.noaa.gov/, accessed April 8, 2009). System dynamics are examined through five data-collection modules: productivity, fish and fisheries, pollution and ecosystem health, socioeconomics, and governance. At the present time, however, the data presented in the Chukchi and Beaufort LME briefs for subsistence harvesting and socioeconomic activities is erroneous or outdated, and the governance section focuses on Russia and Canada.
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they point out, they are required to use under the ICRW to preserve traditional aspects o f the hunt 
by limiting technological development108.
At a local scale, whaling captains’ associations act as a venue for collective action 
relating to monitoring o f the hunt, deliberating on conflict avoidance agreements and other 
industrial issues, exchanging knowledge across generations. Whaling captains’ wives associations 
also organize logistical aspects o f the hunt, teach the community how to sew skin boats and other 
traditional aspects o f  the hunt, and raise significant funds to support the AEWC through bingo 
and other activities (Bodenhom 1990). Boat crews, handicraft makers, and community volunteers 
(e.g., in butchering or cooking) are also involved at the local level.
Significantly, the bowhead migration path brings it along the resource-rich Alaskan outer 
continental shelf, where oil and gas development is slowly developing. Thresholds for harassment 
have been developed based on sound pollution levels that are thought to have a potential lethal 
effect on whales. Industry operating seismic surveys or other loud underwater activities must 
power down their operations in the presence o f whales (MMS 2006). The Minerals Management 
Service (MMS) has conducted extensive environmental and socio-economic studies to evaluate 
the effect o f oil and gas development activities on marine life, even though to date there are no 
systematic baseline studies in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Although these two seas are 
considered as Large Marine Ecosystems under NOAA research and planning purposes, the 
management framework is promising but unclear. Table 6.2 represents examples o f threats to the 
production o f bowhead whales as an ecosystem service, combined with existing institutional 
remedies and an assessment o f the relative effectiveness o f those policies to conserving whales as 
part o f regional ecosystems based on the same model as the polar bear policy assessment. The 
policy problems, existing institutions, and analysis draw from policy documents including impact 
assessments conducted by NMFS (2008b) and MMS (2008), supplemented with observation of 
co-management meetings where many o f  the mitigative institutions and their efficacy are 
discussed.
108 Steve Braund pointed out to whalers at the 2008 AEWC Mini-Convention that adopting new technologies has been a hallmark o f the Inupiaq and Yup’ik cultures. Additionally, he noted that there is no support among anthropologists for the idea that one particular type of weapon makes a hunt more authentically traditional than any other. Bodenhom (2001) makes a similar point in regards to adaptively governing the process of landing and butchering whales.
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Table 6.2 Institutional analysis of bowhead whale conservation in the United States
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Example
Oil and gas exploration anddevelopment
same
same
Increasedshipping
Fast, medium  or slow driver
Fast
Fast
Fast
Fast
Slow
Institutional Scale ofResponse Response
ESA consultations Project leveloperator, MMSand NMFS
MMPA Incidental Project levelHarassment operator andAuthorizations NMFS
Development Project levelstipulations from operator, MMS,oil and gas leasing AK and localcommunities
Conflict Same as aboveAvoidanceAgreement ensures“no unmitigableadverse impact” onavailability ofwhales forsubsistence
United Nations InternationalConvention on theLaw of the Sea*
Efficacy of approach
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Unknown
Feasibility of mitigation
Medium
High
High
High, but with threshold effects for multiple companies
High for vessels associated with US-regulated oil and gas development, Coast Guard, low for others
Efficacy + Feasibility = Effectiveness
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Unknown
<1
Table 6.2 Institutional analysis of bowhead whale conservation policy in the United StatesFor efficacy o f approach, a rating of “low” is based on no or few demonstrated or projected benefits o f policy against the key drivers o f bowhead whale population stress, “medium” indicates demonstrated moderately positive benefits, and “high” indicates highly effective, demonstrated or theoretical benefits necessary for a viable population in the future. Feasibility o f approach is similarly ranked for “low,” “medium,” and “high,” but is independent o f efficacy. Effectiveness is rated as the addition o f both categories and weighting efficacy higher than feasibility. Sources: NMFS (2008b), NMFS (2006), Shelden et al. (2003), IWC (2008). * indicates that the United States is not a signatory to this policy (as o f July 2009) or has not ratified it.
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Disease or predation
existingregulatorymechanisms
Example
Overutilizationforcommercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes
Aboriginalsubsistencewhaling
same
same
Inadequacy of Climatechangepolicy
same
Fast, medium  or slow driver
Fast
Environmen­tal variability Slow
Fast
Fast
Fast
Bioaccumula -tion of toxins
Slow
Slow
Slow
InstitutionalResponse
Commercial ships (e.g., barges) volunteer to sign conflict avoidance agreement
Kyoto Protocol*
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
AEWC Co­management Agreement 
US-Russia agreement to share quota
Stockholm Protocol*
Kyoto Protocol*
National plans
Scale of Response Efficacy of Feasibility of Efficacy + approach mitigation Feasibility =Effectiveness
Operator and local Whaling Captains’ Association
High, with threshold effects for too many operators
Low
International Low Low
International Medium High
Cross-scale, co­management Medium High
Cross-scale, bilateral with interlocal and co­management features 
International
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
International Low Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
National Low Medium Low
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Table 6.2 continuedFactor Example Fast, medium  or slow driver
InstitutionalResponse
Ocean use Slow Coastal Zoneplanning Management Act
same Slow Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Other factors Fisheries Fast MMPAaffecting interactionsspecies’continuedexistence
Scale of Response
National
National
Efficacy of Feasibility of approach mitigation
High Medium
Low Low
Efficacy + Feasibility = Effectiveness
High
Low
National Low Medium Low
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Institutions as feedback channels
Institutions relating to bowhead whale management also have varying success as
feedback channels, according to my heuristic. The International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW) has over time come to adopt an innovative, precautionary control law based on 
Bayesian modeling for regulating whaling, although it has only been used so far to regulate 
aboriginal subsistence whaling. The ICRW was successful in decreasing positive feedback 
through the 1989 moratorium on commercial whaling, cutting off financial markets for products 
made from endangered whales. Although advocates for whale preservation and precautionary 
approaches have desired the expansion of the regime to include habitat protections, to date key 
whaling countries have not agreed. The International Whaling Commission does maintain 
linkages to other issue areas and regimes, including CITES, regional marine mammal regulatory 
bodies such as the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea, among others. As such, the IWC primarily manages fast 
variables, such as the BCB harvest by Alaska Natives and Chukotkans.
Despite the success o f the cross-scale management approach to the BCB harvest, and 
with feedback illustrating the harvest is insignificant to recovery o f the BCB population, the 
political body has not been able to put its efforts towards regulating the use o f more precarious 
populations. Political and values conflicts between pro-whaling and pro-protectionist factions 
within the IWC have driven large investments in learning about the BCB and, to a lesser extent, 
other bowhead whale populations, in order to prove that aboriginal harvests are sustainable. 
Parties to the ICRW meet yearly and often meet between sessions. Feedback about yearly 
harvests for BCB whales are fed back into the harvest model to build knowledge o f population 
dynamics; the model does not include slow drivers as parameters although it does simulate 
stochastic events.
Many other institutions related to bowheads address fast drivers such as aboriginal 
harvests and oil and gas development. These institutions (e.g., MMPA, ESA) have been 
successful in determining thresholds for sound pollution and diversions from migratory paths 
from industrial activities. Each year, a multi-stakeholder, multi-agency group meets to review the 
previous year’s mitigation plans and modifies them based on performance. Thresholds for social 
impacts have largely been set by the Minerals Management Service unilaterally. Thresholds such 
as disruption o f harvests for multiple years are not acceptable to most Inupiat, although they are
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interested in discussing thresholds through co-management and broader community consultation 
processes. Some communities are not amenable to this approach, however, and have stated in 
public meetings that the risk to bowhead whales is unacceptable based on cultural and spiritual 
grounds. A Tribal Council member from Point Hope at a meeting in Barrow on oil and gas 
development said that accepting such a risk would be a breach o f  Eskimo Law.
Discussion
The previous section analyzed to what extent existing polar bear and bowhead whale 
policy regimes are addressing key drivers o f system dynamics. The analysis confirmed the 
findings o f Folke et al. (1998b) and Chapin et al. (2006a), in that both agencies have focused on 
the management o f fast variables. I have shown that agency mandates relating to international 
affairs (e.g., limit number o f bowhead whales harvested and understand population dynamics) 
and protection from industrial activity (e.g., Incidental Harassment Authorizations) drive many of 
NM FS’ bowhead whale policy choices. The agency has not exercised its discretion to protect 
habitat either through the ESA or through the MMPA, likely due to political pressure and 
administrative directives. Without critical habitat designation or a recovery plan, NMFS bowhead 
whale regime has largely been problem-focused and ad-hoc, even as it has been successful in 
recovering bowhead whale populations (Gerber et al. 2007). Slow social variables relating to 
international and national law have not provided mandates for habitat conservation congruent 
with a new summer sea ice regime. Existing authorities under the ESA and MMPA, while within 
NM FS’ discretion to implement, have not been used109. Therefore, governing agencies such as 
MMS and NMFS have largely managed fast variables using institutional thresholds relating to the 
ability o f whales to tolerate conditions (e.g., sound from underwater seismic testing) and whalers 
to conduct whaling with low levels o f interference.
Polar bears in Alaska have been the focus o f more than forty years o f study and 
monitoring. Together with the Nanuuq Commission, USFWS has documented historic and 
present traditional ecological knowledge and scientific knowledge related to slow variables such 
as habitat selection and migratory paths. To date, this information has not been operationalized 
into habitat protections, other than temporal restrictions around oil and gas development and
109 For a similar argument about habitat provisions in the MMPA with regards to walrus, see Robards (2008). Managers interviewed for this chapter could not identify any instances in which the MMPA had been used to protect habitat for the animals they monitored.
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protected sites such as maternity dens. As o f early 2009, USFWS has yet to implement habitat 
requirements o f the 1973 Agreement despite directives from Congress and wide public support, 
although it appears the Service is moving towards such a designation.
The climate-induced loss o f summer sea ice has no effective institutional oversight, and 
as such, managers may choose to manage for future climate scenarios that would support bear 
populations in Alaska, or continue to closely manage trade in bears living elsewhere. As with 
bowhead whales, most management activities have been focused on fast variables, such as 
subsistence hunting and oil and gas development mitigations and this management focus has been • 
insufficient to counteract key threats or manage for future system states. In both cases, the 
primacy o f oil and gas exploration and development, combined with an ice regime that 
constrained human activity offshore has led federal agencies with land management authority to 
put o ff managing slow variables, such as habitat.
Conclusions
I have proposed that the extent to which institutions enable the coupling o f social and 
ecological subsystems is a measure o f policy fit. I argue that evaluation o f policy fit must 
consider the magnitude o f the fit as well as the feasibility o f adopting policy in relationship to 
other existing social goals. This study compares policy fit through two case studies of bowhead 
whale and polar bear conservation. I conclude that as the dominant resource use o f the area shifts 
from subsistence marine mammal harvesting to oil and gas exploration, gaps in ocean governance 
relating to slow variables have emerged. Furthermore, modem institutions built upon previous 
iterations o f related policies have not been designed to act as feedback mechanisms, especially for 
slow variables. In fact, chapter three illustrates how marine mammal management policies in 
Alaska have been the product o f extensive political bargaining through time. For instance, there 
are few if  any explicit linkages between programs designed to monitor coastal development and 
decision-making venues about coastal development.
Modem marine management agencies often act as problem-focused adhocracies (see 
chapter five) in dealing with one fast variable, such as rates o f harvest. Adhocracies are credited 
with qualities conducive to adaptive management. However, to the extent that powerful interests 
are also lawfully using the same ecosystem under property rights rules such as oil and gas 
development leases, institutions relating to use laws (e.g., International Convention for the 
Regulation o f Whaling) rather than control laws (e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act) will
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not have the broad reach necessary for managing complex multi-use landscapes for long-term 
resilience (Crowder et al. 2006; Young et al. 2007).
Two important areas important for ecosystem services include Alaska’s Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge, an area important for female polar bear denning and the outer continental shelf, 
an area critical for bowhead whale migrations110. Crowder and Norse (2008) recommend 
delineating, planning for, and protecting discrete places meaningful for animal life histories 
before incompatible, multiple uses become embedded in the institutional landscape. Significant 
gains or losses could be made in the next decade, as political actors advocate for their most 
important ecosystem services.
In the 1980s and the 1990s, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service presided over a successful recovery o f most marine mammal populations in 
Alaska, with a few exceptions. Only one species, the Cook Inlet beluga, was overhunted to 
depletion and even there, recovery appears to be stalled by environmental conditions rather than 
subsistence takes. In the first decade o f the 21st century, however, Arctic warming and increased 
oil and gas exploration in the offshore environment has accelerated while managers and 
communities struggle to adapt to new conditions. How successfully the agencies and their 
governance models will perform is a point o f conjecture. Given that novel conditions often 
require innovative approaches, in the next chapter I will project the likely impacts o f a loss of 
summer sea ice on bowhead whales and polar bears in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and then 
discuss strategies o f innovative governance based on maintaining or building social capital, 
innovation in agency approaches, and developing new institutions. All o f these strategies would 
be expected to enhance the ability o f managers and communities to act collectively, a requirement 
o f successful cross-scale governance.
110 However, as Pidgoma (2007) notes, even the National Refuge System has been slow to address large- scale processes such as climate change, which has contemporary and anticipated effects on the ability of refuge lands to support ecosystem services. In addition, land ownership in Arctic Alaska onshore is split across several different federal agencies, with different organizational cultures and statutory mandates, often preventing a spatially coherent approach to land management. The outer continental shelf is managed by both the State of Alaska (within the three mile limit of jurisdiction) and the Minerals Management Service (outside o f the three mile limit). The MMS has not explictly addressed climate change as a land manager.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In a time o f  drastic change it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned usually fin d  
themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists. -  Eric Hoffer, Reflections on the 
Human Condition (1973: 32)
Marine mammal management in Alaska can rightly be called a “wicked problem” 
because stakeholders and agencies often have radically different conceptualizations o f the 
“problem”; the “problem” is never solved, only managed; and old “solutions” continue to be 
implemented despite changing conditions (Conklin 2006). Insight into the dynamics o f a complex 
social-ecological system requires a methodology capable of appreciating complexity. However, 
there is no perfect vantage point from which to study policy processes that bridge vast scales 
between international policy venues and local communities ostensibly governed by them. 
Ethnographers o f the global economy have pioneered multi-sited ethnography, in which 
researchers trace the paths o f resources flowing from local places, later transformed into 
commodities, and finally take on a life o f their own in global trade flows (Marcus 1995). A focus 
on any one level o f  the chain o f production provides an important piece, but understanding the 
connections and drivers o f those connections across scales is important to broader insight into the 
potential success o f policy change during a time o f rapid environmental transformation. In 
addition, a focus on the path o f particular policies across multiple scales allows the accumulation 
o f insight into the dynamics o f policy problems as a series o f action situations, rather than a focus 
on the places where policy solutions are deliberated and/or implemented.
Each temporal and spatial scale o f analysis (as in figure 6.1) required different 
approaches and methods, suited to differences in access to the processes, places and people as 
well as the social dynamics characterizing those situations. For instance, a policy narrative 
approach was appropriate for both long-term and mid-term scales, whereas a social network 
analysis drawn from interviews and participant observation was well-suited to local interactions 
o f a short duration. Multiple methods allow for a triangulation o f findings across these situations.
This dissertation examined in depth three aspects of marine mammal management when 
conceptualized as an action arena: history o f the regime (legacies o f prior arenas), character o f 
the community (agency culture), and patterns o f interactions between regime actors (Stakeholder-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
agency relations). Understanding these three aspects is critical to designing new policy 
interventions because the configuration o f  these aspects affects the plasticity o f governance.
Using a resilience lens, each configuration can be thought o f as the way agencies typically “do 
business,” in which new projects may be initiated here or there, but the agency does not make 
significant changes to their organizational structure, or ways o f working with stakeholders, unless 
shocked into a new configuration. The shock can arise through a threshold event, or an exogenous 
change to a slow driver. An example o f such a shock would be a real change in the distribution of 
constitutional-level decision making power or a new ocean resources policy that required an 
Arctic marine conservation plan based on marine spatial management rather than managing 
marine mammal-industry interactions project by project. Past shocks also include the ban on sport 
hunting o f polar bears in Alaska and the implementation o f the first bowhead whale subsistence 
hunting co-management agreement.
Increasingly, communities and governments recognize their mutual dependence as well 
as the benefits o f collaboration, especially when the area to be governed is as broad and vast as 
Alaska. That is not to say that collaboration and co-management are always positive and 
rewarding experiences, or that actors necessarily recognize the limitations o f their own 
knowledge bases. However, co-management and the processes o f social learning that theorists 
predict can come o f it, are persistent features o f the governance landscape in Alaska now. My 
dissertation focused on two overarching questions: 1) why do two federal agencies with similar 
mandates and policy tools, working in the same geographic areas, with many o f  the same 
community partners differ in their approach; and 2) do these differences matter for conservation 
o f resources and the communities that subsist on them?
The focus o f this study was heavily influenced by institutional theory. At a foundational 
level, institutional theory is a body o f work concerned with the mechanisms for coordinating 
human behavior towards public goals. As a point o f departure, this dissertation focuses on the 
social fit o f rules to the place and people subjected to management. I began by situating my study 
in institutional and common-pool resource theory, with a focus on drivers o f policy choices and 
associated outcomes. In chapter three, I investigated the ways in which marine mammal 
management has shaped policy histories and trajectories in Alaska under Indigenous, Russian, 
American, State and multi-party governance. In chapter four, I examined agency culture as a 
driver of policy outcomes. In chapter five, I traced the emergence o f policy networks for harvest
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assessment as a measure o f policy fit to local social and cultural conditions. Finally, in chapter 
six, I considered the ability o f current marine mammal policy regimes to foster resilience of 
marine social-ecological systems. I summarize my findings from these chapters below and 
consider the role o f institutions in Arctic marine governance.
History
History has a long arc in the story o f marine mammal management in Alaska. Drivers o f 
institutional development have included technological change (e.g., the development o f sea 
mammal hunting) and competition for resources in the Native Nations era, quests for sovereignty 
and high commercial yields in the Colonial era ending in nascent conservation institutions, 
conflicts over “public use” and sovereignty in the early Statehood era, and the twin goals of 
conservation and self-government in the post-MMPA era (table 3.1). Uses and diversity o f values 
towards marine mammals have also changed through time for both non-Native as well as Native 
peoples. In this chapter, I used a historical institutional lens to build a policy history o f marine 
mammal management in Alaska. I demonstrated how the combination o f sovereignty, mode of 
production, and value orientation shaped the adopted dominant mode o f governance over human 
uses o f marine mammals, resulting in relative measures o f ecological sustainability. Findings 
suggest that management regimes scaled up to international political fora in the Colonial era have 
now largely settled into a cross-scale pattern o f governance, although in many communities, 
harvests that have not been the focus o f international political deliberation remain guided by local 
institutions. Finally, I noted that sustainability in the post-MMPA period is challenged by rapid 
ecological change.
Cultural influences
The second part o f this study involved the development o f a model conceptualizing how 
cultural differences within government agencies influence policy creation, adoption and success. I 
drew from primary and secondary literature to build cultural profiles and policy histories o f each 
agency and tested these profiles with an internet survey based on the Competing Values Model of 
Cameron and Quinn (1999). The analysis centered on the interactions o f agency culture, history 
and the dominant ways in which agencies engage with stakeholders to create agency approaches 
to co-management. The weight o f evidence presented points to these approaches as an important 
factor in the choice o f policy and its ultimate success. When placed in historical and structural
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contexts, I demonstrated that the externally-oriented culture o f NMFS has shaped co-management 
regimes to be relatively transparent, scientifically-oriented, with local management authorities.
In comparison, I found USFWS to be an internally-oriented agency that prefers to work 
with a small group o f trusted allies; its co-management relationships have often been more 
focused on research activities and information-sharing than management-oriented. USFWS has 
had a more contentious relationship with its co-management boards than NMFS has due to a 
combination o f its hierarchical approach and management authority over species with high 
commercial value. The conceptual model was used as a framework to examine the development 
and implementation o f harvest assessment programs as well as other management activities. The 
Nanuuq Commission and the USFWS seem to have worked out a relationship at the international 
and regional scale that works based on largely autonomous activities pursued by the Nanuuq 
Commission, including those funded by other agencies. These high-level policy dialogues have 
not yet translated into greater autonomy at the local scale; harvest assessment is largely conducted 
by the Service.
In Barrow, relationships between USFWS and local hunters remain strained by heavy 
enforcement actions; harvest assessment participation is low to average when compared to the 
rate o f reporting for other marine mammals. Relationships between whalers and NMFS seem 
largely positive, as evidenced by intensive collaborations around the International Whaling 
Commission and the high level o f performance in harvest assessment. In consideration o f my 
findings, I do not recommend deliberate manipulation o f agency cultures; rather, my findings 
suggest that agencies and communities may work best together when their preferred ways o f 
working complement each other and this process may require deliberate efforts on all sides.
Social networks
The next phase o f the study focused on local environments where marine mammal policy 
is implemented, using social network analysis to illustrate sites o f collective action and policy 
implementation. Drawing on community interviews and surveys, I argued that the extent to which 
federal institutions use policy networks that mirror local self-organized networks increase their 
effectiveness. I compared federal networks for harvest assessment o f bowhead whales and polar 
bears to self-organized advice networks for resource management functions. My research 
demonstrates that the network o f whalers has a high rate o f communication and coordination in 
their network. The central organization, the local whaling captains’ association, is the primary
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venue for enacting policy at the local level. Whalers also reported high levels o f familiarity and 
engagement with how various resource management rules are created. Polar bear hunters, in 
contrast, did not have a local management body dedicated to polar bear policy implementation. In 
2006 and 2007, they reported lower levels o f familiarity and engagement with rule-making. 
Findings suggest that the dynamics o f local networks and the reinforcement o f local norms are 
enhanced by consistent engagement, led by a centralized local entity. Further, strong networks 
with real management authority encourage greater participation and buy-in, resulting in policy 
effectiveness.
Institutional performance
The final phase o f the study concludes that as the dominant resource use o f the area shifts from 
subsistence marine mammal harvesting to oil and gas exploration, gaps in ocean governance 
relating to slow variables have emerged. Modem marine management agencies often act as 
problem-focused adhocracies in dealing with one fast variable, such as rates o f harvest. However, 
as harvests are no longer the most important drivers in the system, new goals for conserving 
marine resources will require a broad approach based around enhancing the resilience o f the 
marine environment through managing human-environmental interactions that may fragment 
habitat or degrade sites o f productivity and refugia. A new conservation agenda must involve 
stakeholders at multiple scales.
Visions o f arctic sovereignty built through Congressional committees and Administration 
Departments are unlikely to capture a full range o f  ecosystem services important to local 
stakeholders. At the same time, the Federal Government has an important role to play in land 
management and conservation o f slow drivers. The strategy must also ensure that the State of 
Alaska balances resource use and protection o f habitat, as it no longer has a management regime 
for conserving marine mammals.
A shift towards adaptive governance would entail reorienting regimes around learning 
from feedback channels and developing the organizational capacities (e.g., through law and 
operational rules) to support institutional diversity at multiple scales. Managing for resilience 
through marine spatial planning and systems-oriented programs will require significant policy 
development. In the absence o f new policy tools, political compromise across community, 
government, and development communities could prepare the necessary groundwork for ocean 
governance.
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The field work for this dissertation (2004-2008) took place in a significantly changed 
policy landscape from the decade before it. The administration o f President George W. Bush was 
considered by many to be one of the most conservative administrations in recent memory. In 
terms o f marine mammal management, the story o f the Bush legacy is largely yet to be told. The 
Bush Administration grappled with looming ecological change such as climate change and the 
Endangered Species Act listing of icon species such as the polar bear. The way the Bush 
Administration shaped policy will no doubt influence administrations to come. The new Obama 
Administration has kept many o f the Bush era rules intact as o f June 2009 (e.g., rules designed to 
prevent advocates from using the ESA listing to protest development outside o f Alaska based on 
the potential impact on polar bears), but has repealed others and has vowed to restore the role o f 
science in decision-making. Habitat conservation for marine mammals remains a difficulty across 
administrations, however. It could be that humans have difficulty managing for slow variables, 
but the fact that other jurisdictions have accomplished it gives some hope for optimism. The 
return o f populations o f whales once commercially hunted to near extinction is a positive sign and 
a test o f our collective ability to practice ocean governance along the new arctic maritime frontier.
Governance in a time o f rapid change
During the past decade, the world has witnessed an ecological regime change in Arctic
sea ice conditions. As an example, the Max Planck Institute (Hamburg) model predicts changes to 
summer and fall arctic sea ice as a structuring habitat feature over the next forty years that would 
have differential effects on both the bowhead whale and polar bear regimes (Walsh 2008). The 
model predicts sea ice change based on the average warming rates o f  fourteen o f the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change models assuming a middle-of-the-road (AIB) 
scenario o f the growth o f greenhouse gas emissions. The model predicts an open water period of 
125 days per year by 2050 for the North Bering, Chukchi Sea and Beaufort Sea area with no 
significant areas o f  refugia (Walsh 2008; Moore and Huntington 2008). Considering this extreme 
change to ecosystems in the Arctic, questions o f governance arise -  how will these regimes 
respond to such changes? What new sources o f social capital or institutional innovations are 
necessary to respond to the challenges?
Likely climate impacts to both species under the Hamburg model and derived through 
prospective studies are listed in figure 7.1. I f  disturbances occur at a faster rate than a system’s 
capacity to recover, dramatic change can result (Palumbi et al. 2008).
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Figure 7.1 Ecological effects of new ice regime The figure is a projection o f the effect o f 125 open water days on polar bear and bowhead whale populations in the Beaufort Sea by 2050 (based on the Hamburg climate model cited in Walsh (2008)).
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Palumbi et al. (2008) demonstrate that productivity and diversity play major roles in the resilience 
o f ecosystems because they drive recovery from and resistance to change. Assuming that the 
Administration, Alaska Native communities and the American voting public desire the 
conservation o f polar bears and bowhead whales, strategies rooted in resilience theory would 
accordingly focus on recovery for polar bears and resistance to change for bowhead whales. 
Projections o f ecological change and the strong governance strategies required to address those 
changes provide insight into the importance o f adaptive capacity (table 7.1). The concept of 
recovery can include time or spatial scales greater than those typically considered by managers 
and in the case o f polar bears, may stretch into the next century and should focus on strengthening 
the global population for recovery generations from now rather than achieving a recovery o f the 
Beaufort Sea polar bear subpopulation.
In closing, I do not underestimate how challenging it will be for agencies and 
communities to work together in a time o f rapid change and under novel conditions. However, 
lessons learned through co-management regime success and failures to date are excellent sources 
o f data to examine processes that foster adaptation and collective action. Both adhocracies and 
hierarchies have important strengths and weaknesses in confronting wicked problems. 
Adhocracies may have the agility and adaptive capacity to develop collaboration based on mutual 
learning while forging methods to deal with uncertainty in a transparent, democratic manner. 
Hierarchical forms o f governance may work best in developing new sources o f authority to 
regulate many diverse actors across sectors. They may also be able to better sustain relationships 
in the longer term due to consistency in action. Ultimately, both forms o f governance are useful 
for different sorts o f problems. Neither approach alone will be sufficient to solve climate-related 
conservation crises. I recommend that both agencies work within a landscape/seascape model o f 
conservation to focus on slow variables with a view to the long term. This shift in focus from 
human interactions with specific species to a spatial conservation model with an active 
monitoring component will require new forms o f social capital that connect actors in diverse 
sectors across scales, the development o f place-based institutions such as marine spatial 
management, and broad visions o f conservation looking past protection towards resilience.
Agencies and communities will be thrown together in a myriad o f  ways, but I recommend 
that they especially seek out governance strategies that build on joint visions and use approaches 
that fit into the social environments o f both parties. Where there is no fit between partners, there
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Table 7.1 Governance strategies for recovery and resistance
Governance for recovery (polar bears)
Social capital Management approaches
Conserve Linkages to Social learning ofproductivity fisheries food webs andstakeholders across scales oceanography
Conserve Cross-scale Experimentalmodularity networking across management underglobal extremejurisdictions uncertainty
Conserve Collective action Peaceful co­diversity across global existence to reducepopulation for bear-humantighter feedbacks interactions
Newinstitutions
Marine spatial management
Assistedmigration
Enhanced local authority to react
Governance for resistance (bowhead whales)
Social capital
Build constituency for ocean zoning
Maintain and strengthen network for whalers, agencies, and industry
Maintain and strengthen knowledge network for bio-
Managementapproaches
Pre-emptivemultiple-usemanagement
Monitoring migratory paths
Social learning model
New institutions
Federal, state and local authorities for marine spatial management
Large marine areas governance system
Circumpolar bowhead whale monitoring
monitoring
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will be a need for transformation o f  governance, based on a mutually acceptable socio-political 
process (i.e., effective “adaptive co-management”). For the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, this 
may mean an increase in support for tribal wildlife grants based on creating community-based 
conservation plans. This may also require a shift away from enforcement actions that do not 
affect the overall system drivers o f  decline and engender community mistrust o f government. For 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, new approaches might include active engagement with 
ocean zoning and other line agencies within NOAA. The agency may also need to take a more 
active role in negotiating conflict avoidance agreements and spend less time managing the very 
small global whaling industry. Finally, both agencies have a poor record o f accomplishment in 
adopting explicit policies for habitat conservation in the marine environment. The development of 
an ecosystem-based plan for the marine environment o f Arctic Alaska will challenge existing 
management mandates, ways o f working, and lines of funding. However, there is no better time 
to start developing these programs than before they are desperately needed.
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Appendix: Interview protocols and survey tools 
Questions for co-management key informants
1. How long and in what ways have you and your organization been involved in co­management in Alaska?
2. How does your agency define co-management?
3. W hat do you see as key events in the development o f [insert name o f regime] co­management ?
4. Is the regime working? Please describe key challenges and successes.
5. Is the regime resilient to change -has it withstood crisis? How is it vulnerable?
6. Are there other ways you think would improve marine mammals management in Alaska?
Questions for hunters and other resource users:
1. What marine mammals do you hunt or work with and how long have you done this?
2. How have things changed since you began?
3. Are you getting as much as you need?
4. Are you involved in the [insert appropriate board]? What do you think about their work?
5. How often and in what way do you interact with NMFS or USFWS?
6. Please tell me about your experiences with either or both agencies.
7. What do you think are the biggest problems facing marine mammals and communities who harvest marine mammals?
8. Do you know of any governmental or local groups addressing these problems?
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Social Network Survey
Survey No.DateWhoAgeOccupationGenderInterviewed by
Survey of whaling captains / polar bear hunters
1. If you had a concern about whaling / polar bear harvesting rules, who would you talk to?
a. How often do you talk to them?
None Some A lot
b. Would you say that you tend to give them more info, they give you more info, or about the same?
You give You get About the same
c. W hat kind of information do you give/receive and are you satisfied with this level o f interaction and the quality of information?
2. If you had a concern about whale / polar bear health or saw them somewhere you’re not used to seeing them, who would you talk to?
a. How often do you talk to them?
None Some A lot
b. Would you say that you tend to give them more info, they give you more info, or about the same?
You give You get About the same
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c. What kind of information do you give/receive and are you satisfied with this level o f interaction and the quality of information?
3. If you had a concern about industry and whales /  polar bears, who would you talk to?
a. How often do you talk to them?
None Some A lot
b. Would you say that you tend to give them more info, they give you more info, or about the same?
You give You get About the same
c. What kind of information do you give/receive and are you satisfied with this level o f interaction and the quality of information?
4. a. Do you think that overall, harvesting rules for whales /  polar bears are made fairly?
b. If  you had concerns, do you think that your concerns would be addressed in making harvest rules?
c. Do the harvest rules protect whales / polar bears?
d. Is traditional knowledge used in creating harvesting rules?
5. a. Do you think that overall, rules for protecting whale / polar bear habitat and monitoring health are made fairly?
b. I f  you had concerns, do you think that your interests and concerns would be addressed in these rules?
c. Do these rules protect whales / polar bears?
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d. Is traditional knowledge used in creating these rules?
6. a. Do you think that overall, rules for whales and industry are made fairly?
b. If  you had concerns, do you think that your interests and concerns would be addressed in these rules?
c. Do these rules protect whales / polar bears?
d. Is traditional knowledge used in creating these rules?
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Agency Culture Survey July 2008
University of Alaska Fairbanks survey on collaborative resource management
Dear Resource Management Professional:
We would like to invite you to participate in a University of Alaska survey examining the goals and success of collaborative resource management in Alaska. Your insight is critical in our understanding of what makes for successful resource management. In the survey we ask a variety of questions relating to your opinion as an employee of a natural resource management agency.
The information you provide will be anonymously reported to the researchers. Your email address and identity will not be associated with your answers and will be erased after the survey ends. In addition, as your participation is voluntary, you may end the survey at any point.
If you have any questions about this survey, please contact study author Chanda Meek at chanda.meek@uaf.edu.
The survey will take approximately 20 minutes to answer. If you agree to participate, please start with the 
survey now by clicking on the Continue button below.
This survey is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under OPP grant number 0612523. The authors are solely responsible for its content.
Which agency do you work for?
> J  National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries)
O  U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 
* .1 U.S. Geological Survey 
O  Alaska Department of Fish & Game 
•O Alaska Department of Natural Resources
PART I: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT
The purpose of this part of the survey is to characterize the culture of your agency. In this study, we define organizational culture as the shared set of knowledge, assumptions and beliefs your group uses 
to guide its decision-making and priorities. In the following questions, you are asked to mark how well each statement reflects your organization. There are no right or wrong answers.
To determine which organization to rate, you will want to consider the section to which you belong (for instance: the Division of Fisheries and Ecological services in the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the Sustainable Fisheries Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service, or the Sport Fish Division of the Alaska Department of Fish & Game).
DIRECTIONS: In the following questions, divide 100 points among these four alternatives depending on the extent to which each alternative is similar to your own organization. Give a higher number of points to the alternative that is most similar to your organization. For example, if you think choice A is very similarto your organization, B and C are somewhat similar, and D is hardly similar at all, you might give 55
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points to choice A, 20 points to B and C, and five points to D. Just be sure your total equals 100 points 
for each question.
A. The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share j ' a lot of themselves.
B. The organization is a very dynamic entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their j~
necks out and take risks. ___
C. The organization is very results oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. !” People are very competitive and achievement oriented.
D. The organization is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally f  
govern what people do.
Leadership in your organization is generally considered to exemplify...
A. mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. f
B. policy entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk-taking. j
C. a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus. j
D. coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency. j~
The management style in the organization is characterized by...
A. teamwork, consensus, and participation.
B. individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.
C. driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement.
D. security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in
The social glue that holds the organization together is...
A. loyalty and mutual trust. Commitment to the organization runs high.
B. commitment to exploration, innovation and development of new approaches to resource 
management.
C. the emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment.
D. formal rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.
The organization emphasizes...
A. human development. High trust, openness, and participation persist.
B. acquiring new resources and taking on new challenges. Trying new things and adapting 
organizational strategies are valued.
C. outcomes and achievement. Accomplishing measurable goals is important.
D. permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.
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O ur organization defines success on th e  b as is  of the.
A. development of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for people.
B. finding and pursuing innovative solutions to resource management problems. It is an adaptive organization.
C. gaining broad public and/or political support for the work of the organization. Public trust in j its expertise is key.
D. efficiency. Standard procedures, internal production of information and expedited review are ! 
critical.
When dealing with uncertainty, the organization...
A. looks inward to develop a unified approach to the problem through staff expertise.
B. finds and pursues new or alternative methods of solving problems.
C. builds external support for its approach and monitors its progress in solving the problem at 
hand.
D. turns to standard procedures, internally produced information, and efficiently executes its plan.
When seeking information, our organization...
A. uses information developed internally or by trusted colleagues.
B. seeks out, accommodates and utilizes new sources and kinds of information about resource j management issues.
C. surveys our information needs and develops usable information through standardized 
methods.
D. pursues its management strategy using existing methods and information deemed critical to our mission.
When working with stakeholders, our organization...
A. develops solutions to resource management issues through a trusted group of employees 
and allies.
B. pursues and develops innovative stakeholder partnerships for working through resource management issues.
C. builds support from stakeholder partners who we work with to implement and monitor our 
preferred solutions to resource management issues.
D. works with stakeholders to the extent that standard procedures and efficiency allow.
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How would you describe your agency's culture?
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